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INTRODUCTION
Throughout the. ninateenth century wany Americans imagined that
East Asia was a land of cruel varlords, opium dens, heathen temples and
masses of unwashed coolies. Now and then businessmen dreasned of vast
and untapped m-arkets, and missionaries conceived bold plans to
convert
Asians to Christienity . Travelling journalists found Asia a source for
strange and exotic tales which perpetuated the mysteries of the
East for
the reading public. Asians living in the United States could
do little
to alter the negative stereotypes. Working long hours for
meager wages,
they wore considered a menace to American labor. Moreover,
they retained
their Oriental customs, refused to cut off their pigtails
and congregated
in what /iniericans believed to be evil and filthy
ChiaaCowns
America's popular image of the Orient ren'.ainec1 largely
unchanged
by the 1890's. Ihea in the early surnr.ar of 1894
China and Japan declared
war, r.«ssxng their amrles in the small kingdom of
Korea. Americans
became intensely interested. "Whatever be the issue
of the present
conflict," one conte.nporary observed, "it is likely
that A...ericans will
know .-.ore of Chinese Asia during the next six
n,onths than they have ever
cared to iearu before."^ They studied
hastily-written books and articles
on Asian history, politics, art and economics.
Ihey looked into fasci-
nating analyses of the "Oriental mind." Ti.ey
searched their maps for
Seoul, Chemulpo and other cities mentioned in
stirring newspaper accounts
of the early fighting. The Mi XS^k Tril^e noted in December 1894
that
"in the year just closing Asia has. for the first
time In a generation.
2been the scene of the world's chief interest. It alone is
sufficient to
^3
roake 1894 an ever-memorable year."
American interest was remarkable in view of the important
domestic
concerns. A terrible depression, accented by battles
between strikers
and soldiers, seemed likely to endure for years.
Aniericans feared the
B,enaces they perceived in immigration, socialism and
Populism; but they
were angry too over an economy monopolized by the
trusts. Arguments
over gold silver money daily grew more intense,
while discontented
groups agitated for reforms. One llassachosetts
Democrat warned President
Grover Cleveland in July 1894 that theae new forces
threatened to under-
=,ine the two-party system and might bring about
a violent revolution.
••Populisra. Coxeyism. and Debism are all of a piece."
he explained, and
they proposed to destroy the An^erican system."^
Ihese dcnestic crises
and frustrations, according to historian Richard
Hofstadter, may have
been important in turning the attention of
Americans to foreign affairs
during the 1890's, as a welcome and excitins
diversion from the con-
5
plexities of trying tiraes.
Cleveland's second administration, however,
could scarcely be
called dramatic in its conduct of foreign
policy. It had instigated
.inor interventions in Bra.il and Nicaragua,
but by 1894 it v.. being
called "cowardly" through its contrast to
the adventurous spirit of the
preceding administration. Benj«.ln Harrison and
hie Secretary of State
. PN-cited over foreign affairs
James G, Blaine had kept the Aiiiericau
^chUz exciteci c. x
for several years. Harrison's war scar,
-with Italy ha. h.rdly subsided
in 1891 when the .urder of two An.erican
sailors in Valparaiso threatened
to lead to war with Chile. A rebellion
by Americans living in F.waii
3promised for a time to result in American annexation of the islands.
Yet, despite Harrison's efforts, Congress postponed passage of his
annexation bill; it was still pending when Cleveland entered the \Tnite
House in Il^.rch 1893.
Cleveland's victoi^ in 1892 V7as due partly to his long-f tanking
reputation for honesty and morality in government. "It is better to be
defeated battling for an honest principle than to v/in by covjardly eubter-
6
fuge," he told his follo:7ers. Cleveland campaigned by criticising the
corruption and belligerency of the Republicans, promising not only
financial and civil service reform^ but also the return to a less
aggressive and less dangerous foreign policy- Cleveland consistently
assured An-^ericans that his foreign policies would be based on "conscience,
justice, peace, and neutrality," while "rejecting any share in foreign
7
broils and ambitions upon other continents."
Cleveland's choice for Secretary of State, Walter Quintin Gresham,
fully concurred with the President's foreign policy objectives. An
Indiana Revpublican, Judge Greshasi had grown increasingly unhappy with
the corruption in his party. In 1892, he abandoned the Republicans and
supported Cleveland, realising that in all probability he had ended his
political career. When the President-elect asked him to become Secretary
of State, Gresham hesitated, fearing that his appointment would be criti-
cized as a political deal. But Cleveland assured Gresham that because
of his "sturdy regard for political duty" and his "supreme sincerity and
disinterestedness," he would contribute a vital service to his nation as
the head of the State Department. Gresham accepted and travelled to
Washington with a fcr\'ent intent to justify Cleveland's faith in him.
Though a novice in foreign affairs, Greshatn applied his background
and knowledge of lav; and domestic politics to the formulation of foreign
policies. He believed that in international relations there was right
and wrong, good and evil; some policies were legal, others illegal, A
diplomat was be^it served by his unswerving allegiance to principle. In
1894 he wrote a close Indiana friend that his foreign policies would
oppose expaitsion into the Prxific, as well as the creation of a large
army and navy. Never, for instance, v?ould Greshasi condone a foreign
policy which aiiiied to enhance the deals and intrigues of business
interests. Amarican ccrnnierce Must proceed according to the v/orkings
of honest laissex-faire economics. A high tariff fostered a nurabcr
of evlle and must be lowered or abolished to ensure friendly relations
9
between the United States and all other nations.
The pending legislation concerning the annexation of Hawaii
presented Cleveland and Gresham with their first najor foreign policy
decision. Ihe President, prompted by Gresham, urged the Senate to delay
action until his special corrmissioner , James H. Blount, could complete
an investigation of the recent Hawaiian revolution. Blount discovered
"irnproper" involvement on the part of the American minister in Honolulu,
and this confirmed Gresham' s suspicion that the revolution had been
engineez-ed by "iirjnoral" Aiaerican business interests in Hawaii. Tne
Secretary of State advised Cleveland to abandon annexation and restore
the legitiniate government to power. Ihough restoration of the former
regime failed, the President dropped the annexation treaty. Cleveland
jusrlfi-d hU. decision by blaming Harrison and the Republicans for
having manufactured the Hawaiian problem, thereby initiating a virulent
Viipat-tisan debate over the direction of American foreign policy vhich
lasted throughout Clevelaad's entire second terra. Influenced by the
need to provide a clear contrast with Republican foreign policy as well
as by their ovn backgrounds, Cleveland and Greshain adopted policies
V7hich, through incessant enunciation, appeared non-aggressive, anti"
irr.perialist
,
straightforward and mindful of the rights of all nations.
As Sino-Japanese hostilities began in East Asia in 1894, the
prospGCt of titanic battles between battleship fleets and huge amies
was enough, in itself, to capture the interest of the American public.
Had Benjarain Harrison still been President, the audience might well
have e^ipoctcd heightened drama in the for^n of some American connection
with the wiir. llo such policy, hov?ever, could be expected from the
current leadership; and no one was surprised when Cleveland and Gresham
announced a policy of "strict neutrality."
Having understood that their government would be strictly neutral,
Americans were startled in June of 1894 when they learned that United
States marines and naval personnel had landed at Chemulpo, Korea, and
marched some thirty miles to the capital at Seoul. A few months later
the marines were in China, fully expecting to fight their way to Peking.
American warships crisscrossed the Gulf of Chihli on urgent missions,
while gunboats defiantly steamed on China's rivers- Americans fought
in belligerent warships, sold arms to belligerent armies and accompanied
those armies as observers and reporters. Cleveland's diplomats
took
sides in spy ca-=>es, disputes over belligerent property, matters of
local
politics, peace negotiations and other imbroglios forced upon them
by
their government's energetic conception of neutrality. Obviously
there
6could be no real neutrality, much les:; indifference toward the war. With
so many Americans on the scene with so confysins an assortment of roles
to fulfill, the plr^y of circumstances alone was enough to produce
undesired involvements on one side or the other.
The history of America's response to the "Pigtail V/ar" has long
been neglected. It is important because it sheds light on the question
of American economic interests in Asia and because consideration of the
strains of public opinion which it evoked can contribute to an under-
standing of general /^r.erican attitudeo in the 1890's. More significantly,
however, it provides insight into an embarrassing and even dangerous
early American involvement in Asia. These entanglements in this far
distant war were unintended and unplanned, deriving from a diplomacy
vhich priced good intentions sbove professional experience and ability;
a tendency to act first and worry later; a Kathod which often created
corr^idtments at some point prior to careful analysis of the issues
involved
.
CHAPTER I
THE KOREAN CRISIS OF 1894
Few Americans in 1894 could locate Korea on the map. They
admitted that this ssTiall Asian country vas one of the least knovri
areas of the world. Knovledge of the "Hermit Klngdosi" was acquired
largely through the press and fron^ columnists such as Frank George
Carpenter. Carpenter, given only a year to live in 1883, survived to
fonn his own news syndicate in 1888. An eiiiaciated little nan attired
In over-sized suits and broad -brimmed hats v;hich slipped do--m over his
ears, he began a series of world travels, sending articles back to
fifteen leading newspapers.
In 1894 Carpenter toured China, Japan and Korea, becoming the
first American nevspaperman to view the Korean crisis. He portrayed
"queer old Corea" as a land of oriental mystery, strange aln^ond-cyed
beauties and weird tortures. Peering through his gold-rimiued glasses,
Carpenter examined Korean life in great detail. He visited prisons,
explaining to American readers the "con^on practice" of "paddling,"
whereby a prisoner's skin was ripped from his body. He interviewed
Korea's "squeezers" who made rail lions by taxing an already ir^poverished
people. Carpenter travelled through the countryside and obs-r.rved the
potential wealth of the kingdom. He wrote in his syndicated columns that
"the gold mines of Korea turn out from two to three million dollars*
worth of dust and nuggets every year, and practically nothing but placer
7
8. . . ,
„1
mining is done.
Other American journalists, farther from the scene, discussed
Korea in more general terras. Tney pictured '*semi**savagc'* Koreans as
being primitive as the "Thlinklits or the Quichias, or the Patagonians."
Americans read that Koreans were "queer people" and that Korea, ruled
by an effeminate king and a chain-smoking queen, was a "queer country."
Korea--in the view of VJilliam Randolph Hearst, who was editor of the
Francisco Examiner in 1894--"is as near to an absolute noaentity as
any aggregation of ten taillion people could possibly become without
flickering out of existence. It is a colorless and feeble copy of
2
China."
Asnong the several hundred AsiiericaxiS in Korea in 1894 were repre-
sentatives of the cnuill trading finr/of Morse ^ Tovnisend, several
military and administrative advisers to the Korean king and perhaps two
3
^
hundred niissionarie£--ir.ostly Presbyterians and Methodists. The most
prominent American was diplomat-missionary Horace Newton Allen. Shortly
after his arrival in Korea in 1884, Allen had won the confidence of the
royal family by saving the life of the Quaen's nephew, who had been
severely slashed by an assassin's sword. Allen scon became entangled
in Korean factional struggles, assassinations and international
rivalries. Ihe weak king relied on the A^^erican's advice and in 1887
4
sent him to Washington to establish a Korean legation.
11-iis Prei:byterian medical irissionary proinoted the United States
as Korea's special friend. He had attempted to interest American
businessmen in Korea and had received the Harrison administration's
assurance that the United States would pursue an assertive policy in
9that kingdom. Although critici^;ed by the Cleveland administration for
Keddling in Korean politics, /illen*s interpretation of American-Korean
relations generfdly satisfied most contemporaries familiar with Asian
politics. Dr. H. N. Allen, Carpenter wrote, "will go dov?n into history
as one of the greatest of our diplomats- He has done more good for
Corea than any man ever connected with the United States legation."
Allen based his view of Korean-American connections on the
assumption that the United States had opened the "Hermit Kingdom*' to
foreigners. Ihe United States had, in fact, followed Japan* s path-
breaking treaty of 1876 with its own Treaty of Amity and Corrnierce in
1882, which left cut mention of China's claim to Korea. When the United
States sent a fully-accredited minister to Seoul in 1887, Allen assumed
that his country supported Korean independence. Thus, the United States
had placed itself beside Japan as the upholder (symbolically, at least,
in the light of Airtsrica's weak power position in Asia) of Korean
independence. Furthermore, the American treaty implied opposition to
China's traditional relationship with Korea, a tributary state to which
China had provided protection in return for virtual control ever Korean
politics. It was possible, therefore, for some journalists to predict
that the United States would becotiie involved in the struggle soon to
6
occur between China and Japan over Korea.
Contact between China and Japan on the Korean peninsula was deeply
rooted in the past, but the causes of the 1894 crisis resulted froni
several more iiitrnediate factors. The maturation and consolidation of
JaX^an's nodernisaticn program during the 1870' s and iSSO's had cata-
pulted her into direct confrontation with China and Russia in East Asia.
10
Msny Japanese politicians favored a gradual and measured approach to
power, preferring the use of diplomacy to strengthen their economic
and political position in Korea and to revise their hated extra-
territorial treaties vlth VJestern powers. Thus in 1884 when a Japanese-
backed Korean rebellion had failed, Japan had outmaneuvered the Chinese
protectors of the anti-Japanese faction through the Li-Ito Convention
signed at Tientsin the following year. The Tientsin Convention not
only indemnified Japan for her property and personal losses in Korea
during the abortive insurrection, but indirectly acknowledged China's
recognition of Japan's equal status in Korea,
Then in 18'?1 Japanese policy in Korea faced a new threat vhcn
Russia announced it vould build a trans-Siberian railway. This corapli-
cated Japan's gradualist policy and gave strength to militant opponents
of gains through diplomacy. By 1894 advocates of a more vigorous
program forced several dissolutions of the Eouse of Representatives of
the Imperial Japanese Diet, and some observers predicted that the violent
debates could lead to revolution. Others believed only a great foreign
8
adventure could bring the country together.
The murder of a pro-Japanese Korean refugee, Kim Ok-kyun, in-
tensified the Japanese political crisis. Kim had found refuge in Tokyo
efter the abortive Eouet_e of 1884 and h^d become the rallying point for
Japan's designs in Korea. In late March 1854 a supposed frieiid lured
Kim to a Japanese hotel in the foreign concession of Shanghai and
murdered hir<c Despite ill-advised intervention by Horace Allen, a
Chinese gunboat brought Kim's body back tc be "hung, drawn and quartered
and the. head, feet and hands exposed to public view at different places."
11
Tiie Chinese treated Kim's murderer as a patriotic hero and applauded
attempts by Korean agents to murder another political refugee in
Tokyo. Japanese police blocked the latter plot, but the damage had
9
already been done.
While the Kim af^^air increased Japanese hatred of China and
strengthened the war party, the actual catalyst for conflict was an
insurrection by the fanatical Korean nationalist sect, the Tongbak^Tang
.
The Tonghaks were founded in 1860 by the Korean prophet, Ch'oe Che-u,
who preached a doctrine comprised of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism
called the "Eastern Learning," or Tonghak. Although Ch'oe's execution
several years later drove the movement underground, his disciples kept
its spirit alive. In 1893 it reappeared with political and national-
istic overtones to protest the corruption and burdensome taxation
perpetrated from Seoul. Tae revitalized Tonghak blamed foreign influence,
particularly Christian and Japanese, for Korea's problems. Tonghak
banners called for the reorganisation of Korean society on the "principle
of Confucian virtue,'' the elimination of the "Japanese barbarian" and
10
the exterraination of corrupt nobles and officials in Seoul.
The Korean king ignored Tonghak petitions and in the spring of
1894 the cult rebelled, dragging most of the southern provinces into
the insurrection. An American missionary in Korea wrote to a friend,
"I suppose there are no less than 50,000 men in ChuUaDo (a southern
province) who have revolted and many of them are armed.
"'^^ In May the
rebels threatened the capital, and the King, pressured by the Chinese,
asked China for assistance in quelling the Tonghak rebellion. Japan,
citing the joint-action provision of the Tientsin Convention of 1885,
12
also responded by sending cavalry, artillery and infantry into Korea.
Large bodies of Chinese and Japanese soldiers rov; faced each other in
Korea and refused to withdraw. "It was the story of Tunis over again,"
observed W. A. P. Martin, the most prominent American scholar in China
and head of Tungwen University, "when French coming to fight Krourairs
seized the Bey and declared him independent of Turkey. China was not
as apathetic as the Ottoman and both parties, perceiving the real issue,
pushed fonjard their troops as fast as their ships could carry them,
their ostensible object v;as to annihilate the Tunghaks /.sic7s their real
12
ains to settle at once and forever the question of Chinese supremacy."
The beleaguered Korean king looked for foreign assistance to
prevent a clash of the two Asian giants on his territory. He turned to
his old friend the United States. During the early stages of the Kim
and Tonghak affairs, with the exception of Allen's intervention, AiTiericans
had served merely as observers and reporters. The American ministers to
Korea and Japan, respectively John H. B. Sill and Ed'.;in Dun^ with
^assistance from Horace Allen, had kept the State Department informed on
both crises. Allen particularly hoped to use the Korean situation to
opan a new wedge for American influence in East Asia.
In 1894 it took six weeks or more for diplomatic dispatches to
travfC-1 from Seoul by stcaraer across the Pacific to San Francisco and
then on to Washington. Of course one could use the cable-"either the
povthern line through Shanghai, Indie, Malta, Gibraltar, Lisbon and under
the Atlantic to New York; or the northern line across Russia, Europe,
13
London and then on to New York. But this vas expensive and the
Department discouraged use of the cable except in emergencies. Thus,
Araerican ministers faced with crucial decisions often acted first and
requested instructions later.
As the Tonghak rebellion spread in Korea, Sill urged American
missionaries to leave their scattered posts in the interior and seek
safety in Seoul. He called for an American gunboat to visit Chemulpo,
Seoul's harbor. The American Asiatic fleet consisted of one protected
cruiser, the Bal_^imore, then in Nagasaki, Japan; and the old Civil VJar
gunboat, the Monocacy , considered unseaworthy by her officers and crev;.
The reiaaivider of the sniall Asiatic squadron V7as guarding the seals in
the Bering Sea or rusting in the Mare Island Naval Shipyard. Sill
begsed the Commander of the Asiatic fleet, Rear-Admiral Joseph S.
Skerrett, to send the Ba l timore to Chemulpo. Skerrett wrote back that
these little disturbances in Korea usually burned theraselves cut and
that the local authorities could take care of the situation. Skerrett,
considered by some a "travesty in the An/^erican/ Navy," refused to leave
his wife and daughter at Nagasaki for the sake of a few missionaries in
Korea.
Meanwhile, other pressures were being placed on the United States
government to send a warship to Korea. Allen convinced the King that
the United States would be an ir'.partial arbiter of Korea's troubles and
on June 1 the Korean monarch wired his minister in Washington to request
that Secretary of State Gresham send an Anerican toan-of-war to Chemulpo.
GreshM asked Hilary Abner Herbert, Secretary of the Navy, "whether a
VftsBcl may convenietttly be sent to that point for the protection of our
14
Legation and citizens of the United States residing there and to
express the hope of the Department that this course may be followed if
14practicable."
The final decision rested with the President. On June 2,
Grovcr Cleveland called in Actiiig Secretary of the Navy William McAdoo,
vho told him that the Bal timore,, famous for having nearly started a
var with Chile under the previous administration, was only forty-eight
hours away from CheTnulpo. Cleveland delayed; he had promised in his
campaign to tone dov7n Harrison's foreign policies and he was already
plagued by strikes, tariff revision and doatestic unrest. His Hav/aiian
policy was still under attack and Latin American problems threatened
to entangle the United States- Should he become involved in Korea as
veil? The President, called by his friend and biographer George F-
Parker "one of the strongest advocates I have ever known of the
missionary cause," knew that a number of American religious workers
resided in Korea. Indeed, on that same day the Naw York Tribune
reported that the lives of "300 to 400" Americans were in danger.
Taking these factors into consideration, Cleveland decided to send the
1
5
Baltimore to Chemulpo,
As the 4,400-tcn flagship steamed out of Nagasaki, the King of
Korea forv/arded his request for Chinese soldiers to help suppress the
Tonghaks. Between 1,500 and 2,000 foreign-drilled Chinese regulars,
part of powerful Chinese official Li Ilung-chang's private amy, were
dx57;2tched to China's alleged tributary- According to the American
consiul in Tientsin, site of Li's headquarters, China had promptly noti-
fied Japan, In compliance V7ith the Convention of 1885, thst it was
15
eending troops to assist Korea*^^
Tae Japar.ese govemment, increaGingly vilified by its political
opposition at home, decided to use this Chinese action as an excuse for
a concerted effort to wrest control of Korean politics away from China
and to block Russian expansion into Korea. Mutsu Munemitsu, the
Japanese Foreign Minister, advised Japan's minister in Washington on
June 7 of his decision to deploy troops in Korea and this lucssage was
relayed to Gresham the next day.^'
During this interval the Baltimore arrived in Cheinulpo, For the
first few days Rear-Admiral Skerrett, Minister Sill and their staffs
discussed the Korean situation. Sill concluded that the rebellion had
collapsed because of the "salutary Koral Effect" of the v;arship, but
he warned Skerrett that if this proved untrue he would ask for a
18
legation guard. Soiaehov; Sill's correspondence with the State De*
partment on this subject reached the press. Tne Nev- York Tribune
assured its readers that it was Anierican intervention that had calmed
the rebellion. The arrival of the Baltic-ore and the "spreading of the
etars and stripes over helpless people," the Tribune announced, had
"indirectly assisted the Government by the moral effect of the ship's
.... ,.15presence at a critical juncture."
Ihe rebellion, although not suppressed, was no longer the central
problem in the Korean imbroglio. Inste.id, the rebellion's offspring,
involvement of Giinese and Japanese soldiers, had become the main ir.sue-
Tne Japanese had occupied the road to Seoul, fortified their positions
increased their legation guard. They seemed prepared to press
their opportunity. The North Chj^iia Kexald noted that 6,000 Japanese
16
troops had massed at Hiroshira«i and vondered: "Is insignificant Corea
destined to prove the pan for tVie preparation of the flash of po%;der
20
that Is to set the world abla2e?*'
A sense of foreboding enianated from the American legations in
Seoul and Tokyo, Foreign Minister Mutsu tried to convince seasoned
diplomat Edwin Dun in Tokyo that Japanese troops were merely protecting
property and lives in Korea and vould not cnuse trouble. Nevertheless,
Dun inforiiied Gresham on June 15 that "it is impossible to believe that
CO large a force is required in Korea for the protection of Japan's
legation, consv^latcs and subjects inasmuch as she already has in Korean
21
pdrts ten ships of war." Sill shared Dun's concern and wondered
V7hat Japan's ''ulterior purpose'* could ha in Korea. The American
minister raised the qtiestion of granting asyluai to the Korean king and
clainied that Japan could not pull out of the country without "losing
face." "Some irresponsible outx^ago coirunitted by a Chinaman on a
Japanese, or vice versa," Sill concluded, "might be the beginning of a
22
deplorable contest on Korean ground."
VJliile American diplomats debated the future of Korea, Ch^ulpo
vas fast becoming an international rendezvous. Japanese, Chinese,
British 5 Russian, German, French and Anierican ships steamed in and cut
of Seoul's anchorage. The Japanese methodically unloaded war materiel--
troops, hors36, mountain artillery > mortars and rice, the wide mud
flats at the. snouth of the Man River made unloading difficult and
suppll^ir piled up on the beach. But the efficient Japanese controlled
everything and representati veo of other nations could only take notes
for their military reports.
17
The Japanese stated that they would not vithdraw their soldiers
until China joined Japan in a program of economic and adsr.inistrs.tive
reform for Korea. Unwilling to share responsibility with the Japanese,
China rejected this proposal. Gozo Tateno, the Japanese minister in
Washington, told First Undersecretary Edvjin F. Uhl that the "situation
23
may become very serious." The Korean crisis had reached an irnpasse
and new initiative vjcs needed.
The United States, first Western power to sign a treaty with
Korea, made an attempt to preserve peace in Korea. Cleveland felt
obligated to offer /anerican good offices in the crisis. On July 22 Uhl
cabled Sill that "in the view of the friendly interest of the United
States in the welfare of Korea and its people, you are by direction of
the President instructed to v.vo. every possible effort for the preser-
vation of peaceful conditions.
"^^ Cleveland assumed sole responsibility
for this message. Greshara was not in his office, leaving Uia in
charge
of the Department. And, as Cleveland later told Congress. "I felt
constrained at the beginnins of the controversy to tender our good
offices to induce en sxiicable arrangement of the Japaiiese demands for
administrative reforus in Korea." The President added that he was
Kotivated by the desire to preserve "our cosr^nercial interests" and
to
insure the "safety of our citizcn.s" in Korea." With coEMBercial
interests limited to one sniall firm. Cleveland's ..otives
probably ste^ie
mainly frora his concern for the missionaries. And his desire
to "use
every pos.^ible effort" in the cause of peace foreshadowed
America's
overly-energetic neutrality in the months ahead.
The President's policy statement soon faced a severe
test. On
18
June 24 Sill cabled Uhl that the Korean king had solicited American
intervention in asking for the removal of Japanese troops from his land
Sill, believing cooperation to be the only realistic policy in Asia,
had already joined with Great Britain, Russia and France, the
"Caucasian" representatives in Seoul , requesting mutual Sino-Japsaese
troop withdrawals. Ttie Minister also had prondsed the King asylum in
the American legation and had convinced Skerrett to delay departure of
26
the Balt3.roore»
John Mahelm Berry Sill, former principal of the Michigan State
Komal School and an ordained minister, was devoted to his President
and had accepted his duty as minister to Korea as a grave responsi-
bility. Kc accepted Cleveland's instructions— to use every possible
effort to preserve peace and protect ABcricans---v/lthcut reservation.
It Kiattered little to Sill that Cleveland had only a vague Idea of
diploniatic complexities in Korea. Hie Russians were plotting to
strengthen their position in Korea and China; while the British, in
order to maintain their trade supreiracy in the Asian market, were
seeking to avert war. The French and Germans ware exploitiP.g every
opportunity to increase their influence in Asia, and China was casting
about for allies, with unofficial Prime Minister Li Kung-chang playing
one power against the next. Into this tangle of intrigue, Cleveland
interjected his vague, if high-minded, principles.
Cleveland's Secretary of State was destined to entangle the
United States even more deeply in Asian politics. Greshan^'s
restraint
during the Hawaiian annexation debate indicated that he would
avoid
American involvesr.ent in Korea. Yet. toW the end of June 18S4. he
grew intensely interested in Korean affairs. On the 29tb he cabled Dun
in Tokyo to discover what Japan planned in Korea. At the sams tima the
Secretary told a reporter that "the United States did not exercise any
protectorate over Corea, and that the most this Govermasnt could do in
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any event would be to tender its offices to settle the difficulty.
During the next few days Greshara received British, Chinese and
Korean requests fov diplc:;atic intei-ventioa in the; Korean problem. The
Korean representative in Ifashington relayed a tclegrain from Seoul cn
July 5 which begged Gresham to "please ask the President of the United
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States to adjust the difficulty." Greshaia wavered, fearing
entanglements. Itisn in a private discussion with the Japanese minister,
Gozo Tateno, Greshcm learned that Japan was v?illing to risk v?ar with
China over Korea.
Meetin3 with Tateno behind closed doors at the State Department,
Gresham asked why Japan voBld not withdraw its soldiers froa
Korea,
rne Japanese minister gave the official answer that the
troops were
there to protect Japan's interests and would leave when
domestic reforms
were made. Disclaiiaing any American intent to intervene,
Greshatn asked
if Japan would respect Korean independence. The
r.inister replied that
Japan had no designr. on Korean territory. "I suppose.
Kr. Minister,
your Governr^ent is watching China more than Korea."
Greshain Inquired,
"and that yo.. are looking to war more with the forr.er
than you arc with
the latter?" Tateno agreed. "Tb.at is correct.
Quv situation at home
is critical, and war with China would improve it by
arouaing the patriotic
sentin-ent of our people and more strongly attaching
them to the
„30
Gcverswient -
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Tateno's frank admij^sion of Japan's war plans shocked Gresham.
Torn between his reluctance to involve the United States and his belief
in the justice of Korea 'c request, the Secretary determined to do his
best for the helpless kingdom. On July 7 Gresham instructed Dun to
communicate the following message to the Japanese government:
The goverament cf the United States has heard with
sincere regret that although the insurrection has been
sv^ppresi^ed and peace prevails in Korea, Japan refuses to
withdra-v? her troops and demands that radical changes be made
in the domestic administration of Korea.
This demand is more remarkable in view of the fact that
China favors the simul taneouG withdrawal of both the Japanese
and Chinece troops. Cherishing sincere friendship for both
Japan and Korea, the United States indulge the hope that
Koreans independence and sovereignty v;ill be respected. You
are instructed to say to the Government at Tokyo that the
President will be painfully disappointed ehould Japan visit
upon her feeble and defenceless neighbor the horrors of an
unjust war.
ProiTipted by moral indignation, Greshr.rn ignored a more practical means
of preserving Korean independence* The United States could have
coope-^ated vjith Western powers in Seoul, as it was doing in China, in
the issuance of a joint note to Japan. Fearing involvement, Gresham
had turned dcvn requests for cooperation; now Tateno's revelation forced
him to pursue a policy which > in its own way, could bring about
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entanglements
.
Somehow the substance of Gresham* s cablegram reached the press.
Possibly William W- Rockhill, Third Assistant Secretary of State, who
was critical of Gresham^s uncertain Asian policy and who consorted with
top Republican opponents of the Secretary, was responsible for the
leakage. In any event, ca Jv.ly 18 Hear^t*s San Francisco Exsiaincr
reported that Gresham had made a '*gr£ve diplomatic blunder" by sending
21
the note to Japan. The Examiner also suggested that Gresham's
friendship with the Chinese minister in V/ashington had improperly
Influenced the Secretary of State. Whitelav? Reid's New York Tribune,
the leading Republican Party newspaper, attacked Gresham, calling him
a "meddler" and a "willing dupe" of the Chinese minister in alienating
Japan, America's friend and the most progressive country in Asia. "It
is plain that if Secretary Gresham has without any provocation abruptly
taken sides with Russia and China he has coirunitted an act v?hich can only
be adequately described by saying that he has made an ass of himself in
the State Department," added the K^rtford Post. Tne little four-page
Emporia, Kansas, Daily Ga:i:ett_e stopped attacks on the Populists long
enough to claim that all of Gresham's acts were blunders and no one
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should be surprised that he had committed another one.
More moderate press reactions were also critical of Gresham. The
Philadel phia Inquirer claimed that if authentic, the dispatch was "a
violation of the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine, for if we do not allow
other people to interfere in American affairs, we cannot expect them to
allow us to interfere in theirs, where we have no direct interest."
The independent S^^Mjiafi^ ILSEH^l^^ (Massachusetts), while admitting
that the attacks on the Secretary were political, still found fault
with
Gresham's policy, "Our interests are not likely to suffer if Japan
should gobble Corea or if Japan and China should fight to see which
should have the plum." In contrast, the Boston Globe maintained
that
34
Gresham should try even harder to avert war through arbitration.
Sensitive to press criticism and confused over the outburst
against
a policy he considered just, Crer.ham remained in his apartment at the
22
Arlington House and pondered the results of his note. Later, when he
received nsv/s that the British couguI and his wife had been molested by
Japaiicse soldiers in Seoul and that the Araarican minister had received
a diplomatic "sneer" in reply to his protests, the Secretary passed the
message on to Cleveland without comment but praised Dun for having
refused to present to Japan the protests Sill had uttered in conjunction
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with Russia, France and Great Britain.
Despite embarrassment and confusion concerning the Korean probleai,
Cleveland refused to revise his earlier instructions to Sill. This
strengthened the minister's resolve to use every possible effort to
preserve peace, including the employment of American armed forces. This
appeared out of the question with the only available force a handful of
marines on board the Baltimore. Yet Sill pressed Benjamin Franklin Day,
the new captain of the American warship, with the desirability of sending
ciarines to Seoul
.
Day, a career officer promoted through the ranks, opposed sending
his nien into the heat and disease of the Korean countryside. He not
only wanted to avoid incidents but also thoroughly disliked missionaries.
He wrote Sill, "In event of war between Japanese and Chinese,
there would
seem to be no reason for apprehending danger to Americans provided
they
attend to their own affairs." A Japanese attack on the royal
palace in
Seoul on July 22 provided Sill with another opportunity to
request a
legation guard. With the streets of Seoul filled with fleeing
refugees,
the mnister asked for a contingent of fifly men. Ke informed Greshan.
that the policy of "strict neutrality" necessitated
the emplo>-:nent of an
American guard since the use of an available Japanese
force would be
23
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regarded as an unfriendly act by China.
Day acquiesced and agreed to dispatch a legation guard. Unable
to locate, a pilot for his steam-launches, Captain of Marines George F.
Elliott elected to march his men overland the thirty-one miles to Seoul
rather than risk navigating the unkiiown Han River to the cspited . At
7 p.m. on the evening of July 23, American military personnel, each r<ian
arraad v;ith forty rounds of amvaunition, began an eleven -hour march through
Korean territory'. A Japanese guide assisted the fifty Americans along
narrow footpaths, over deep sand and through Kuddy rice fields. The
hurnid night and the heavy air exhausted Elliott's msn. They reached the
legation vjithout incident, hov7Qver, and were joined the following day
,
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by thirty- three additional men vho arrived by stean- launch.
Though Sill had his legation guard, his instructions to preserve
strict neutrality brought the minister into further disagreement vith
Captain Day. Sill claimed that the naval officer had disregarded
Aiaerican neutrality when he employed a Japanssa guide to bring up his
troops. Even worse, the earnest diplomat informed Day, the Japanese at
the head of the American column "boldly rode his horse into our Legation
gate," creating the impression among the "great crowds" present that
the
United States favored Japan. "This act added intensity to a growing
anti
Ai»erican feeling," Sill concluded. Day replied bitterly, "I don't
care
what nationality he is," and "for his bad manners in riding his
horse
through the Legation gate I atn in no way responsible, nor do I
regard
the fact that he did so a matter of political or any other
consequence
whatever
^
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Washington's instructions, hindered by delayed communications and
e vague and oversimplified view of the Korean situation, were
already
creating problems for American representatives in Asia. The following
months would bring further complications as the government sought
to
maintain its special conception of neutrality.
CHAPTER II
THE UNDECLARED KAR
Except for scattered press reports, the trouble in Korea had
received little public attention in the United States during June ^.nd
early July. Greshain's warning to Japan had generated some adverse
publicity but this vas largely conditioned by earlier anti-administrstion
criticism of Cleveland's policies in Hawaii, l^e deplo^Tiient of the
BsTtirnore in Korean waters and the landing of narines on Kore^in territory
elicited a number of coir-ments, due to the belief that the Korean
rebellion had collapsed as soon as the Ainerican v?arship had appeared on
the scene. Yet, despite tremendous Sino-Japanese troop concentration??
in Korea, few Ajr.ericans actually expected a major v?ar. For exaiirple,
the Kew Yoyli TriJ^une found "neither China nor Japan an:-cious to fight
1
about Corea."
Dispatches arriving from the American legation in Peking during
the spring of 1894 provided no indication that trouble was anticipated
in East Asia. The regular r.inister. Charles Denby, vas on leave in the
United States recovering from a kidney stone operation and his last
dispatch from China on March 16 had assured the State Department that
"the approaching sumr.ar will be quiet," since China wa.^ busy preparing
birthday celebrations for the Empress Dowager.^ Th-ou-h his appointrnent
by Cleveland in 1885 was a political reward, Colonel Denby had
become
e. reliable and hard-working representative of Ainerican interests
in
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China. He understood the Chinese people better than most vesterners
and for eight years the State Department had relied heavily on this
"old China hand" for information. VJhcn his friend Walter Qaintin
Gresham became Secretary of State in 1893, Denby's influence further
increfised. As Greshara vrote to his minister in England (Thoraas Francis
Bayard), "I wish all the States in the Union were full of such men."
But the years had softened the minister. Secure in his post, he
had permitted affairs to slide, relying more and more on his secretary,
Fleniing Duncan Cheshire, and on his son, Charles Jr. The senior Denby
left his son in charge of the Peking legation during his absence,
hoping to groom the young man as a future miniGter to China. The
younger Denby certainly posses.^sd the. potential to serve as minister.
For years this Princeton-educated scholar had studied the Chinese
language and institutions. On the other hand, he was stubborn and proud,
and, despite his inexperience, often refused to listen to advice from
his senior colleagues. Now, as crisis approached, this "callow youth"
vas in charge of American interests in China and he hesitated to report
4
on problems which might reveal his inexperience.
The Korean rebellion had served to focus the attention of
Washington on Asia and now the Department, worthing that young Denby
was not providing full information, requested fuller reports from other
diplomatic repreGcntatives in Asia. Consular agents replied that war
betvGcn China and Japan, with possible European intervention, might
occur at any time- On July 22 Sherid.nn P. Read wrote the Department
from Tientsin that the Chinese Emperor was "hot for war." The consul
warned that an Asian conflict would endanger American property and lives
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in China and suggested that a gunboat be seat to Tientsin. The
follo:-;ing day Consul -General Tiiomas R. Jernlgan cabled frora Shanghai
that "war appears inevitable." Indeed, Jernigan observed, the Chinese
threatened to close treaty ports to all shipping* Sill added that
although only "unauthenticated accounts" of land engagctnevits had
reached his legation, he knew "for a fact" that large Japanese forces
had inarched south from Seoul to engage the Chinese- Charles Denby Jr,
vas the last to report that conditions in China v?ere no longer tranquil.
Suggesting that the Chinese government had been humiliated by Japan's
earsy occupation of Seoul, he informed Gresham that "the Emperor and
conservative statesmen are eager for v;ar»"^
Fighting between Japan and China had already begun around Seoul.
Wliile aware of var ruaiors, even tho.^e Americans in the Icii^ediate
vicinity were uncertain as to the extent of hostilities. Captain Day,
still hoping to withdrav; his men frora the Korean capital, reported that
the Japanese had secured control of the area; but because of the inter-
ruption of telegraphic consnunications he did not know of any declaration
of war by either China or Japan- Meanwhile Marine Captain Elliott,
closer to Chinese and Japanese troop concentrations than any other
American, also groped for information. "Ihere is a rumor that war has
actually and formally been declared between Japan and China," Elliott
noted on July 28, and "if this is true, our governir.ent will of coitrse
6
be in possession of the official information."
But the governnsent had no information, official or othen;ise.
The Ch.inese and Japanese embassies in Washington could provide nothing
concrete, while the oi-ly nG-.v's reaching the American governsient during
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this interval of undeclared var came by delayed cables from Aitisrican
diplomatic and naval agents in Asia or from press releases originating
in Shanghai and transiaitted through the British-controlled cable. Tnis
problem of comraunications fostered uncertainty in Washington and
encusabered any official Aiiiarican response to the crisis.
Secretary of State Gresham, still resentful over the criticism
of his note to Japan, waited impatiently for news. Anxious to fonnulate
a policy, he could not do so until he understood the nature of the Sino-
Japanese confrontation. Rad var been declared? If so, the United States
of course v;ould resaain neutral, as it had in the Korean-Japanese affair
a month earlier. But what should the Aniarican attitude be t.Ci'.jard
selling anr.s to the belligerents in a state of undeclared war? Kow
long should the United States wait before offering its good offices to
mediate differences? Would the hostilities threaten American interests
in Asia, particul^^.rly the lives of missionaries? Should the United
States send additional military forces into the area?
Badly in need of guidance for his Asian policies, Greshasi
telegraphed Charles Dcnby, then convalescing froia his recent operation
at the Cadillac Hotel in Detroit. The Secretary urged Colonel Denby to
return to Peking. Aware of his old friend's pride and confidence in
his son, Gresham assured the senior Denby that: "Y6ur son will doubtless
look after our interests in China about as veil as you could," but the
President had "indicated that he thought it vould be veil if you vere
there." Both Gresham and Cleveland hoped to avoid en^barrassments
and
preferred that their trusted adviser return to coordinate the
American
7
diplomatic efforts in Asia.
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Though deteroilned to reraain neutral in the Sino-Japanese crisis,
Washington could not legally prevent the sale of var material to either
China or Japan until v/ar had been declared. In fact, both China and
Japaxi V7ere using the period of undeclared \^ar to purchase arms, ainirra-
nition and supplies in the United States and in Europe. Chinese
representatives could be sold anything, so long as it was lethal, and
New England arras raanufacturers reportedly did a brisk business. In
their indiscrirainate orders, pigtailed buyers seemed unaware that the
bullets had to fit the gun. "Most of the rnodern equipment of the Chinese
aririy vas made in Ncv; England," one Boston newspaper erroneously assumed,
"and guns and cartridges can be landed in China or Japan luore quickly
from New York tha'a frora any countr}? in Europe." Steamers in San
Francisco, as well on the East coast, tried to beat the declaration
of v;ar by hastily loading var supplies from the United States to be
8
shipped to Asia.
The state of undeclared var created other problems for the United
States govera^iient. The traditional dictum of freedom of the seas in
time of pe^^ce vas challenged when Greshaca learned that the Japanese were
searching all vessels arriving in Korean ports. Before the Secretaty
could study this issue, he received a telegram from Charles Denby Jr.
clarifying earlier reports that both China and Japan had requested
An^erican £ccd offices for the protection of their subjects and archives
in the other's country. Several days later this request was confin^cd
by Yans y", the Chinese minister in Washington, when he informed the
State Departvaent that:
^HlilHIl^
For the protection of the lives and property of the Chinese
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subjects in Japan the Chinese Governniant begs the United
States Government to allow that the United States Legation
and the Consulates at Japan my protect the Chinese in the
raid couritry during the absence of the Representative;^ of
^
the Chinese Govermaent at the time of var, if there be any.
The formulation of an Asian policy was complicated by the constant
reminder that the United States possessed only two ships in Asisn
waters, the Baltimore and the Honocacy « Pressure counted to send
additional v/arships. The llew Ot^eans Pic calling the currently
nebulous hostilities the "wsr in the Far West," considered Asia to be
an extension of the United States i\nd American gunboats to be forts on
the ne;-; frontier. "The United States has vcaay citizens resident in
China and Japan whose lives and property are likely to be imperiled by
the va-c," warned the Pica:SLIl§» "Pror.ipt steps should therefore be taken
to h.'^ivo sufficient forces of warships at the scene of the fighting as
speedily as possible." Other nevjspapers predicted that anti-foreign
riots, which were certain to occur throughout China as a result of the
fighting, would require the presence of American gunboats to restore
order-
10
Rumors persisted that tv.^o -women missionaries had already been
attacked in south China. Both Gresham and Cleveland, according to
speculation in the press, considered any attack upon a woman as an ,
especially heinous act. "A woman in trouble," Mrs. Gresham reuismbered
,
and "my hutjband would certainly side, with her against the pover, greed
and lust of num." Americans now wondered whether the "cowardly"
ad!);iiixstration would stand back and alio;? Christian voncn to be
slaughtered by the heathen Chinese.
Gresham' s first action was not to defend Americans in Asia but to
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protect Chinese and Japanese interests. On July 26 he sent cipher
telegrams to Charles Deiiby Jr. find Edvin Dun, instructing esch to ''act
£6 custodian" and "afford friendly offices for /.the/ protection /pf^/
Chinese Mnd Japanese/ subjects in Japan Mnd in China/; either directly
or through Consuls acting under your instructions but you vill not
represent China /and Japan/ diplomatically." Although writi.ng his
friend Yang Yu that he "took pleasure in instructing" the ministers to
afford miJtual protection, Greshstn's instructions raised some difficult
questions. Wouldn't the Amarican role place the United States in an
untenable position when the first conflict of interests occurred?
Would not the first incident, v?hcther in China or Japan, force the
abmidonsient of strict neutrality? Gresham overlooked such questions
and furtheraore his instructions assumed that a state of war existed
between China and Japan when in fact it did not. Even the Secretary
acknowledged this when ha asked Dun on July 29, "Has Japan declared
war, or coiar?3onced war?
While the State Department groped for a policy appropriate to an
undeclared war, the Asian crisis generated an increased number of news
stories and ever larger headlines in the United States. Detailed maps
of Korea, China and Japan accompanied lead articles, helping "inany people
brush up their rusty knowledge of Asiatic geography." Illustrations of
Cheiiailpo harbor and belligerent: warships suppleniented the laaps. Prints
of Li Hung-chang, strangely resembling an cmclatcd Grever Cleveland;
and the Ernperor of Japan, with his medals, epaulettes and European-styled
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uniforra, appeared on the pages of A.merican newspapers. Cartoons, vhich
included ape-like representations of Chinese and Japanese soldiers
pulling each other's long, braided pigtails, reflected a popular viex^
14
of the corabatants.
By the last veek of July articles and editorials vere investi-
gating what the San Francisco, Examner called "the true inwardness of
the Corean trouble." The Examiner concluded that "the fundamental causes
are the crowding of Western ways upon the Orient through Japan, and the
resentment of change by that ancient, austere and dignified despotism,
China." Ihe pro-Japanese Kew Orleans Picaxuns claimed that China's
opposition to a Japanese uiodernigation program prevented proaress in
Korea and caused the current trouble between the t\.'o countries. Ithe
Kew York Tirras, v?hile vary of Japanese ambitions in Asia, told its
readers that "there is reason to suppose that Japan is a better
friend
of the Coroans than China, and that, on the whole, there would ba
less
Interference with their home affairs under a virtual Japanese protector-
ate." The Kew York Herald, continuing a notion developed during
the
Korean affair, argued that "the time has come for Japan to
shov herself
worthy of her civilization and of her ambitions .... She is
in Korea
today for the benefit of the whole world, and her retlreiBent
therefrom
would be tar.taraount to allowing the Kerait Kingdom to sink
back to
Chinese barbarism.
"^^
Convinced of public f.iscination for the Asian crisis,
newspapers
discussed it with unconcealed anticipation. In a view
typical of the
He«t Coast, where excitement over Chinese inunigration
was especially
intense, the San Francisco Examiner predicted that the
United States
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would support vibrant, exciting Japan in a war vith China since "she
is the most progressive among the Oriental nations, while Chir.a is a
lethargic roass of repellent burbarism." Hie approaching war shared
space with the Pullman strike and Eugene V. Debs in the pages of several
inidwestem dailies. The £hicaf^ Tri_^in9, for example, argued that an
Asian catastrophe wotild lead to the consumption of more grain and wheat,
thus establishing "dollar wheat." in the Midwest. The Chicago Inter-
Ocean believed that war in Asia vould stimulate the American carrying
trade, while providing higher wages and more work for troubled Ainsrican
labor. But the paper concluded that war, which vould probably involve
Europe, would also greatly impoverish the world and ultimately hurt
the
16
United States.
A nuffiber of Eastern newspapers agreed that hostilities were
imminent and eagerly analysed the military forces of the two countries.
Ihe Atlanta Constitution claitisd that ".American sympathies are
doubtless
with the island; the Japanese are a bright, progressive people— the
Americans, so called, of Asia." In the northeast the Boston Globe
prominently displayed the columns of war correspondent Frank G.
Carpenter
and urged its readers to pay attention to events in Asia because
bloodthirsty China, the enemy of progress, would "not hesitate
to adopt
anything that might be invented" in the way of horrible weapons.
China
"could bring a gigantic ainny into the field" with her teeraing
population,
the Globe predicte-J. and "Europe may some day be ovcrinin
by a great
17
Chinese inundation."
The rising interest in Asia also prcnipted cultural
analyser, of
the coH.b..tants. 'Ihe loeaning of the Chinese and Japanese
civilisations.
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discussed In tha context of the yestern vorld and America's relation to
East Asia, V7as debated at length. The rhetoric of race consciousness
and Social Darwinism, so popular in the world of the late nineteenth
century, appeared in a number of articles, "The Japanese arc the real
Chinese," one writer enigmatically claimed in July 1894. "Tney
represent the best eleraents of the Mongol race" ... and "arc
close
rivals of; the best of the Caucasians." Another observer argued
that
"the Chinese and the Anglo-Saxon are thoroughly antagonistic."
Lafcadio llearn. an American writer and teacher who had adopted
Japan
as his own countr>', susgosted that Japan had undergone a
process of
„18
"Occid^ntf^lization" without upsetting its Oriental "race bram.
In their popular image as the "Yankees of the Orient,"
the
Japanese grew steadily taller and paler. Fe^ninist Helen H.
Gardener
noted that the United States naturalised "hundreds of low
and worthless
from European countries." vho vere not as "white" as the
Japanese.
Indeed Japan had adopted Western technology, education
and representa-
tive government and. as one source acknowledged,
studied Napoleon,
American history and the English language. Consequently
few Araericans
disagreed vith the New York Tribune when it claimed
that Japan should
be "ranked with America and the nations of Western
Europe, rather than
vith Asiatic countries.
Equating Japan vith An>erican idealr, of civilisation
and progress,
social reformers and intellectuals emphasized
Japan's strv^ggle for
justice in the fa^^ily of nations. Japan, they argued, had
passed tha
tests of Western civilisation and vas entitled
to take an equal place
beside other advanced nations. "Ihis little oasis
of progress in the
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Far East," airaounced Benjamin Orange Flov/er. reformist editor of
the
Arena. "s^^^"" ^ villingness ... to adopt vhc-.tever
the Western
civilization could offer %^hich was higher, better or more
helpful than
that v'hich they possessed." Therefore. Flo-..er
concluded, the United
States vas raorally obligated to revise its unequal
treaties with Japan
signed in Japan's "pre^civil i..ed" stage in 1858.
Flower compared
Japan's struggle for treaty revision vith the
ante-bellum abolitionist
crusade against slavery, and he proclaivaed that
treaty revision would
permit the enlightened and progressive political
groups to triurnph,
thus fulfilling Japan's natural evolutionary
progress to higher
20
civilization.
Efforts by Japanese-Americans supplemanted
this favorable view.
Ever)n.he>:e one looked. Japanese-Americans seemsd
to display that
fitridoBt style of patriotism and pride which
the American people could
understand. Young Japanese throughout the
United States raised
brigades "arn.ed with Arr^^rican rifles" and a
fervent intent to return to
Asia and fight the Chinese. Japanese fund-raising
can^paigns prospered,
with C.10.000 collected in San Frcncisco
alone. Tae. Japanese ccn^unity
i« Boston, though composed of students
too poor to contribute to the
war fund, displayed "appropriate" patriotic
.eal and confidence that
Japan would win the war. Japanese in Nev
York City aUo were admirably
confident as they mocked and laughed at the
clu.,sy Chinese. In so.e
parts o.e the count.T Americans and Japanese
cooperated in a boycott of
21
Chinese Icumdrics.
. . T«««*^ were tvjo condcruaing China,
For every vnriiiclc praising Japan there
^ ..^v/.*- im-»^ro£re33ive and on the verge
usually portraye<S as despotic, corrupt,
unprogre.oi
36
of revolution. Althoush some admitted that the Chinefse people had a
rich cultural history, most writers in 1894 accepted correspondent
Juliav^ Pvalph's view of the Chiisese as the Kagroes and Hobrevjs of the
Orient. Drawing on a fanciful version of black Ajnaricans as "Sambos,"
Ralph GlEilfirly described the Chinese. "One sang an endless comic
song . . . and all laughed as long as they were awake, when they vere
not wrestling or frolickins, or bandying repartee with the hsppy folk
22
on passing vessels and on the shore."
Ralph's observations were reinforced by press reports of Chir.ese-
Air,ericans huddled in their filthy Chinatovms, praying to their "Joss
gods," burnirjg incense and singiug strange "L'ongolian chants" to the
beat of "tonitoms." Unlike the Japanese, Cbix^ese-AEsricans
seenied
ignorant of the trouble in Asia, and if they had heard reports
about
it they expressed a startling and hardly admirable ividif
ference to the
fate of their countxT- Further, the backward Chinese
seeined deteixiined
to resist progress, proved by the closing of their country
to Western
education and co^^erce. Americans hoped that a Japanese
victory would
4 23
force China to accept the modern world and to learn
frcn it.
The anti^-Chinese Boston Globe proved that it could
be impartial
in its disdain for oriental nations. Its editor
argued that a fight
between Japan and China over Korea would be a "war
over nothing,"
particularly since Japan had no right to interfere
in Korea. "Japan's
best claim to superior civilization." the Boston
paper concluded, "would
be to have n>inded her own business." Pro^nptsd
n^ainly by a fear that
potentially-dangerous China would be aroused by war. the
GlobeLs
criticism of Japan was lost in the pro^Japanese
sentiment that s'.;ept
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the United States during the last days of
the undeclared war/
During the Utter part of July the press devoted
extensive
coverage to the relative military strength of
Chin., and Japan. On
paper the Chinese army appeared awesome, for
every province had its o-,m
large artr.y. Western observers late in July
matched a mile-long colu.-nn
of dog»trottiiig Chinese infantry- u^oving
north to-v.ard Korea. Rivers
were filled vith soldier-laden boats. One
Ane^-ican reported that "a
Chinese ar..y in notion can be likened to
nothing nore truly than a
flight of locusts," ravaging everything in
its way. According to
Frank G. Carpenter, vhose interest in the
exotic never ceased. Chinese
soldiers ate bi^ck dog's flesh and ground
tiger bones to rr.ake them
25
bloodthirsty and brave.
Africans mar/elled at China's v.,3t size and
resource., ttey
ass^ed that China's population of 400,000.000
people would overv.m
the 40.000.000 Japanese. "In th. matter
of brute str.nstl.," China had
a tremendous adv.ntase over the Japanese,
the Sainstield Renubiican
.o.^ented. T„e £a Ysrt TJae. predleted that If the Chinese
proved
deter.,lned to de£e.,t Japan they could
co„eentrate •i«..=nsely superior
resources of numbers and .oney" against
their s«aier ene„y. Further-
.ore. the Css^SSi^ and Finar^Ul Chrffilcle.
concluded. "China has .11
the advantages »hich result fro.» a
direct land connection vlth Corea."
Japan, .ost agreed, would h. a decided
undardos, and this factor alone
,.26
created considerable sympathy for the
Japanese side.
I« actu..Uty. the diversity and
i..ensity of China would prov.
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one of the major weaknesses of the Chinese war effort. Each province
was jealous of its own arciy and ofte^i refused to send troops to help
the Peking government fight what many considered its own private war
against Japan. Without a standardised system of armament, Chinese
soldiers often lacked proper cartridges for their rifles, if indeed
they had been furnished with rifles. Many of the Chinese warriors
marching north carried bovs and arrows and gaily decorated lances.
Chinese conscripts were inadequately clothed and fed, their officers
pocketing payrolls and privately selling army provisions. >k)st of the
officers had purchased cor;!ralssions and the e-ntire military system
-euffered from a traditional kickback system called the "squeeze." Tae
corruption which permeated the entire fabric of Chinese administration,
Julian Ralph observed, made the Chinese mlitary as corrupt as the
27
"TamsTiauy plan."
Ihe Japanese army, in comparison, was a model of efficiency.
In 1879 General Ulysses S. Grant, on a visit to Asia, had predicted that
the Japanese army was so well trained and armed that 10,000 of them
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could march against all odds back and forth across China. Westerners
praised the uniform system of conscription and carefully-organized
£ctive and reserve units. VJith European-style uniforms and armed
with
Japanese-made, repeating Murata rifles, soldiers reflected the training
and discipline of their We.^tern instructors. Japanese officers-having
nemorissed the most modern textbooks on tactics and command, possessing
Western artillei-y and supported by an excellent supply system
and
29
hospital corps-impatiently ayaited the test of battle conditions.
In a generation which avidly studied the works of
Captain
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Alfred Thayer llahan, debated the merits of a big-battleship navy, arraor
plate thicknesses and gun-bore sizes, A^ericany paid particular
attention to analyses of the Asian navies. Both countries owned a
number of foreign-built , aritiored warships. China was represented by
two fonner German battleships and assorted smaller vessels, vhile
Japan had a number of new, British-built cruisers and torpedo boat?5.
Americans especially looked forward to the comparative performances of
several Annapolis graduates, includins one rear«adiniral in the Japanese
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navy.
Tlis public did not have to wait long for the first naval en-
ESgeinent. On July 23 the 1350-ton transport Kowshinp^ loaded the la^^t
of her contins^i"^^ Chinese troops bound for Korea. The Kc^fshing.
belonged to the Indo-China Steamship Navigation Company, controlled by
the British fina of Jardine, Matheson and Conpany. Since var had not
been declared, China sent troop transports to Korea under foreis^i
flags, in this case the British flag. The Ko-.7shing,, along with several
other troopships and a gunboat escort, left the Taku forts on the Gulf
of Chihli on July 23. /^oard were 1,200 Chinese regulars, several
foreign advisers and a dozen pieces of field artillety. On the evening
of the 25th, in sight of the islands off the Korean coast, the Kovshiris.
encountered three Japanese armored cruisers, and, soon afterwards,
three rr.ore men-of-war, one of which fired two warning shots end
ordered
the transport to stop.
Japanese officers boarded the Kovghin- and conm-.anded the
British
captain to foUxr^ the Japr,ncse ir..nn-of-^ar. The Chinese soldiers
on
board, however, threatened to kill the captain and crew if he
followed
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thece instructions. The British officer refused to obey, and the
Japanese officers returned to their own vessel, vhich then fired a
torpedo and opened up with all her heavy guns. The Kowshing exploded
and sank stem first about forty miles from Chemulpo. VJhen the
Chinese and their European advisers and crew abandoned ship, the
Japanese varship moved ainong the survivors and sprayed them with
machine gun fire. Several dozen Chinese and a few Europeans, including
Geraian mercenary Constantin von Hanneken, escaped to tell the story or
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tlie Kowshing affair.
Although the initial American response to the sinking was one
of shock at the terrible slaughter, most coi-mentators did not blame
the Japanese. "Hairsplitting aside," argued the MSi IO£iS I^^i^iiiS^'
"the Ko-jshins was a Chinese ship engaged in actual warfare against
Japan, and the Japanese ship had as good right to fire on it as
the
Kearsarge had to fire on the Alabama." Furthemore, when the Japanese
minister to England explained that Japanese warships did not know
thst
the Ko^^shing was an English vessel, the Boston GloVe quipped,
"she
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certainly didn't have a particularly English name."
A defense of the Japanese by an eminent British
international
legal expert, Tnomas Erskine Holland, reinforced the tendency
to side
with the Japanese. Holland, the Philadelphia M£ord reported,
had
declared Japan innocent of violating international law
when it destroyed
the Kowshino. According to the Record. Holland had
argued that the
transport comprised part of a "hostile expedition"
directed against
Japan during a period of actual, even if undeclared,
warfare. "Having
released the neutrals who were saved from the sinking
ship," the
Al
Record explained, "the Japanese have fulfilled every obligation
imposed
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upon them by international law."
The SEringfiel^ ££Eii^li£S2. re minded Americans that the
western
nations had perpetrated far worse crimes on the open seas.
Ihe
Regublican cited the British attack on the United States
warship
Ch^ESake in 1807 as a prima e^si^ple, concluding that "nothing
Japan
has done could equal that in outrageous violation
of international
law."^^
The Japanese paid careful attention to official
stateinents and
press treatments of their country in the Urdtcd
States. They were
pleased by most of what they had observed, but
coverage of the ^J^^
affair made them uneasy and convinced Japanese
policymakers that a
concerted propaganda effort would be needed to
n>aintain American
syB^athy for Japan. Tne Japanese Secret
Service fund already had paid
A:.erican writers, including Edward Howard Rouse,
editor of the l^yo
Tirnes. to publish mterial favorable to Japan.^^ ^
^^tack
prior to a legal declaration of war necessitated
a much larger infer-
maticnal effort.
rne Japanese minister in Washington,
explaining Japanese policy
to the American press on July 27. said that
Japan was not led by "fire-
eaters" or "foolish people" but by careful
statesmen. Flaying on fears
of radicalism in the United States, the
minister argued that "it would
be just as fair to judge Japan's attitude at
the present time by
listening only to Japan's jingoes, as it would
be to for. an estimate
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of American statesmen from the examples afforded by Gen. Coxey and
Mr. Debs."^^ Several days later the Japanese government released a
lengthy statement explaining that Japan was veil within her treaty
rights in acting in Korea. Meanwhile Japanese consular agents inter-
viewed by the press stressed the theme of a progressive Japan
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reforming back!>7ard and uncivilized Korea.
The most extensive use of propaganda in the United States did not
occur until the arrival of the ne.V7 Japanese minister, Shinchiro
Kurino,
the follov?ing month, but during the period of undeclared var the
Japanese vere testing their techniques and trying to create a
favorable
Initial impression of Japan before making a formal declaration of
V7ar.
In this they seem to have succeeded, aided all the while by
precon-
ceived notions already held by Americans concerning China and
Japan.
As the Chancellor of the Japanese consulate in New York
City declared:
We are grateful to the American papers for what
they sa^' about us and for the great moral weight of the
public opinion of this country, which se-jns to have been
thrown almost entirely on the side of Japan; and
whatever
be the outco.-ne of the struggle it will only strengthen
the bonds between the great Republic of the Far West
and^
her "Yankee brother," as you call Japan, of tne
Orient.
The sinking of the Kov^Mjn£ provided the first concrete .
evidence
of fighting in Asia, even though reports of the
action remained sketchy
and confused. It was generally believed that the
attack would clarify
the situation. Charles Denby Jr. informed Gresham
that it would mean
an "immediate" declaration of war between China
and Japan. ^' The weeks
of uncertainty appeared to be over.
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The period of undeclared war had established an initial American
response to the Sino-Japanese War. Officially it was one of strict
neutrality. That the administration's conception of a neutral's role
was active, rather than passive, could be seen in a number of
statements
and decisions, the most important of which was acceptance of the
"good
offices" responsibility. The response of press opinion, however,
was
anything but neutral, the belligerents had been pre- judged, the
stereotypes created and the right and wrong decided. Japanese
propa-
ganda merely reinforced an established condition.
CHAPTER III
UlTEASY IJSUTPv^ITY
China r^nd Japan declared war on Aug-ast 1, 1894. Under inter*
national law a state of war required American neutrality if the
administration was convinced that each belligerent had "just" cause
for war. Consequently the two oriental pot7ers endeavored to justify
their policies to the United States government. Japanese officials,
trained in the subtleties of western diplomacy, assured Washington
that their nation would fight China "consistently with the law of
nations." Maval Attache Naoki Miyaoka explained to Gresham on
August 1 that China had forced Japan into the declaration of V7ar by
refusing to cooperate V7ith her in instituting a reform program for
bacVrward and anarchic Korea. Stressing Japan's moral role in the crisis,
he informed the Secretary that China's request for Anglo-American
1
mediation was a "ruse" to strengthen its military forces in Korea.
China countered with a view of its own. Though Chinese
spokesmen in the United States reraained silent, fearing punishment from
Peking if they said the vrong thing, the Chinese Foreign Office
(Tsungli Yamen) released a detailed statement of its Korean policy to
Charles Denby Jr. At the same time, a for);2or Chine-^e minister to the
United States, Chang Yen-hoon, outlined China's defense in a letter to
hin old friend, Thorns Francis Bayard, now the Ainerican minister to
England. These documents insisted that China could not, under the
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customs and laws of its tributary relation to Korea, enter e. program
of internal reform with Japan. Chang noted that when Bayard had been
Secretary of State, he had ecknowledged Korea's tributary status in
1887. Chang argued further that Japan had invaded Korea while China
had been invited in to suppress the Tonghak rebels. His concluding
argument appealed to American moral sensitivities by suggesting that
Japan's unprovoked and savage attack on the Kowshing. during a
time of
2
peace constituted a flagrant violation of international law.
The declarations of war failed to clarify the Asian situation
in
the United States. Cocmjunications , unreliable at best, broke
dcwn
conipletely. The Chinese delayed cable Kessages coiicernir.s the
war
and /u.!?.ricm. telegraph companies C'estern Urdon, the
Anglc/'o^rsrican
Telegraph Company. Direct U.S. Cable Coir.pany, Coiranercial
Cable Caiapany
and the Great Northern Company) temporarily suspended their
Asian
service. For news, the United States depended largely
on delayed
dispatches delivered by steamer or on unreliable reports
einamting
3
froiu London.
The Cleveland administration insisted that,
with the declaration
of war, it would even "more strictly observe the
neutrality laws."
Yet neutrality laws were complex, iir-precise and
out of date. In
Augu.t 1894 the only published restrictions on
Arnerican citir,ens wore
based upon a law ..ade in 1860 prohibiting enlistment
in the arx-uer. of
belligerents to n.ake war against countries friendly
to the United States
(both J.pan and China were considered friendly
by the State Department)
or to fit out anned vessels for belligerent
service. Nothing, however,
prevented belligerents from buying arn,s in the
United States and
46
4
shipping them in their own. vessels.
American speculators, busiuessmon and expansionists threatened
to underraine the image of a friendly and impartial United States.
Claiming that the United States was locked in a struggle for "possession
of the world" with China and Japan, Hawaiian annexationists
urged
American businessmen to take advantage of the Sino-Japansse War by
adopting the "untiring zeal /Ind7 eplendid commercial talent" of the
Jews to achieve economic ascendancy in Asia.^ Predicting
that the
present crisis vould entangle Europe as vail as Asia in a
costly and
bloody var, other imperialists demanded that the United
States repeal
its neutrality lav;s and allow /Americans to take
belligerent ships under
the American flag. William Randolph Hearst's San
Frs2cisco ExaminSX
implored California iDunitions and shipbuilding finos
to exploit the
war. Hearst's newspaper advised the Union Iron
Works to build fast
torpedo boats and cruisers for Japan, circumventing
the neutrality
laws of the "law-abiding Ad.ainistration" by
contracting warships for
Sa^oa and then, once they were at sea, selling
them to Japan.
Some expansionist businessmen, though less
sanguine than Hearst,
anticipated that the war would open East Asia
to American capital.
Expressing revived interest in the Asian market,
American manufacturers
urged the State Department to inform them of
new trade opportunities in
China. Japan and Korea.' At the same time.
Kew York's CcHpercial m^d
Fii-nci-i Chronicle predicted that this
"real eastern war" would
stimulate American trade with Korea and China.
A leading Virginia
manufacturing spokesman, the Richncnd S^, doubted that the present
var would greatly benefit American export
trade but concluded that
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"if Russia should interfere and England should resent to the point of
hostilities, the hard times in the United States would quickly
disappear." Focusing on the current controversy over silver and gold
money in the United States, the Hew York Tribune added that at least
the war would raise the price of silver and "not only help both our
ovm Treasury and that of the Ividian Government to unload part of the
enorraous quantity cf silver tvaiion which they have acctunulated, but
may also render it possible to work at a profit our silver mines in
the VJest that are now idle."
Lahor spokesiaen speculated that, while the war might increase
esuployinent in the world's arsenals, it eventually would cause increased
public debt, taxation find human suffering. "Ko one can tell v/hose
toes my be traraped on before it ends," the United llin^ IJorkor's
9
Journal cOE::nented. ihe Journal^ of the Knights of Lebor hoped that the
Sirio-Japanese War would reveal European governments as "awful cowards,"
10
prompting their people to rise against thexa.
Afiierican labor epokesmen v?ho commented on the war in 1894
generally agreed that all v;ars exploited the workingnian and caused
widespread suffering; yet they often proved themselves vulnerable to
the rhetoric of expansicnists--that this particular war would benefit
the United States by ci-eating jobs, higher wages, an end to uneiflplo>^ient
and depression and a wcrld-wide demand for Ajrierican products. Further-
Eiore, as the FInights of Labor publication noted, the Asian war might
eliminate con^petition from cheap oriental labor because "all the
patriotic Japs and Chiuaraan /si£/" would "go there now and be killed
for glory and relief of America.
"^^
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Others criticized assumptions that the war would materially
benefit the United States. Tae Staunton Weekly tlews (Virginia)
editorialized that the Asian war helped only wa;: profiteers and actually
hindered the v/orld's economy by dislocating commerce, destroying
property and creating hardships in Asia which V70uld detrimentally affect
the United States. The Boston Globe claimed that the United States
had a duty to stop the war because it had contributed to the hostilities
through its "reckless" sale of arras to Japanese and Chinese, who were
no more than "children." The American Peace Society demanded that the
12
goverEisent prevent American weapons from reaching Asia.
Meanwhile, the entrepreneurs were busy. Ships loaded with flour,
beans, pork, beef, fruit and leather goods destined for the hostile
arsiies departed from San Francisco. Ihe steamer Mo de Janeiro sailed
with 200 tons of pig lead consigned to Japan. The Armour Packing
Company in Kansas City negotiated with the belligerents for the
sale of
500,000 pounds of canned corn beef, while the Anker Bouillon
Capsule
Manufacturing Company of Jersey City signed a contract with
Japanese
officials to supply the army with one million capsules of
beef. At the
same time Hartley & Graham, the New York agents of the
Remington gun
works, reportedly sold several million rounds of ammunition
to the
Japanese EOvemn-.ent. The New York brokerage firm of
Charles R. Flint
& Co. allegedly negotiated Japanese purchase of the
Chilean cruiser
Esmeralda, while Cramps Shipbuilding of Philadelphia
con3idered latest
offers for a cr^.iser, the Minneapqli_s . which had
been destined for the
United States Navy. A:nerican marine insurance
companies raised their
r^tes on "war risk" goods and carried on a "brisk
business." Tea and
4^
rice iJierchants in Kew York and Chicago pfospered. As one businessman
noted, "all lines of trade report an increased business, which is
..13
attributed to the Oriental VJar."
Expecting Asserican enforcement of neutrality laws and a Japanese
blockade of the China coast, California gun-runners outfitted ewift
merchantmsn designed to slip by patrolling cruisers. An Axaarican
purchased the coastal stearaers Srnitjl ^nd Cass, to shuttle munitions
from aiainlersd China to Formosa. Applications from assorted military
men, adventurers and cranks flooded the Japanese legation in VJashington--
so many, in fact, that ths legation released a circular enplainins that
no volunteers would be needed by the Japanese siilitary organization.
Undeterred, ex-Confederate soldiers vied with their Union countevparts
to offer service to Japan. In Cleveland, Ohio, several issmbers of the
local National Guard forffi-d a "Japanese Loyal Legion" and received
seventy signatures -^hen they circulated an enlistment form for service
In the Japanese army. In California a "mysterious vhite man,"
allegedly
carrying the credentials of an official Japanese War Department
recriiiter,
promoted an elite regiment, equipped with the latest repeatii^g
rifles,
clothed in their own special uniforms and enticed by prospects
of
looting various mndarins' palaces. The San Fr^JLcisco EKamner
revealed the recruiter to be a famous "frontiersnan," Captain
Dick
Falconsberg.
On the East Coast, coke striker Valentine Nowacki
of Pennsylvania
offered to enlist five thousand of his iepoverished
and unen^.ploycd
fellcv;. as soldiers for Japan, Vlhan a cashier of the
Second National
Bank of Altoona. Pennsylvania, absconded with the
bank's money and fled
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to Japan, a Hew York newspaper coirraented on his "intention of helping
out the island people financially in their present crisis*"^^
Among breaches of neutrality by individuals, the most sensational
case originated with the scheme of a New England inventor to build en
"infernal machine" for China. The late Victorian imagination thrived
on tales of sinister devices and awful engines of destruction. It
was an age in which M. Eugene Turpin's "engine of war" thrilled Paris
5
General Clarke's secret "electrical fish-shaped torpedo" amazed
Aiaericans and rumors of deadly balloon plots caused Londoners to shudder.
John Wilde, a Providence, Fdiodc Island, chemist and nautical inventor,
had concocted a mysterious weapon which he claimed would destroy entire
fleets without the loss of a single attacking ship. Ignored by the
United States Kavy, the fifty- two-year-old V7ilde brooded in his dark
waterfront laboratory and planned to shov^ the world the power of his
"terrible secret.
"^^
Wilde interested George Howie (alias George Cameron)--form£r
deiaolitions expert aboard the dynamite cruiser Nictheroy during the
Brazilian civil war and presently a torpedo tester for the Hotchkiss
Ordnance Company— in his ideas. When news of possible Sino-Japanese
hostilities in Korea reached Providence in early July of 1B94, Wilde
wrote the Japanese minister to Washington, Goeo Tateno, offering his
invention to Japan. Wilde assured Tateno that he possessed "secret
Information which if known by your Government would enable them to
destroy the whole Chinese fleet and enable the^ to capture any forts
or water battery without the loss of a man or a ship." The Japanese
government apparently was not interested in Wilde s plans.
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The inventor turned next for help to the senior Fhode Island
senator, Nelson W. Aldrich. On August 27 Aldrich requested that the
Chinese minister listen to Wilde vho '^desires to confer with you in
18
regard to jjome natter v;hich he will present." Chang Fang Mo,
II
Yang Yu's secretary and first interpreter, interviewed Wilde and llovyie.
Ho, %^ho chilled himself C, F. Moore in the United States, vore a viz to
hide his pigtail and passed in many circles as an .A^.erican. As
Fleming Duncan Cheshire, the interpreter for the American legation in
Peking vrote to Rockhill, "the chap in /.the/ Chinese Legation vho
styles himself C. F, Moore must be an ass; he is no ntore styled Moore
in Chinese th-r^n I am, but anything will pass in the states so let him
19
call biraaelf Hoove or ai^.y ether d--d nat?.e he plesscs/' Moore expressed
interest but v^anted to check vu'.th former Secretary of State John VJatson
Foster before accepting Uildc's plan. On September 5, Foster inquired
of the Brazilian Minister Salvador Mandonca whether V/ilde or Howie
actually had been involved in the Brazilian civil war. Mendcnca assured
him that an American had been eiaployed by Brazil but had never tested
20
his terrible v;eapon.
On Septeraber 13 Moore accepted VJilde's proposal and agreed to
finance his trip to China. Uv^fortunately he could not raise enough
money for the fare. Wilde urged him to try harder, promising that "if
I get there before the. ;?ar is over through your endeavors, it will mean
21
Re.nk, ^loijior and Wealth for you." Moore replied vnihappily that even
the Chinese minister doubted the utility of the scheme and would not
assist Wilde. The inventor wrote back: "They laugh at you do they . . . ?
Well, I will try ray best to raise the woney and if I can we will go to
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China . . . V3 v/ill destroy the Japanese fleet • . . carry the V7ar to
Japan . . . then \m will see if your Minister vill laugh .... We
vill show hini, and not only him, b"*.it the vhole vjorld, that it is no
22laughing ciatter.""
Somehow either Moore or Wilde raised the necessary funds for
passage to China. On October 16, accompanied by Howie, they left
San Francisco bound for Tientsin on the steadier Gaelic , Tney strongly
suspected that Japanese agents were shadov;ing thesu and that Uovie's
indiscreet boasts of an ominous "ciachine-de-guerre" had been overheard
by a fellow passenger, the Japanese consul -general to Mexico. Therefore,
upon arrival in Yokohania on November 2, the trio clandestinely slipped
their ship and boarded the French steamer 5Z^2Z» floored at the same
v^harf. The ntse v;as not Kucce!:;sful . VThen the S^^dno^ stOT^ped at Kobe,
Japanese marines boarded the ship and arrested the three. Ihe Japanese
clairaed that a contract, complete with tetins of sale as well as an
ironclad guarantee to destroy the Japanese fleet, was found in Moore's
pocket. A copy of this evidence, fonjarded to the Ar^ierican minister
in Tokyo by the Jap.t:nese Foreign Office, indicated that the Chinese had
agreed to pay Wilde one million dollars in gold and a percentage of
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every ship they destroyed in exchange for revealing his plan.
Publicly ter^ned another Mason and Slidell case by the New York Tijmes,
the so-called "S^ldngx affair" threatened to involve the United States
in ^ controversy with Japan, Would the United States demand return of
thn^ prisoners? Gresham refused to entangle the government, iiis true ting
Dun only to "insist that he C^ilde) shall receive proper treatment" as
a prisoner of war-^^ The Japanese politely reciprocated by releasing
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Wilde and Howie on their p5^<^i^*ise not to take up t^xcxs against Japan and
to stay aiiay from China. Moore was hustled away to a Japanese prison.
Though Kov7le and Wilde later broke their pledge and helped the Chinese
plant mines at Weihaiv7ei, leading to Howie's recapture, a potentially
25
serious issue over neutrality hv^d been avoided.
The United States government tried to prevent incidents such as
the VJilde Case. Federal officers hunted the elusive Dick Falconsberg
in California, while the consul -general at Shanghai refused to let the
Cass and Spitji carry arms to Forraosa under the American flag, llie
government also planned legal action against the Colt Arms Factory of
Hartford, Connecticut, at the request of the Japanese minister vho
objected to the sale of ten million small-bore rifle cartridges to
China. It was necessary too for the State Department to pointedly
refuse to encourage a relief project sponsored by the ChristJ.an Heraljd
to feed starvins Koreans for fear that the food vould fall into the hands
of one or another of the invading armies and therefore lead to a
.
.
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neutrality violation.
Determined that iiidividual Americans must not in any way endanger
the neutral policy of their goverraient, Greshaa sent cautionary' in-
sti^icticns to diplomatic posts throughout Asia. In his note to Dun
on August 30. the Secretary ordered the minister to "issue all
manner
of writs to prevent the citizens of the United States from
enlisting in
the military or naval service of either of the said countries
to mnke
var upon any foreign power with whom the United States are at
peace,"
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Concerning this particular threat to neutrality, Gresham could act
most decisively. He told Dun to "carry out this pov^er by a resort
to such force belonging to the United Stater, as may at the time be
27
within reach.'*
Compared to the need to restrain American individuals, Japanese
and Chinese threats to American neutral rights, especially freedom of
the seas, offered the administration a more co?aplex problem. Although
European powers had sometimes successfully challenged the American
interpretation of neutral rights, Asian defiance of these venerated
doctrines was a different raatter, creating consternaticn and even anner
in the State Department. Japan had labored quietly for treaty revision
during the past few years, but now China threatened to upset the system
of Western trestles hy closing the treaty ports cf Amoy, Canton, Kingpo,
Chinkiang, Foochov-/, Shanghai, Hankov and Tientsin, China warned that
it would blockade harbors, remove buoys and channel markers and shut
down the coastal lighthouses. Chinese officials allowed it to be known
that they V7ei*e considering the searching of ships and the seiizure of
suspected contraband cargoes. On their part, the Japanese seemad
prepared to blockade China's treaty ports and already had planted subma-
rine torpedoes at entrances to their own harbors* Noting the growing
danger to foreign commerce and reporting that pirates now attacked
merchant vessels at v;ill (since Chinese cruisers, fesring Japanese attack,
refused to venture into the open sea), British merabers of the Chinese
customs service later admitted that "things seemed bleak in August-
Great Britain, in fact, had asked the United St.ntes to cooperate
with Britain, Italy and Geraany to preserve the neutrality of the treaty
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ports by the use of naval force. Sir wlulian Pauncefote, the British
minister in Washington, discussed the possibility of American co-
29
operation in several private meetings with Greshara. Tlie resulting
dilcEima (one interpretation of neutrality at odds with aviother) drew
a characteristic response. Guided by the large, overall principle he
had helped establish in regard to the war the Secretary of State assured
reporters that the United States v/ould never participate in armed inter-
vention in Asia and would maintain "strict impartiality" toward China,
30
Japan and Korea.
Once again confidential State Department business was leaked to
newspapers. Ironically, Gresham was attacked as another "Machiavelli"
or "Talleyrand," for having covered up allegedly sinister and deceitful
meetings with Fauncefote. One pcjper claiimed that Gresham had never
inspired public confidence in the good faith of the State Department.
Another accused the Cleveland administration of making entangling
alliances with European powers to keep the treaty ports open, thus
betraying the basic dicta of the Founding Fathers as well as the
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Monroe Doc trine
-
On August 10, Chinese authorities at Shanghai announced that
American merchant vessels would be searched. Charles Deuby Jr. at once
inquired whether the United States would "concede" to this dc-nand.
Consulting his legation's volumes on international law, the younger Denb;
granted that China might have the right to exai^ine American merchant
ships "in the territorial waters of China," but doubted that it could
ej^ercise this right on the high seas. He informed Gresham that no
Oriental power had ever been permitted to search a public vessel of the
56
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United States and urged that this right should not now be admitted.
Grcshara hoped that he v?ould nev2r have to make the sort of
decision suggested by the acting minister in Peking. He advised young
Denby on August 15 that if China searched Asnerican merchant vessels
on the high seas, "you will immediately report the fact for in-
structions, but you are not expected to encourage the assertion of that
right VJliere United States Mavy vessels v;ere concerned, Gresham
could speak raore firmly. V/hile belligerents might be permitted to
ascertain the neutral character of American ships, "the search of tnen-
of-war can not be permitted," nor could the rnovement of American ships
be revealed to the Chinese. Tne Secretary of State fon;arded an
optii?.istic circular to all diplomatic and naval personnel in Asia:
"As naither China nor Japan has made knovn an intention to exercise the
belligerent right of visitation and search on the high seas, it is
hoped that neutral coirjnerce snay escape the inconvenience and obt^truction
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vhich the exercise of that right must necessarily entail."
Possessing few large warships capable of long-range operations,
the United States could not resint violations of American neutrality.
Advocates of a larger navy asserted that China's actions should stimu-
late Congressional appropriations for additions to the fleet "beyond a
few torpedo boats, which while excellent in their way are of no service
on foreign stations." Noting that "we have sent several tubs into
South American V7aters, but they never accomplished anything," others
remarked that the current Asian situation offered the opportunity to
display the American navy. Tlie Atlanta Cc*nstituticn echoed the views
of "big navy" people when it corfiniented
:
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We no'v? have the best navy that we have had in a
generation, and it is time to make our power felt in
foreign waters. Our cruisers and battleships are needed
in the ports of China, and any delay in the matter nay
cost us the lives of inany Aniericnn missionaries. Ve need
a more vigorous foreign policy. The British snovld be
kicked out of Central Ariierica, checVied in Venezuela, and
in China and Japa'a our naval supremacy should be rande
manifest at once.
^4
Give old glory a chance again!
The Springfield Republican cautioned against this latest outburst by
naval enthusiasts: "Tliey say they are needed there to protect American
interests, but wouldn't they in reality be likely to get us into more
trouble than they could avert? Luckily wa havc^n't a large fleet to
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spare just now for purely spectacular purposes."
Nevertheless, events in Asia v;ere persuading Greshaoi that a
larger fleet might be necessary to preserve Anerican neutrality. The
Japanese navy bombarded the Chinese xnilitary base at Weihaiwei on
August 10, accelerating rtmiors of an imminent attack so^iewherc on the
China coast. The Chinese sank rock-filled junks in Tientsin harbor,
constructed a wooden barrier across the Peiho channel and reraoved
navigation lights from the approaches to the Taku forts. Expecting
invasion, thousands of refugees filled roads to the interior. Panic
dominated even the Hanchn governnient, and bandit armies roamed the
countr>'side, attacking Chinese and foreigners without fear of
,36
reprisals.
Americans viewed China's self-defense measures with disdain.
Some feared maritime incidents or resented inconveniences caused
AT^erican stean^ers loaded with case oil or tea. It was increasingly
apparent, however, that the greatest danger to Araericans lay in the
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chaof; that would probably result from an attack. American diplomatic
agents in Peking and Tientsin warned the State Department that a
Japanese attack woiild turn the Chinese against all foreigners. Lawless
Chinese infantry already had insulted American missionaries and the
younger Denby anticipated mob violence. "Much anxiety is felt air.ong
the foreigners at Tientsin for their own safety," the acting rainister
related. "If the Japanese land and defeat the Chinese, the routed
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soldiers will, it is feared, attack the settle^nent ." Consul Sheridan
Read advised: "Should the Chinese soldiers be defeated on their own
soil it is understood that they will scour the country, committing
outrages of every sort, and it is apparent that the slender thread
which sustains the obedience of the masses to the Viceroy, would in
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that event be snapped and pandcnioniura would reign supreme."
American missionaries expected to be the primar>- targets of
Chinese reaction to v Japanese attack. In 1894, missionaries—
principally Presbyterians, Methodists and me.Tibers of the American
Board
of Corr^niissioners of Foreign Missions-constituted the largest
single
group of Americans in Asia. Scattered throughout Japan,
China and
Korea, little bands of missionaries established chapels,
schools and
hospitals, often accumulating substantial personal property
as well-
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including $50,000 vorth in the area of Seoul. Tne majority of
missionaries labored long hours, learned the native
langu-sge and lived
with the people. They had to cope vith the disea.es
which had decimated
countless n^isslonary fa^nilie. in Asia throughout the
nineteenth century,
as well as the distrust and hostility of the people
and officials.
Anti-mssionao^ riots had plagued China in particular,
and missionaries
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often faced death at the hands of anti-foreign mobs.
Church organizations in the United States apprehended that
American missionaries confronted even graver dangers now that var
had
been declared between China and Japan. Ihe ttUnta Constitution
reported that an Aiaerican Presbyterian church recently had
been razed
by an anti-missionary mob, and Southern Methodist
Bishop Alpheus V7.
Wilson varned that "there is much reason to fear for the
safety of
the missionaries both men and women, now stationed
in China and Corea."
At the savne time the K^i ^ork Tribune published a letter
from Hankow,
China, claiming that the outbreak of hostilities
had "revived all the
native fanaticism of the Chinese" and that the Chinese
were insulting
40
foreigners and threatening violence.
Meeting in Kashville, Tennessee, in early August,
the executive
co^uttee of foreign missions for the Southern
Presbyterian Church
stated that the United States government should
take all necessary
steps for the protection of their fifty
missionaries in Chin.. Resolved
to present its case in person, the committee
dispatched the Reverend
Dr. J. W. Bachman to a Washington conference
with Gresham and the
Japanese charg^ d'affaires. Leaders of the
Board of Missions of the
Northern Presbyterian Church in New York
followed Bach:.an to Washington
and arranged their own meeting with the
Secretary of State. Concurrently
the Board of the Southern Methodist mission
sent a list ol their people
in China to the State Department. The
Department in fact received
numerous letters from missionary groups and
individuals having friends
and relatives in Asian missions.
Cre.ham assured Inquirers that American
missionaries faced no
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iin^.ediate danger and would be protected. Yet privately
he expressed
doubt that "effective protection" could be afforded "by
the agents of
this GoverLiment on the scene of hostilities."
Despite a popular claim
that "if our Missionaries are killed and no
apologies and reparations
made, this government will do some bombarding on
its own account,"
Gresha^m perceived that the United States could
do nothing at this
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juncture to help the missionaries.
The brutal assault on and ir.urder of a Scotch
Presbyterian
n^issionary Jarr«.s Wylie by Manchu soldiers on August
IC intensified
Aiaerican concern. Tl.e Chinese govermr.ent promptly
issued an Iir^perial
proclamation designed to protect the missionaries.
But Li Hung-chang
cautioned that this edict, which officials
extensively circulated,
would be ineffective if the missionaries
agitated for foreign gunboats,
legation guards or if they publicly commented
on the war. because such
actions would intensify anti-foreign hatred.''
Nevertheless, believing
that the war would profoundly affect their
work. Wican missionaries
refused to rer^in silent. Rev. Charles
A. Stanley, an American Board
missionary .t Tientsin, claimed that ..ylie's
.urder placed his brethren
in great danger. "It is a time of
uncertainty, anxiety, of danger in
see localities." Stanley wrote, "and
we can only fall back on cur sure
Refuge-^the Lord reigneth. in thee is
our trust." But he quickly
added, "we have three gunboats now~^British .
French. German-and may
^ ^ - n Qf-^nlpv uv9e6 Read to request a
have, tvo more, U.S. and Russian,'
Stanley ig a
w-^^lTTT^n ^ another mi-ssionary
gunboat, despite Li Hung-chang's warning.
Meanwhile.
,a. "It is rumored ve are to have
more gunboats here; I hope it
true,- because only the Bal^ll-re and
the Monocacx. that "old-
announces
is
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fashioned sicle-vhceler" which looked like a "New York ferry boat,"
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afforded protection.
The mission stations in Ilorth China reported the movement of
huge araies, and as the fighting spread they feared reprisals from
villagers vho looked upon the missionaries as part of a vast foreign
kingdom arrayed against China. Believing that the war provided evidence
of God's work to open China to Christianity, the missionaries openly
commented on China's cori-uption and weakness. Rev. Willis C. Noble,
an Aisertcan medical missionary at Paotingfu, near Peking, predicted
that the war will have a "decided rmd lasting benefit to the ccuntry"
by breaking up "the intense conservatism of the Gov/_emriient/ and people
ai^d the hatred and suspicion of all that is foreign." Some missionaries
publicly prayed fcr China's defeat while others hinted that the United
States government should prepare to support the missionary crusade after
.
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the collapse of Chinese conservatism.
Reports of the missionaries' plight combined with rumors of
American intervention on their behalf helped stimulate the public's
appetite for war news. Yet there was little reliable information
available during early August, and newspapers filled column after
coUam with editorial analysis. Vney warned that this was not a
"remote" Asian war. Americans could not disregard it because
"European
interests /vere7 so involved in Asia that a war in the Orient may
precipitate a European war. and this would so upset the
enuilibriun, of
x^ations that its effects would be plainly felt even on this
side of
62
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the Atlantic/'
Few doubted that Eui-opean powers would intervene in the w^r,
and not a fev; editorials anticipated that such interference v;ould save
brave and skillful little Japan (which most Americans hoped would
"lick China into a cocked hat") from being swaraed under by three or
four million Chinese. Even reports from /onerican military experts
that the "homogeneous and warlike" Japanese were "much superior to
their Chinese cousins" failed to dissuade soine American newspapers froin
playing on fears of China's ultiraate triumph. "It is hard to believe
that 40,000,000 psople can lick 400,000,000," the Atlanta Cor^l^tu^i^^
observed, r.nd "the chances are that the Chinese will overrun Japan
unless the European powers interfere." The UsSSlS Advertiser explained,
"It will shortly develop that China can coirjf^and advantageous pc£.ii?:icns
and execute frightful slaughter, once her laultitudinous army spreads
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out on the land field."
Other Americans coimnented on China's vast resources. Dr. W.
Luscher of Kansas City, a former surgeon in the Chinese navy, told
interviewers that "China can afford to wage war for years, and from
"the millions of her people can pour troops into Corea as a
child would
pour sand in a rat hole . . . without missing them from the
densely
populated districts." Ihe Springfield ReguMican asserted that
"the
Japanese cannot hope to whip China by killing off ail her
inhabitants,
for. according to a statistician, if 1000 Chinese should be
killed
every day it would require 1500 years to finish the.n."
T>ie Knights of
Labor r.aintained that "owing to the itr.-nonse resources of
China it is
thought she will pour her hordes into Korea and
over.;helm Japanese
63
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troops ."
More optimJ.stic Americans placed their faith in the ultimate
triumph of Japan, which represented the values of western civilization.
The Pnilnclelphia Press predicted that progressive Japan would make
"short work" of China. The former cotrmander of the cruiser BaltitEore,
Captain W. R. Bridgraan, confidently believed that unless China undertook
V7ar preparations on a "gioantic scale," Japan's splendid army and navy
would v;hip her. In this war theory there was no place for hopes that
European powers might intervene. As the l^ui:Sville Couri^r::JourTLai
supposed, Japan's fighting ability "promises hot work for his pig-tailed
enemies," as long as "some of the big European bullies" abstained from
involvemant. T!ie progressive view also challenged the arguir-ent that
China's Kasses would in'judato Japan. "If the Japs continue to in^prove
in marksmanship," the Richmond State quipped, "it is not known whether
China's 400,000,000 will suffice to keep up the target supply or
not."
Typical American views of China as corrupt and decadent did
not
usually include Li Kung-chang, unofficial prime minister and
connaander-
in-chief of China's northern defenses. Li had emerged as one
of the most
powerful Chinese leaders in late nineteenth century China.
He had
placed fan,ily and friends in key goverm^ant posts while
building up his
own private anr.y and navy as Governor of Chihli Province.
Yet Li
r^T.ained loyal to the Manchu dynasty and used his
power to protect the.
throne as well as his own interests. Popularized by
Grant's visit to
China in 1872 and by foru^.er American mnister to China John
Russell
Young's laudatory articles, Li Kung-chang became the
only Chinese
leader recognizable to the Atnerican public. "Li
Hung Chang is a n,an of
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liberal views, measured by the conservative Chinese standard,
"
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Sheridan Read observed, and he "is regarded as distinctly pro-foreign.
During August 1894 Americans were calling Li the Gladstone or
Bismarck of China, the greatest of his race and the only leader willing
to adopt western technology and education, Li appeared to be the one
man capable of uniting China in a war effort against Japan, since Li,
like Bismarck, vps thought to possess the ability to mold diverse
groups of provinces and cities into a national entity. But when Li's
enemies urged the Emperor to deprive him of his "Yellow Jacket and
Peacock Feather," signs of Imperiel favor and confidence, (ostensibly
for permitting Japan's seizure of Seoul and the defeat of Chinese
troops), there were many Americans who noted that China would seal its
^
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own fate by turning its back on a man with Western attitudes.
Stories dealing with Chinese-Americans continued to confirm
earlier opinions that the Chinese lacked patriotisni and the incentive
to fight. Most Chinese interviewed in American cities appeared
uninformed
or indifferent about the Sino-Japanese conflict, vnien asked
what the
war laeant to Atlanta's Chinese population, Sam Sing, an
"intelligent
Atlanta Chinai^an." allegedly told the Constitution, "no makee
diffence,
Mellican Chinaman allee samee washee. makce monee, no go war,
En^ler
China say come fight muchee, me no go tall, stay in Lanta,
workee,
wcshee, no, n,e no go war." ITiis type of coverage,
repeated in Boston,
few York City, Chicago and San Franci.co helped fon^
the image of a
people sadly deficient in national pride, a flaw which
would drag China
down to defeat. As the Boston Globe reported.
Chinamen in Boston's
Chinatown would "remain here to wash, play fan tan,
and make money"
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during the war. Residents of New York City's Chinatown, the Tribune
stated with amusement, were content with "Low Flung," a new god
meant to insure Chinese victory, which had been erected atop a building
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at the corner of Mott and Pell Streets.
On the other hand, when interviewed about their opinions of the
war, local Japanese were admirably patriotic and well-informed. Ihey
founded a Japanese Patriotic League in Brookl^m to read dispatches,
discuss the war and collect contributions for Japan's war effort.
Ihey established similar groups in Chicago, San Francisco, Tacoma,
Boston, Mew Haven, Baltimore and Atlantic City. Japanese residents of
Portland, Oregon, organized a Kutual Protective Association which
pledged absolute loyalty to Japan. Alv;ays v^illing to discuss the war
with An^ericans, the Japanese in the United States stressed Japan's
progress, democracy and reforming zeal and they predicted that by
adopting American technology they could conquer barbaric, un-
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Christian China.
One Aiuerican who disputed simplistic views of the war was
Ambrose Bierce, political pundit, journalist and later author cf the
Devil 's DicH-^narj^. Bierce contended that few Americans had endeavored
to understand the causes of the war, much less the Japanese and Chinese
peoples. "All that we knew or cared to know was that our Chinatowns
were filthy—alir.ost as filthy as the East side of New York, that the
Chinese workingman in America is a heathen and works for low wages"
and "that the Japanese make pretty bric-a-brac--which we nsay buy from
Chinese tradesmen." He suggested that Americans study Japan and China
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before passing judgment on the combatants-
6&
Partly to gather more accurate nevs but primarily to increase
sales with sensational stories, major publishers debated sending spscial
correspondents, at great cost, to the war zoner*. Harper's Weekly and
Harper's HaRazine hired Julian Ralph, already planning a trip to China
and already equipped with uncomplimentary views of Asia, Ralph wrote
Secretary of War Daniel S* Lament that he needed letters of introduction
"so that I may see some water fighting in the course of the grotesque
war that is going on in Corea . . . perhaps a letter from you, stating
that I am your friend, and of repute in 'ny own countree* might be very
valuable," Ralph suggested that Laiiiont keep the whole thing quiet "as
I a?n keeping it dark so as not to excite the other publishers into
sending men to share my 'glory' with me/' Lamont ccsrplied with Ralph's
request, also enclosing letters from Gresham and Assistant Secretary
of Kavy William Kc-Adoo, "Well, if I ain't fixed for my trip nobody
ever was," Ralph joked, and he hoped that reports from "cross-eyed
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and quaint" China might "advertise /hil/ wares.
Richard Harding Davis, just starting his career as journalist and
author, also expressed interest in following the Japanese army for the
purpose of writing a history of the war. He urged Lamont to write a
letter to the Japanese Secretary of War, "saying that I am all sorts of
a fine person and one who he should at once attach to the staff of
some
general in the field if he wants his side, the Japanese side, of
the
war written up with grace and accuracy combined." Davis even
phoned
Mrs. Cleveland to thank her husband for procuring credentials.
"Will
you say farewell for m-^ to the President and thank him for his
fine
Cabinet, three of whom came through with letters which made it
possible
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for lae to go." SoEehow Davis' plains fell through, but a nuiibsr of
other special correspond ants vould follow Ralph and play important
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roles in shaping American reactions.
While strident pro-Japanase publicity continued to threaten
American neutrality, the Cleveland administration searched for a var
policy which might preserve neutrality v;hile protecting American
Interests. Any effort along such lines vould remain unilateral. 'Gie
President, responding in part to growing criticism of British inter-
vention in Latin America, was determined not to alter his country's
non-entangling alliances tradition. Ke turned down all Britieh
requests for cooperation in Asia and ordered the strengthening of the
Asiatic squadron. Responding to missionary pleas for a gunboat at
Tientsin, the administration ordered Secretary of the Kavy Hilary Afcner
Herbert to send the first available V7ar vessel to that port as a
"precautionary measure." Tne Kavy Department also prepared to suppleaent
,
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tlie EaltiBiore and the Konocacy, with gunboats from the Bering Sea
patrol.
The captains of the gunboats Concord and Petrel coaled and
equipped their steam whale boats vith mounts for gatling guns,
vhile
stowing below a nur-.ber of Lee Magazine Rifles and Colt revolvers.
Fully expecting land duty on the Asian continent, the crews
of the
ehips steaming toward China drilled daily as infantry.
Meanvhila
the Secretary of the Navy ordered Captain George U.
Coffin of the
second-class cruiser Charleston to con>plete. repairs at
Mare Ir.icnd and
sail iirnnediately. Tais 3730-ton protected cruiser,
along with the V.o
68
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gunboats, would join the Baltimore and Honocacy in tlie war zone
Herbert assigned command of the reinforced Asiatic squadron to
Admiral Charles C. Carpenter, a "bull of a man" with a thick wavy beard
and tsiustache. Carpenter had conm-jnded the USS Hartford in 1884 when he
had suffered the first in a series of nervous breakdowns which would
eventually lead to his suicide in a Massachusetts sanitarium several
years after the Sino-Japanese War. In August of 1894, at any rate.
Carpenter was considered capable of cor.imanding a fleet in a critical
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area
.
At the saaie time Gresham prodded the elder Der.by-"£till resting
at his hosie in Evansville, Indiana--to "go to Peking without delay."
Noting that a steamer would leave San Francisco for China on August 28,
Gresham strongly suggested that th- minister ought to be on board.
"Haturally enough we fear that the war between China and Japan mny
embarrass us," the Secretary admitted, and the President strongly
agreed
that the current crisis required the presence of the senior Denby
in
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Peking
.
Denby 's experience was considered essential to the maintenance
of strict neutrality, already subject to a variety of stresses and
strains. Tne press continued to promote sympathy for the
Japanese.
Faulty cosFuunications invited misinterpretations of instructions.
Neutrality violations by both Americans and Asian, caused
constant conster
nation, and missionary groups clamored for protection.
Could the United
States remain indifferent to neutrality violations,
threats to
nissionarie. and acts of atrocity? Not in the legalistic
view of Gresham
and Cleveland, vho felt that neutrality must be
strictly enforced, by
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means which included the strengthening of the Asiatic fleet. Having
accepted a neutral policy, the government could ignore none of the
responsibilities suggested by that policy. One of these responsi-
bilities, to be fulfilled regardless of the consequences, was the
function of "good offices,"
CHAPTER IV
HIE OPJ)E/.L OF GOOD OFFICES
When the United States agreed to extend its good offices to
China and Japan in order to protect the subjects and property of each
in the country of the other, the Cleveland administx-ation believed
that this was required by any honest and responsible policy of
neutrr.lity. Cleveland and Gresham envisaged good offices as a ikjoral
duty to be offered by an impartial friend of tV70 varring countries.
Yet complications arising from this well-meaning policy soon created
unforeseen problems.
In 1894 the terra "good offices," as defined by most international
legal experts, signified the offer of "unofficial" and "impartial"
advice by a third party to two disputants, sometimes as a first step
toward raediation but more coiaiBonly as a means of maintaining useful
comir.unications into and out of nations at war- The United States,
vhile traditionally advocating the peaceful settlement of international
disputes, had offered its good offices sparingly during the nineteenth
century, limiting then: primarily to disputes among Latin American
countries. Yet, the Ai^.erican treaty with Korea of May 22, 1882,
specified thc':'t "if other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with
either Government, the other will exert their good offices, on being
informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus
showing their friendly feelings." In such a case, much more was implied
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than a narrow and technical diplomatic function.^
Despite opposition to the implementation of the Korean treaty,
Gresham had established a precedent by using good offices in an atteiript
to alleviate the tensions between Japan and China on the Korean pen-
insula. Shortly aften^ard, the State Department began to consider yet
another extension of the good offices concept* Should this function
nov include the protection of Japanese property and subjects in China
and the same for China in Japan? During the last V7eek of June 1894,
the Japanese government had requested Dun to inquire whether the United
States would "use its good offices to protect Japanese archives and
2
subjects in China." Gresham cabled Dun that if the Japanese government
withdrew its minister frora Peking and requested American good offices,
"the request would receive the President's friendly consideration, but
3
it would not be granted v7ithout the assent of China."
During preliminary discussions American officials voiced little
concern over the idea that the meaning of goad offices might be extended
to protect belligerent interests. Such an interpretation would go
beyond the role of impartial intermediary, suggesting instead possible
instances of intervention, even if accomplished under the broad intent
of impartiality. International law recognized that the term could be
"somewhat elastic" but its definition had never really included the use
of good offices to protect property and parsons of warring powers.
Yet, Charles Denby Jr. assured the State Department that international
law provided for expansion of the service and Washington failed to
4
ques t i o n th i s cone ep t .
Preparing for expected Sino-JapanBse hostilities in late July,
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the State Department instructed American agents in China and Japan to
reprer»ent unofficially and upon request belligerent interests in their
respective countries. Confused by these instructions, consular repre-
sentatives requested further definition of their duties under good
offices. Young Denby distributed a circular to consuls on July 31 in
vhich he explained that American diplomatic representatives in Asia
would protect Japanese in case of war without diplomatically representing
Japan. The acting minister added that the consuls might become
custodians of Japanese consulates and archives but could not fly the
American flag over Japanese property nor act as Japanese consular
agents, Ihe State Departrient failed to help young Denby clarify these
instructions, only adding to the puxclenient by noting that the "raising
the flag of the United States over buildings ov7ned or occupied in China
by the Japanese Goverriment would be perfectly proper and according to
precedent."^
The Japanese charge d'affaires and his entire legation staff
vacated Peking on August 1 leaving the Americans in charge of Japan's
interests in China. Informing the Tsungli Yamen of the Atnerican
responsibility, young Denby requested the Chinese Foreign Office to
issue "stringent orders" to local authorities designed to protect
6
Japanese subjects travelling from the interior to the treaty ports.
Good offices, almost from their inception, contributed to
misunderstanding and tension between American diplcniatic representatives
and the Chinese. On August 2 Consul Sheridan P. Read, in
accordance
with his instructions, escorted the Japanese consul's wife and
children
through hostile and shouting Chinese i^obs to a waiting British
stearoer
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then coaling at a wharf in Tientsin. Later Chinese soldiers and
ruffians boarded the ship, hunting dov?n and forcibly rerrioving every
Japanese passenger, including i?omen and children. Read at once inter-
vened, demanding that Li Hung-chang reprimand the soldiers and permit
the Japanese to return to Japan. Li complied, apologizing profusely,
but the incident reinforced Chinese assumptions that the Americano were
somehow allied with Japan.
^
Meanwhile Consul -General H^omas R. Jernigan at Shanghai announced
that the Department's instructions "so disquieted Americans that I
was pressed to conirnunicate with you (Uhl) . . . submitting that the
course of the United States tov^ards China and Japan be absolutely neutral
in the interest of American interests in both countries." Jernigan
further indicated that good offices Loight be construed as favorable to
Japan and "would tend to transfer to American residents in China the
intense animosity ot the Chinese for Japanese and especially endanger
g
the lives of American missionaries in the interior of this Empire."
Although generally less critical than the Chinese situation, good
offices in Japan also caused difficulty, N. W* Ilclvor, the American
consul-general at Kanagawa, reported that when soire Chinese were stoned
by a Japanese mob, he assumed protection of some five hundred persons
9
making their way to the docks to board the China-bound Oceanic . The
Chinese in Japan complicated matters by insisting that the Americans
now held diplomatic as well as legal jurisdiction over them, which of
coiirse the State Department denied. Coed offices clouded the line where
Americaia authority ended and Japanese jurisdiction began. The Japanese
reser^tcd Chinese claims that only the United States had authority over
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their subjects in Japan, announcing by Imperial Ordinance that
"Chinese subjects in Japan shall be wholly subject to the jurisdiction
of the Japanese courts. "^^ Mclvor assured Japan that the United States
"had net sided with anybody," but acted as "a friend of good order and
civilization" in Asia, which mollified Japanese officials,
Up to this point the Cleveland administration had suffered only
minor embarrassraents from its broad application of good offices* It
was not prepared, hov;ever, for the question of Japanese spies in China.
For years the Japanese intelligence services had infiltrated China v;ith
agents disguised ac students, merchants and even religious men. They
supplied the Japanese aririy with detailed maps of the countryside and
sketches and descriptions of major fortifications and arsenals. The
Chinese obtained some knowledge of this network and with the declaration
of war announced severe punishment for any Japanese captured as a
military spy. llie Chinese suspected almost every Japanese, and this,
combined with American assuinption of the protection of Japanese in
China, led to a volatile situation. Charles Denby Jr. tried to avoid
a confrontation by urging the Chinese "to proceed with moderation and
to be influenced rather by motives of humanity than by bitterness toward
Japan" and to deport rather than execute suspected spies.
With the outbreak of hostilities, Japanese citizens in China
flocked to the treaty ports in preparation for their flight to Japan.
At Shanghai Jernigan promised members of the Jap^^nese community that
they would be safe under his protection if they reiiiained in China. The
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first test of Jernigan's promise occurred on August 10 when two
Japsnese students accused of spying sought protection in the American
consulate under the auspices of good offices. Shanghai sweltered in an
extraordinary heat wave which had kept the mercury at over one hundred
degrees for more than a week. The heat bothered Jernigan but not nearly
as much as the need to implement a policy, the pitfalls of which he
had already recognized. Although the consul-general wanted to avoid
involvement, he refused to hand the Japanese over to Chinese authori-
^, 13ties.
The Chinese Foreign Office instructed its minister in IJashington
If
to protest Jernigan's decision. Yang Yu informed Gresham th^^t China
demanded the irru-aediste surrender of the two Japanese in Jernigan's
possession. Taken completely by surprise, the Secretary of State cabled
young Danby to "report iirtmediately and fully" on the Chinese complaint.
Gresham added that legally "our legation and consulates in China are
not authorized to hold Japanese accused of crime against the demand of
14
Chinese authorities."
In reply the acting minister defended Jernigan, explaining that
the two Japanese wearing Chinese clothes had been arrested by the French
consul in the French concession in the International Settlement. Ihe
Japanese had requested asylum in the American compound under the good
offices provisions until the case could be investigated. Jernigan had
granted this fully in line with his interpretation of the State
Department's instructions to protect all Japanese in China. Doubting
the rights of China in the case, Chsrles Denby Jr. advised Gresham that
important principles were involved and that the Secretary should not
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act precipitately.^^ The spy case enmeshed Gresham in the controversy
between the western interpretation of treaty rights (extraterritoriality)
and China's legal claims. Moreover, when Jernigan and the younger D^nby
asserted that surrender of the two alleged spies, whom they claimed to
be only poor students, meant terrible torture and decapitation of
"innocent victims" by the barbaric Chinese, Gresham confronted a moral
as well as a le^^A dilemma.
It
Meanwhile Chinese minister Yang Yu reminded Gresham that,
despite their interview of August 18, American representatives had not
surrendered the spies to the pi'oper authorities* Lacking inforraation,
the Secretary deferred action until he received further v7ord from China.
Kc castigated young Denby for having failed to dispatch a full report
16
of the case to Washington.
The acting fainister waited until August 26 to cable Gresham that
the Japanese had been arrested in the foreign settlement and therefore
must be tried by foreign consuls, in this case the American consul acting
for Japan. Stressing that Jernigan had called the alleged spies "mare
school-boys, peacefully and openly living at Shanghai," Charles Denby Jr.
requested instructions for the consul-general to try the case in a mixed
court of both foreigners and Chinese officials.^^ The same day young
Denby further defied the State Department in a case" involving another
accused spy at Ningpo. John Fowler, American consul at Ningpo and a
cloue Boston friend of leading anti-administration spokesman Henry Cabot
I-odge, had conplained to the acting minister that the Chinese had seized
a Japanese priest and without evidence had sentenced him to death for
spying. Fowler denounced the Chinese action, asking the Peking legation
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for instructions. Charles Denby Jr. replied: "Gresham's orders
positive
. . .
consuls cannot protect Japanese secured of crime • • .
you may use friendly offices to secure trial; if refused no alterna-
tive." He then added his ovm corollary to Gresham's instructions,
stating that if a Japanese accused of crime desired refuge, the Atiierican
legation in Peking considered it "lawful" to retain him until the
18
Chinese presented reasonable proof of guilt.
Learning of the younger Denby 's insubordination, the Secretary
of State tried to spell out a view of good offices acceptable to the
United States government.
You and Consul General at Shanghai seem to misapprehend
nature of protection authoriKed. Lending good offices does
not invest Japanese vith extraterritoriality nor should
legation or consulates be made asyluni for Japanese v;ho violate
local laws or conjiiiit belligerent acts. Protection to be
exercised unofficially and consistently with neutrality.
Consul General should not have received two Japanese and is
not authorized to hold them. Your susgestion that our
Consuls act as arbitrators not entertained.
Pressured by the Chinese, agitated by recalcitrant subalterns and
compromised by his own instructions, Gresham relied on his legal prepa-
ration rather than his inadequate diplomatic background. He forvarded
another coimuunication to the acting minister insisting that "you need to
be instrv^cted as to the nature of your duties" in regard to the care of
Japanese subjects under good offices. The Secretary stressed the
unofficial aspect of good offices, explaining that it vas unconsti-
tutional for an American diploinatic representative to act officially for
the subjects of another nation, Furthennore, Gresham reniinded young
Denby that since the Japanese could not be considered citizens of the
Uxiitcd States, they were not subject to the laws of that country.
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Finally, the Secretary asserted that it v;as inconsistent with the law3
of neutrality to show special favor, such as Jerragan's action
comprised, for either side. In closing the former Indiana judge assured
Colonel Denby's son that precedents for the use of good offices existed,
citing as exazriples the American offer to Mexico in 1867, in the Franco-
Prussian War of 1870 and for years on behalf of Swiss Republic's
20
citizens in Caina.
Abstract legal principles did not interest the stubborn acting
minis tex' as much as the humanitarian question of tvjo Japanese who, he
vas firmly convinced, v^ere not spies. He begged Gresham to delay this
"unconditional surx-ender to /the/ Chinese Government" until his father
arrived back ix\ Peking. GreshEm replied curtly, "My instructions 29th
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clear." Realizing that he could resist no longer, Charles Denby Jr.
instructed Jernigan on Septejnber 1 to turn the two students over to
Chinese authorities. Ke expended his anger by sending to Gresham an
elaborate and condescending explanation of vrestern law in China.
The forraer Princeton scholar stated that the foreign concession
in Shanghai contained a multiple legal code and that "mixed courts"
with a Chinese magistrate and a foreign assessor tried criminal cases
in the international coirjiiunity . Kc hinted that Gresham' s action
threatened to undermine the treaty systeni and set a dangerous precedent
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for the future viability of western extraterritoriality in China.
Jernigan underrnined this interpi-etation , however, when he admitted that
the foreign con-jnunity, and not his conception of American legal
obligations, had forced him to ask for a mixed court.
While the Shanghai affair was consuming most of the State
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Department energy, good offices v;ere causing trouble for Americans in
other parts of China, On September 3, Jacob T. Child, the American
consul at Hankow, reported that his marshal had resorted to force
vhile protecting Japanese in that treaty port. Child had ordered
his officer to escort a Japanese businessman to a steamer bound for
Shanghai; however, when a mob of about two thousand Chinese blocked
the path, the Americans had used a "display of rifles" to ensure his
passage. The Chinese accused Child of acting "as an accessary /.sic/
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to the escape of a spy," calling the American "dishonorable/*
Several days later at Tientsin, Consul Read became involved in
the controversy over the ctipture of an alleged Japanese spy named
Ishikawa Yoichi. Read had suspected Ishika^^a of clandestine activity
even before the declaration of war and advised the Japanese to take him
to Japan when they abandoned Tientsin. Certain that Ishikav/a had
departed. Read had assured Li Hung-chang that Tientsin harbored no
undesirable Japanese. Much to the consul's embarrassment, Ishikax-?a
Yoichi was captured in September as he emerged from the home of the
chief secretary' of the Director of the Ordnance Department of Chinese
customs- Though Read believed that Ishikawa was a spy, the Japanese
claimed that he was not and fully expected Read to use good offices to
obtain his release. Read had hardly begun to protest when the Chinese
decapitated Ishikawa, thus freeing at least one American official from
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the good offices dilejonia.
Mean-w'hile, Tliird Assistant Secretary William W. Rockhill, absent
from Washington when Greahara ordered the surrender of the two Japanese
students, returned in early September and unsuccessfully attempted to
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convince the Secretary to view the case "realistically" rather than on
purely "abstract" legal grounds. At about the same time the press
began to comment on the spy case. Newspapers deplorod Gresham's action,
claiming that the spies had already been beheaded. For example, the
^Sii eans Picayune called Gresham*s instruction "a cowardly act,"
noting that "the pledge of the United States to protect Japanese
subjects in China is a mockery, and should be at once withdrawn, so
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that Japan may be able to secure the good offices of some other pov^er."
Public discussion of the spy cf:se sdded to Ihomas Jemigan's
dejection. He felt betrayed and tormented. As a friend of Assistant
Secretary Rockhill vrote from China, the consul-general had "the
Japanese spies on the brain & can talk of nothing else; & not v;ith r^iuch
dignity he inspires or v/rites himself articles belauding his own actions
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e.nd belittling that of the State Dspt." On September 21 Jernigan
presented the Department with a lengthy manuscript justifying his actions
He explained that, while never acting officially, he had retained the
Japanese because of the "then excited state of the Chinese mind" which
would have "meant death to the young men within twenty four hours."
Jeraigan repeated his assertion that the foreign comjrainity in the
international settlement at Shanghai had requested that the consul-
general hold a trial by mixed court. He added that" the Department's
action threatened American lives in a similar situation if the United
States ever waged war on China. Then corrjnenting on Yang Yu's influence
on the Secretary of State, Jernigan noted that "mistakes may have been
Biade . - . but the suspicious nature of the Chinese mind may well be
properly rebuked when attenipting to offer its attributes as the standard
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by which to judge an officer of the United States." Closing his brief,
Jernigan suiriiaarized
:
Viewed from a legal standpoint, the ca&e presented
no difficulty, but I had been instructed to protect
Japanese interests and here V7as a case that appeared,
not to lav7, but to hvimanity, I was not asked to intervene
legally, officially, but as a man having the confidence of
both China and Japan, and desirous of being just to both and
at least humane to the imperilled subjects of the one whose
interest I had been published as being the representative
at thisS port, ^
Jernigan in^plied that the State Department misunderstood conditions in
China. He became convinced that Greshara's instructions not only
condemned the Japanese to death and endangered other Japanese in China,
but also destroyed the consul-general's dignity and effectiveness as a
representative of the United States.
The Chinese minister In Washington, meanwhile, assured Gresham
that his Govern^nent would not punish the students until Colonel Denby
returned to his ministerial post in Peking. He visited Gresham several
times, insisting that "reports in the American papers to the effect that
the two alleged spies had been beheaded by the Chinese Government were
untrue." Even Jernigan admitted this. In a cablegram of October 9,
sent to "be3ie newspaper reports" about the death of the two spies,
Jernigan intintated that the two were alive and well. On October 22,
however, Jernigan reported that the two accused students had been
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tortured and decapitated in conformity v;ith Chinese law.
ISie controversy had subsided by the end of November, when IIavper!s_
^Je^lilj^ correspondent Julian Ralph resurrected it. Locking for sen-
sational copy, Ralph interviewed the tozrm.entcd Thomas Jernigan.
Exaggerating many of the consul-general's coi-nments, Ralph hurried an
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article to Harper clairAlng thi^t the Jr.pane&e spies had been "tortured
V7ith horrible ingenuity and devil ishness, every day with a nev?
brutality, for seven days," iinrplying that American helplessness in
Asia hsd condemned them to this horrible death. He alleged further,
embellishing on Jernigan's suspicions, that the "oily rogue" of a
Chinese minister in Washington had blinded the Secretary of State to
reality and inade him believe that the Japanese V70uld be treated
humanely ."^^
Reprinted throughout the United States, Ralph's article ignored
all evidence to the contrary in claiming that Gresham himself had acted
to condemn the two students to a most barbaric and brutal desth. Ralph
even asserted that the United States Senate had decided to investigate
Gi^csham's conduct of the affair "solely upon ny vjritten vord," Yet,
on the very day that Ralph's revelations appeared, Theodore Roosevelt
suggested to Keury Cabot Lodge that he ought to des^and all the official
correspondence concerning the spy case for a Senrite investigation.
Roosevelt told Lodge on December 1, "It seems to me that this brutal
stupidity and cowardice of Greshaiu in the matter of the surrender of
the two Japanese calls for the niost decided and prompt action
....
If possible I vish he could be iir^peached." Roosevelt's wrath
was based
upon his idea that Gresham had failed a test of manliner^s but
for
Lodge it was a political opportunity to castigate the Cleveland
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administration and increase his own stature in the Republican
Party.
On Decei^ber 3, Lodge requested that the Senate be
shown the
correspondence relative to the delivery of the two Japanese
"If not
incompatible with the public interest.
"^^ Greshai. resisted pressure
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to turn the docuraents over. He urged John T* Morgan of Aisfcaiuaj the
administration's spokesman on the Foreign Relations Coiirmittee, to bring
a Republican member of the coiranittee (Gresham suggested Senator John
Shetman of Ohio) to his office to read the correspondence In private
and then report back to the ConsTiittee. Gresham warned Morgan, considered
by some an um/illing defender of Cleveland's policy, that:
Publication at this time of the correspondence taight
be haraful . The Chinese Minister tells me tncX he is
daily expecting his copy of the treaty betv/eea Chlr^a and the
United States for exchange of ratifications, and the treaty
between this governtnent and Japan v^s only sent to the
Senate yesterday. There are some things in the correspcnderice
the publication of v;hich might irritate China, perhaps offend
her. 34
The Secretary of State penned an identical letter to Senator Sher?nan
and evidently convinced the two lawmakers that they should try to curb
Lodge's Senate criticis3ii of the administration.
The question of releasing the spy case docuniei^ts was debated oa
December 5th. Shem^an suggested that the whole jnatter be referred to
the CojBmittee on Foreign Relations rather than dumped on the Senate.
This afforded Lodge an opportunity to criticize the State Departnisnt.
•The llassachusetts Senator iir.plied that the failure to protect the two
Japanese "is an act of the greatest possible discredit to the htuoanity
of the United States and to the huiijanity of all civilised men." Citing
Ralph's article as his evidence, Lodge assumed that the Japanese,
relying on Atiierican good offices, were turned over to "the most hideous
torture that it is possible to conceive." The Senator stated that "an
c^;planntion is duo to the A.;r.erican people for such an Incident.
Like Sherxiian, Senator Morgan also asked that the affair b^ sent
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to the Foreign Relations Conmiittee since "war is flagrant betv7een Japan
and China, and the least interference on the part of the Senate of the
United States which might be considered as favoring the one side or
the other of those belligerents would be an unfortunate circumstance
at this particular time." Pressed to explain why he thought the
resolution should go to the committee, Morgan defended the administration
Kc contended that imputations of guilt against the President, the
Secretary of State or American diplomatic agents in China ought to be
most carefully considered before being publicly debated on the floor
of Congress.
Lodge insisted that his resolution had simply called for tha
facts of the case and he could not understand why it would influence
American relations with China and Japan. Then the Republican Senator
revealejd a deeper motive for wanting to bring the issue before the
Senate:
J'B have done a good deal of unproductive, if not mischievous,
Ei.eddling in that war already, bt-ginning by warning Japan
from interfering with Korea, when the war was between China
and Japan and not between Japan and Korea. From that time
©rs we have been meddling in one way or another, and I think
Mr. President, that it seems an extraordinary objection to
Exake new to an inquiry as to facts to be told that we may
render our relations uncomfortable with either China or
Japan • . . . I propose this inquiry because I think on the
facts ss stated to the people of the United States we are .
pxit in an attitude which is simply hundliating and dis-
graceful. If it be true that we gave up these men to torture
and to death without a single inquiry after we had an under-
standing with the Chinese Government that we should give
©afe conduct to just such citizens in order to get theni out
©f that country, then a heavy burden of misdoing rests on
somebody* ^
Despite Lodge's pleas, Sherrr.an's motion to defer the question to the
cosimittee passed and the Senate recessed for the holidays.
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During this interval Gresham wrote to the senior Denby, who
at last had arrived in Peking: "The v?holc correspondence will go to
Congress when it assembles after the holidays and some of your son's
despatches may and doubtless will be seized upon by the Republicans in
their effort to damage the State Department." He complained that all
of this trouble could have been averted had Jernigan acted promptly
on his Instructions. In closing Gresham told Denby, "I do not expect
any real trouble to come from the matter, however, and hope you will
37
not let it annoy you."
Even so, the spy case continued to annoy Gresham, weakening his
health, and increasing his irascibility. The Secretary turned on
Yang Yu for what he believed was the Chinese minister's betrayal of
trust xn having promised that the Chinese would wait for Denby 's return
before pimishing the two Japanese. Gresham wrote Yang, "I regret to
eay that there is reason to believe that the men were executed before
the return of Colonel Denby to Pekin, and therefore, in derogation of
the volxmtary promise which you assured me your Governiiient had made."
The Chinese minister replied that his government had never promised
anything but only to take the matter under consideration and that
Gresham had misunderstood the conversation. "It was established by
proof that /the two students? had furnished information to their
Government by means of ciphers in which seventy six telegraphic messages
in all were sent by them, giving reports of the movement of troops
and
of military matters." Hence, Yang concluded, the Chinese government
could not wait for the American minister's return to dispense justice.
Gresfersn pressed the issue in further correspondence but Yang Yu
86
refused to debate it, assuring Greshani that their differences were
38
merely a regrettable misunderstanding.
Incensed by the epithet that "the blood of these tortured and
murdered Japs is on his head," as well as by F^alph's accusations,
Greshara tried to win a more favorable press. He compiled an unsigned
defense for the New York Evening Post, and that paper's editor agreed
that, while the execution of the tvjo Japanej^e was unfortunate, "it
seems that the outcry lately raised against Secretary Gresbsra for not
preventing it is as disproportionate to the occasion as it is groundless
and sensational." Ihe ^JSyl^J^S. ^SHSiSi also defended Gresham,
expliiining that while "it may be regrettable that we cannot prevent
such crimes," evers "Japan admitted /th^t/ it is not within our legal
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rights to do so."
The controversy raged through January 1895. Public disclosure
of the documents, combined with Greshara" s oim testimony before the
Senate on January 16, convinced papers such as the New York World^ that
the Secretary of State had "made a blunder vThich seeir^s to be almost a
crime ... his surrender of the two Japanese students to be tortured
and put to death by the Chinese at Shanghai appears to have been wholly
unjustified." The World maintained that even Charles Denby believed
that the Japanese "boys" were "probably guiltless," raising serious
doubts es to whether Gresham had any evidence that they were spies.
l?'SL l2lit Bierely wondered: "Is
Gresham in his right mind?"
Ironically, Denby himself in a confidential dispatch sent to
Gresham on December 31 (though not received by the State Department
until March 1) supplied evidence that at least one of the
trvo victims
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had been part of an elaborate spy network in China. Denby gathered
information about the training and procedure of Japanese espionage
agents and noted that at one time there vere as many as thirty spies
in Shanghai alone. "I have it on the best authority," the minister said,
"that one of the alleged Japanese spies vho was arrested at Shanghai,
and over whose fate so many tears have been shed, was one of these
detailed officers." Denby disclosed that every village in the projected
war zone had been infiltrated by Japanese agents disguised as
storekeepers, raonks, laborers, merchants and students. "Ihis infor^
mation, I think you will agree v;ith me, tends greatly to sliov that a
vast amount of undeserved sympathy has been wasted on Japjmcse spies,
both in our own country and in this." Even Jernigan admitted that one
of the Japanese students was a spy. He told Assistant Secretary Uhl
that, had he been allowed to try the case, he would "probably have
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committed one and liberated the other."
While these revelations eased some minds, they could not affect
the central problei:is raised by the case. The State Department had
created a broad general policy without first giving thought to its
practical impleraentation. Forced to send precise directions to its
agents in Asia, it learned too late that this task was impossible.
ttie United States continued to employ its good offices to register
Japanese in China and Chinese citizens in Japan, to urge the belligerents
not CO attack enemy merchant ships and lighthouse tenders and eventually
to open channels of ccmn'.unication for peace negotiations. None of
these functions, however, embarrassed the United States so much as
promises based upon the vague assumption that good offices meant
protection of subjects of one country residing in enemy territory.
Prompted by a sense of principle, the administration had made a
kind of promise which could have one of tv:o results; to keep the
prorflise would certainly destroy American neuti^ality and might even
lead to dangerous involvement, v;hile not to keep it would result in
humiliation. The administration endured the latter, a burden which
weighed most heavily upon the shoulders of the Secretary of State*
His friends considered it an important cause for the rapid deterioration
of his health, leading to the Secretary's death in the spring of 1895-
CHAPTERV
THE BATTLES AT PING YANG AND YALU
After reports of the Kowshing affair in late July, Americans
had anticipated early news of pitched battles betvjeen huge armies
interspersed vjith reports of colossal naval engagements. Instead
they received rumors of minor skiTrmishes between Chinese and Japanese
foragers. China and Japan had utilized the first month of the war
to strengthen their positions in Korea. The Chinese had built massive
earthv';orks around the northern garrison town of Ping Yang, while at
Chemulpo squadrons of Japanese transports unloaded troops and supplies.
Minister Sill and his legation secretary, Horace Allen, both agreed
that conditions in Korea were unusually calm.
Lacking exciting news, Americans continued to speculate upon
the scope of coming battles, the terrible barbarities which were
certain to result, Chinese court rivalries and other oriental intrigues
On one day China was said to have purchased the Chilean na^'y, while on
the next the Asian rivals were described as discussing an armistice.
The smallest event, so long as it was concrete, received inordinate
attention. An example occurred on September 14, when the State
Department decided to send Lieutenant Michael J. O'Brien of Boston,
an instructor of military art at Fort Leavenworth Infantry and Cavalry
School, to travel with the Japanese aimy. Hie Richn^.d StaL^
predicted
"If our army officer, attached to the staff of the Japanese
general.
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should be taken prisoner, the Chinese government would behead hira first
2
and apologize to the United States government later."
American observers in Asia believed that the month of silcnca
suggested preparations for a major battle somev7herc in northern Korea.
Admiral Charles C. Carpenter, studying the steady debarkation of
Japanese infantry, cavalry and artillery at CheTnulpo, related to
Secretary of the Navy Hilary Herbert that a battle appeared imminent.
Concurrently, Allen ascertained that as many as 108,000 Chinese troops
were now facing two Japanese army corps of pe^rhaps 70,000 men at the
3
city of Ping Yang.
The aiicient walled stronghold of Ping Yang dominated the road
through northern Korea to Manchuria. During August the Chinese
reinforced the massive walls with loopholcd and moated earthworks,
garrisoned by picked soldiers reportedly armed with American Winchester
rifles and supported by Krupp and Catling guns. Tne six Chinese
generals flying their banners at Ping Yang were confident that their
lines of infantry, artillery and select llanchurian cavalry, brandishing
fifteen foot lances, would check the invading "dwarf-men" (iiOjJ^n)
from Japan. Chinese officers cavorted with Ping Yang*s supple dancing
girls, V7hile their soldiers broke into Korean homes and made themselves
4
comfortable with the city's wives and daughters.
Japanese General Oshima, at the head of a coluran of highly-
trained infantry, watched Chinese revelry from the surrounding hills.
Taking advantage of the situation, Oshima's soldiers attacked the
southern outer forts and after heavy fighting drove cut the Chinese
defenders. Three additional Japanese units joined Cshima's force and
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systematically began to assault Ping Yang in bayonet charges covered
by devastating rifle and artillery fire. At first the Manchu army
inflicted heavy casualties with the repeating rifles, but soon the
Japanese learned to hug the ground and let the Chinese fire furiously
and ineffectively until they ran out of atnnunition. Ihen Oshinia's
men charged, and often the defenders threv down their empty rifles and
fled into the countryside. The only Ajnerican correspondent at Ping
Yang, dapper James Creelman of the Nev; York World , reported the
intensity of the battle:
Blood, blood everywhere- «on the walls, in the rippling
river, on the green hillsides, in the flowering valleys.
Blood trickling over gravestones, blood dashed against
the vails of the ancient temples, blood on the rocks,
blood on the roof-tops-'evers^-^here the cold gleam of
^
steel in the swirling cannon mist and sheeted flame * . « .
The reporter also noted the torrential rains which inundated the
battlefield during most of the twenty-two hour contest for Ping Yang
and turned the fields into a quagmire of mud and mangled men and horses.
The Japanese repulsed £uicid3l charges by the ^^3nchurian cavalry, then
penetrated the inner defenses of the city. The Chinese garrison
retreated, allegedly cutting off the heads and hands of dead and wounded
Japanese as they retired. The Japanese victory at Ping Yang was complete
and Chinese armies fled from Korea.
Tlic first news of the battle reached the United States through
dispatches transmitted to London from Shanghai and Tientsin and then
sent on to New York, Ihe dispatch of September 15 announced that China
had turned back the Japanese attack at Ping Yang, ^^lis was refuted
the
next day by a report from the Central News Agency in Tokyo, claiming
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that the Japanese had gained the victory* The Atlanta Constitution
,
for one, accepted the Japanese version, noting that "Jackson's defeat
of the British at New Orleans fell far short of this showing By
Septerrl>er 18 American newspapers were in general agreement that the
Chinese had been "utterly routed" at Ping Yang* Inaccurate initial
accounts of the battle were blamed on the Reuters nev/s sci-vice which
"foists" riev?s cooked in London legations off on the American press.
Newspapers began to rely upon the United Press Service which provided
Central News Agency dispatches from Tokyo, thus assuring a pro«Japanesc
6
press treatment
«
America's major newspapers--including the A tlanta Cons t i tut ion
,
Baltimore Araerican, Boston Herald, New York Tribune, New York V.|£rld_,
£hijL§5^£lpM5. llHHiE.^' Standard Ujlion, Sa^n Francij:co Ex-.rniTig.r
end others'-pr^iised Japan's great victory, "Ping Yang v;as not a matter
of luck," the Boston Herald explained, "but the result of scientific
preparation and calculation • . . inspired with an intelligence equal
to that exhibited by many Europesn governments." After surveying the
week's press treatment of Ping Yang, Public Opinion magazine concluded
that Japan "has won for herself what has heretofore been persistently
denied her, a degree of admiration and respect that insure her hereafter
an equsl place among the civilized powers of the world." The Army and
Navy Hegister, while praising Japan's "superior strategy," warned that
China might quickly replenish her losses and that this Japanese victory
7
could merely prolong the war and force China to resist change.
Some Americans questioned the facile tendency to equate military
prowess with superior civilization. Pveporting that after the victory
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"the atmosphere /in Japan/ is electric vith spirit of war • . . the army
is mad with enthusiasm . . . the Government is drunk with egotism,"
Jarnes Creelrnan suggested that Ping Yang augured a spirit of unhealthy
militarism in Asia and hinted that Japan would one day become a threat
to the Western pov/ers. The Eoston Globe noted that "having shown her
power as a scientific murderer, Japan has earned the right to be counted
among the civilized nations of the world." Dwight W. Learned, an American
missionary in Kyoto, v:ho observed closely Ping Yang's influence on Japan,
commented: "'j?hese victories naturally stimulate Japanese self-confidence
and the feeling seems to be rapidly grov?ing that it is Japan's mission
to lead all Asia, and after regenerating China to stimulate aid to India
for independence." Despite these prophetic warnings, the meraory of
Ping Yang faded as news of another monumental battle reached the United
g
States.
While the battle for Ping Yang raged, units of the Chinese and
Japanese navies gathered in the Yellow Sea. In July and August both
the specialized and general press in /unerica had commented on the naval
strength of the two combatants, predicting that a Sino-Japanese war
might be the testing ground for modern warships. Noting that Annapolis
had graduated two Japanese naval officers each year since 1872 and that
"the Japanese officers are faithful students of Captain Mahan, the
Araerican naval historian," a number of obsei-vers viewed the Japanese
navy C3 an American protege and waited for the titanic encounter that
would prove its superiority. As Captain Benjamin Franklin Day of the
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Baltimore stated, "the Annapolis men among them (the Japanese navy)
are the smartest sailors and have the most important commands." The
coming test betv^ecn the navies of China and Japan would be the
"greatest naval war" since the American Civil War. The predicted
encounter vould also provide technical information. "The navies of
China and Japan contain specimens of about all the various types of
ships V'hich have been evolved in the last generation and a great deal
9
of light will doubtless be thrown upon their relative utility."
The Japanese fleet cruising near Ping Yang in early September
1894 included a "flying squadron" of British-built cruisers Yoshlno
,
Takachiho> N5niv7a and Akitsushima . already battle-tested in the brief
encounter with Chinese warships and transports on July 25, The 4150-
ton steel cruiser X£5Mii2.» reputed to be the fastest ship in the world
when tested in 1893, was armed with an assortment of quick-firing guns
and five fixed torpedo tubes. The other three cruisers all displaced
over 3,000 tons and, although not capable of the Yoshino' s tv/enty- three
knots, could maintain a steady eighteen or nineteen knots under full
steam. These unarmored steel cruisers shared basically the same light-
calibre, quick-firing attributes of the Yoshino and together they
comprised a tough and mobile group designed to intercept and destroy
convoys
.
On September 17a larger Japanese squadron under Vice-Admiral
Ito, an imposing figure with his heavy epaulettes and cabre-scarred
face, joined the "flying squadron" at Kaiyang Island near the mouth
of the Yalu River. Ito's group contained the HatsushiLia, Itsukushima ,
Hp.shidate, Chiy^a, Fu^o. Kiyei., Akagi and Snikyo. The first three
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were coastal defense ships built by the French betv/een 1889-1891.
Slower than the cruisers but each displacing 4,277 tons, ^rmed with
thirty~tv?o ton Canet guns in opan-topped barbettes with tvelve-inch
armor plate and further equipped with a large number of small, quick-
firing guns, the Matpushima, Itsukushima and Hashidate provided the
backbone of the fleet. Tney were reinforced by the armored 2450 -ton
British-built cruiser Chiyod a and the ancient, bark-rigged Fu?o, a
former British iron-armored cor\'ctte* The obsolete armored cruiser
Hiyei
,
the dispatch gunboat Akagji and the cumbersome, armed merchant
^^^P Saikyq brought up the rcar.^^
Early on the morning of the 17th the Japanese fleet npotted the
smoke of a large group of ships approaching from the east. This was
the Chinese Peiyang squadron under the command of Admiral Ting Ju-ch*ang,
a former Anhvrei army general. The Chinese fleet boasted two 7430-tcn
Geriiian-buil t battleships, the Chen Yuan and the Ting Yuan, reputed to
be more powerful than the Maine or Texas of the United States Navy* A
fourtcen-inch armor belt and four twelve-inch Krupp cannons protected
the Yuan sister ships. Ten German and British-constructed cruisers
If II ft
accompanied the battleships. The Lai-Yuan, Ping-Yuan and the Chin.<>-Yuan
all displaced over 2,800 tons and, though slower than their Japanese
opponents, carried heavier armor. Assorted vessels supported the
battleships and armored cruisers—including the two Armstrong ram
cruisers, Ch'ao Yung^ and Yan^^ Wei, the 2300-ton unarmored cruisers
Chih-Yuan and Chinp Yuan, the gunboat Kuang^ Shl3.* torpedo cruiser
SiiS^S. ZyiS. 2355-ton steel cruiser Chi-Yuan .- China possessed
a number of other steel warships in the southern-based Nanyang, Fukien
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and Kwantung squadrons, but the lack of central contmand, combined v?ith
provincial jealousy, had prevented their concentration in northern
vaters. Nevertheless the Chinese squadron which steamed toward the
Korean coast appeared more than the equal of the Japanese fleet.
Aboard were several foreign advisers, including an American Annapolis*
trained naval mercenary, Philo Norton McGiffin, to offset the Japanese
Annapolis graduates.
The fleets closed, the smaller Chinese warships strung out line
abreast on either side of the tx*70 battleships, forming a loose wedge*
This formation offered the battleships Tnaximura firepov/er but greatly
reduced their laanauverability . Western advisers later clairaed that
this formation had been ordered by the cowardly captain of the Ting^
Yuan to protect his own ship in the center- Ihe Japanese sprinted
forward in single-file formation or line ahead, the four cr-uisers of
the '^flying squadron" suddenly veering off and attacking the Chinese
flank while the main squadron crossed in front of, then around, the
Chinese formation. Tne Kwang- Pirx^^ and the Ping-Yuan slipped away
either to divert part of the Japanese fleet or, as some later claimed,
12in cowardly retreat.
The Japanese concentrated on the main group, singling out the
slower, weaker vessels for destruction, sinking the Ch'ao Yung and
Yang Wei before attacking the battleships* The engagejnent fragmented
into smaller group battles, the Chinese also first attacking the
weakest Japanese ships, Tne Ting. Yuan poured heavy fire into the
^Ai^eS, then turned on the Saikyo, destroying the latter's steering gear
and starting a fire* The Lai
-
Yuan led the attack on the small Aka^-i,
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ripping away masts and riddling its funnel. Somehow the damaged
Japanese vessels slipped av;ay, and suddenly tlie Chinese battleships
found themselves bct^.reen tv?o lines of Japanese cnaisers. For six
hours the opposing groups exchanged fire, hurling projectiles at each
II
other until the Chen Yuan alone had sustained over four hundred hits*
McGiffin, adviser on that battleship, reported that the Japanese
"rapid firing cannon" of four, five and six- inches pumped shot after
shot into the Chinese vessels and "riddled the Chinese Superstructures
with them; disabling unprotected guns, and driving their crews away,
besides setting on fire boats and all £th^/ wood work in unprotected
parts of the ship/' Japanese shells, houever, could not penetrate the
fourteen-inch annor belt of the battleships, and as dusk settled around
the sniOke"Obscured battle area the Japanese v?ithdrev7, fearing that
Chinese torpedo boats lurking on the fringes of the conflict would move
in and attack their criiisers.^^
Tiie Japanese had sunk the weak cruisers Ch'ao Yung^, XSIIS. KSi'
Chih-Yuan and King Yuan without the loss of a single vessel. German
II
mercenary Constantin von Kanneken, in charge of guns on the Ting Yuan,
later blamed corrupt officials and inferior technicians for having
supplied the battleships with armor-piercing shells instead of the more
effective bursting anjiiunition. "It's as clear as daylight that if the
Chiner.e had had the right thing in their big guns, they would have
14
punished the Japs very severely, and perhaps vron the battle*" The
reninants o£ the deraoralieed Chinese fleet limped into Port Arthur for
repairs. 'S'lie liiain fleet still existed; but Japan now effectively
controlled the sea routes to China and northern Korea without which she
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could not have carried on land operations during the next few months.
The State Department learned by ciphered telegr^ira on September 19
that a naval battle had occurred off the inouth of the Yalu River*
Charles Denby Jr. informed Greshara that the Chinese had lost at least
five vessels and the Japanese three. Coiranander Robert E. Impey of the
gunboat Konocacy
, then at Tientsin, repeated Dev-by's report, giving the
names of the Chinese ships believed lost. At the same time the Japanes
legation in Seoul first insisted that Japan had destroyed eleven
Chinese varshipSj then later lov/ered the estimate to seven while noting
that the Hatsushina, Hiyei and Akagj had suffered "soma damage." By
September 21, cables transmitted from Tokyo had convinced the American
16
governiiient that Japan had not lost a single ship at Yalu.
Nev;s of the "great naval battle" excited American naval experts
end newspapermen V7ho proceeded to study the effects of naval gunnery
on steel plate. As the anti-war Nation complained, "they rather
exclaim with a sort of bastard scientific enthusiasm, 'By Jove' old
Krupp was right after all!'" But the popular press and specialized
journals ignored E. L. Godkin's criticism and filled their columns with
analyses of the Yalu battle. For example, the Scientific American
called the battle "the most important naval engagement since the advent
of iron and steel in shipbuilding." As the Engineering News stated,
"Tests of guns and armor on a government proving ground are well enough
but this cannot compare with the tests of an actual battle" such as Yali
Newspapers echoed this theme. The New Orleans Picayune predicted
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that Yalu would be "carefully studied" as "the first practical test
in actual warfare of many of the modem appliances for naval defense/'
Stating that Yalu proved cruisers and small fast gunboats co^jld
defeat heavily-armored large battleships, the New York Tribune be-
lieved that the lesson of "Japan's Trafalgar" was "too obvious to
need further emphasis." At the same time the Springfield Republican
editorialized that Yalu "enjoys the distinction of being the first sea
fight of any magnitude, under modem conditions of steam, high-pov:er/^ed_/
guns and heavy armor • . • and on this account alone it must possess
considerable historical importance, V7hatever it's l_sic/ political
18
results may be."
The popularity of the naval battle prompted several Americans
supposedly serving on Chinese v/arships to capitalize on the publicity.
Raymond H. Hornbrook, claim.ing to have been an engineer on the ill-
fated Yang Wei_, sold his stories of the action for five dollars a column
to the San Francisco Chronicle and the New York Sun, According to
Hornbrook (or at least as the San Francisco Examiner asserted, an
"inebriated reporter" who doctored Hornbrook's stories), the Yan^ ^Tei
had not really been sunk but had single-handedly held off the entire
Japanese fleet and, once it had run cut of ammunition, had escaped the
swift Japanese cruisers. The r*ecord speed of the Chinese warship,
Hornbrook claim.ed, had been achieved by adding "a fresh bottle of gin"
to each stoker. The Examiner , a rival of the Chronicle , accused that
paper cf "Hornbrooking" the public. The Chronicle had "manufactured"
19
the stories and "humbugged" its readers with "a cheap outlay." In
fact, the Examiner doubted that Hornbrook ever had served on the Yan Wej
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and subsequent investigations confirmed the suspicion.
Yalu also made a short-term hero out of the American adviser on
n
the Chen Yuan , Phllo Norton McGiffin. No one doubted KcGiffin's
presence at Yalu. He had served as a naval instructor for Li Hung-chang
since 1885 and when the Sino-Japanese War broke out had volunteered
for sea duty. During the battle, McGiffin suffered a concussion,
partial loss of sight and lacerations--and he had pictures to prove it.
Th^ Nev; Orleans J^ipitSiS^ claimed that this "plucky ex-American naval
officer" vas really a hero, vith a Japanese rev/ard on his head for
$5000, The Century MagaEivie published his story and Richard Harding
Davis later included him in his collection of great war heroes. For a
time, McGiffin lectured on naval strategy and was cited by experts as
an authority on the subject of modern naval warfare. But when William
Ferdinand Tyler, a British adviser at the Yalu battle, revealed that
McGiffin, "queer before the fight," had contracted a "curious case of
partial brain affection" after the battle, becoming a "Yalu-maniac"
and telegraphing his exploits around the world, the public lost interest
in the hero. McGiffin later shot himself with his ov;n service revolver
20
in a New York hospital.
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan tnade far better material for hero
worship. Reporters rushed to Gravesend, England, where the Captain was
holding court aboard the cruiser Chicago. Here the world-rcnowncd
naval expert explained the meaning of Yalu. The Chinese fleet, he said,
had suffered from its duty to protect the troop convoys and consequently
operated too close to shore, enabling the Japanese to cut down its
Eianeuverabilitv. "It was a big engagement for modern vessels but I
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see nothing yet to lead me to suppose that the engagement will point
to the reconstruction or remodeling of V7ar vessels." Comiaenting
privately on tlhe Yalu battle to his friend in the Royal Engineers,
Major Sir George Clarke, Mahan said that the Sino-Japanese naval
display reinforced his own theories that modern warfare could not be
22
conducted without a "fleet superior" to a "fleet in being." For
Americans, Mahan was the greatest naval expert and since Japan had won
they concluded that the Japanese had followed Mahan* s teachings.
"Looking on the tactics and the results as a whole, they are flattering
to Ainericans, for the Japanese are pupils of Captain Mahan and the
23
Chinese are not . . . ."
Secretary of the Navy Hilary A. Herbert scrutinized battle
details more diligently than did Mahsn and raost of the others. Herbert,
ex-Confederate war hero and ardent expansionist, hoped to use the
"lessons" of Y-alu to stimulate interest in Congress and in the public
for increased ^r^val appropriations. Tnough his critics asserted that
he "did not toow the difference between a man-of-war and a wash-tub,"
Herbert actually had studied naval problems as chairman of the Senate
coiimixttee for^ naval appropriations and always had been sensitive to
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the criticism that the American navy was second-rate.
Herbert sjas collecting a scrapbook of news clippings concerning
naval action during the Sino-Japanese War. Despite popular acclaim for
the £t?ift cruisers supposedly victorious at Yalu, the Secretary paid
particislar attention to one clipping from the New York World of
Septonber 2Bth. "Ihe two Chinese battleships proved to be formidable
war s^Lachines.'* the World had noted. "They stood the battering of
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heavy, quick-firing guns admirably
. . . their upper structures were
severely damaged, but no shot penetrated to any vital part/' Other
naval officers supported this pro-battleship view. At the New York
meeting of naval architects and constructors held in November, Rear-
Adrairal Richard W, Meade, Jr. specified that *'there was nothing
connected V7ith the Yalu fight which disproves the hitherto generally
accepted theory of the superiority of the battle-ship as a fighting
vessel." Meade called for construction of more large battleships for
25
the United States Navy,
Herbert received a copy of a private letter written by Philo
McGiffin to a friend at the Norfolk Hydrographic Office (Virginia)
on November 13 which stressed the need for battleships. McGiffin, at
this time still regarded as an authority, wrote that he preferred
"battle-ships /ironclad^/ by all means for fighting." He stressed the
efficiency of rapid-firing guns and observed that all vjoodwork should
be removed from warships because of the extreme fire hazard, McGiffin
concluded that Chinese "official corruption and inefficiency," as well
as Japanese strategy and tenacity, had accounted for their victory,
.
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not the superiority of cruisers over battleships.
On December 12 Herbert received another letter, this one a
lengthy discussion of Yalu from the New York City police commissioner,
Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt revealed to the Secretary of the Navy
that he had obtained a detailed description of the battle and damage to
ships from a friend whom he preferred not to name (actually Speck von
Sternburg, military attache in the German Legation at Peking). Slipping
over to Port Arthur, Roosevelt's friend had examined the Chinese fleet
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immediately after the battle and reported that "they had received the
most terrific hammering, and if it had not been for their excellent
iron-clads, which did most of the fighting, under control of foreigners,
not a ship v?ould have returned." The letter concluded that "the most
27powerful cruisers cannot successfully fight ironclads .
"
Roosevelt's letter prompted Herbert to write an article about
Yalu, "The Fight off the Yalu River," which appeared in the November
edition of the North American RevieW ' Critical of suggestions in the
American press that future wars vjould be fought by sv^ift, unarmored
cruisers rather than heavy battleships, the Secretary asked: "Is there
anything in the recent naval developments to justify the conclusion
that the days of the battle-ship are ended?" After surveying the Yalu
battle, Herbert sunalsed that "certainly there is nothing in these
facts to induce the conclusion towards which so many writers seem to
have been straining, that instead of battle-ships we should rely on
cruisers as fighting-vessels." In fact, Herbert suggested, battle-
ships should be improved and equipped with better armor. Consequently
he urged Congress to authori:ie the construction of additional battle-
ships, as well as torpedo boats and to replace older guns on existing
ships with rapid-fire six-inch batteries. In closing Herbert warned
Americans that the Yalu battle carried a lesson "our country must heed.
Unless either China or Japan is to be wiped off the map as an independent
nation, the United States are to have west of them two nations each
steadily increasing its naval power, while our trade relations with both
28
are rapidly becoming more intricate and more complicated."
Cleveland and Gresham had often suffered severe criticism for
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their uncertain Asian policies, but Herbert's aggressive analysis of
Yalu drew one of the most virulent r.ttsck.? made on a government
official during the course of the V/ar. E. L. Godkin's Nation cUs-.
paraged Herbert's acticle, claiming that the "erstwhile inoffensive
Congressman" had undergone a "metamorphosis" into a "bloodthirsty
bully of the sea." The Nation charged:
In the last North Arrarican Reyievj he has an article on
the lessork3 of the Yalu seafight, in which there is not
a vord of syiTipathy for victims or survivors, not a line
in deprecation of our ov7n country ever being dra^m into
war, but only and every*7here anxiety about making our
battleships bigger and more deadly. Is it any vonder
that when the head of the department takes such a tone,
a subordinate shovild drav7 a fancy picture of a *'hell
of death and destruction," and print it in a popular
magazine as th|gkind of thing naval officers think about,
day and night?
Yalu, in fact, accelerated the administration's desire to
strengthen its navy in Asian waters. While Gresham and Cleveland had
wanted a larger fleet to protect American neutrality, Herbert sought
more ships to study naval warfare and gather infomiation firsthand.
IhB Secretary of the Navy pushed for additions to the Asiatic fleet
while sending detailed instructions to Admiral C. C. Carpenter concemin
Navy Department policy and strategy during the war. Herbert cabled the
coa::niander-in-chief of the American Asiatic squadron on September 24th
that the Navy Department desired the stationing of permanent warships
at Kewchwang and at Chingkieng. "It is the wish of this Department
that a ship shall be kept at each of the ports mentioned and that the
vessels of your squadron shall be so distributed that every protection
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may be given to American citizens and particularly to the mission-
30
aries." The Secretary ordered Carpenter to cooperate with other
naval pov?ers to protect foreigners at the treaty ports. Tnen he
reminded the Admiral that one of his primary missions was to gather
infoririation
,
especially "careful reports desired on ships injured in
action," Herbert vested Carpenter vrith all necessary powers to send
intelligence officers to the eneray fleets as veil as permission to sail
as close as possible to sites of hostilities. Ihe Department, Herbert
added, would try to assist by sending additional ships, four of which--
X2j(^^^> l^h^t'leston, Machias and Detroit--were already slated to
join the Asiatic squadron. "The arrival of these vessels will place
you in co^irnand of a large squadron, from which the Department expects
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energetic and efficient work."
Ping Yang and Yalu further excited public interest in the Sino-
Japanese conflict, vrnile the two battles fulfilled the expectations of
technical observers, and while Yalu reinforced the arguments of
battleship advocates, the engagements were even more useful to sen-
sational journalists. Japan's overwhelming victories fulfilled the
heroic role forecast for her. She had applied western technology and
a particularly American style of strategy in her initial triumphs.
Washington's policy of strict neutrality must have seemed unbelievable
to those who observed the highly-partisan enthusiasm of the teerican
public in its discttsjslon of Japan's successes.
CHAPTER VI
BARBARISM VERSUS CIVILIZATION
Japan's victories at Ping Yang and Yalu crystallized earlier
pro«Japanese sentiment in the United States even if this mood threw
into question the country's self-defined role as impartial arbiter in
Asia, Vicarious pride v/as provided by the obvious superiority of
Japanese technological and military development. Commentators appeared
comfortable in their assumptions that western civilization had triumphed
on the Korean battlefields. "It can hardly be said that the news v/as
a surprise, for all the advantages of an advanced and progressive
civiliziation were oa the side of the smaller pov;er," the Coairuercial^
Chronicle commented, "and is it not fair to add that seldom has any
nation, in a war not purely patriotic or for self-preservation, been
more entitled to the world's sympathy and encouragement?" The only
way that Americans could ever sympathize with China, the New Orleans
Picayune added, would be if the Chinese removed their "troublesome
pigtails." "If they want to lick the Japs, they must let down their
back hair, have it cut, and wade into war without a hitch.
"^
In the weeks after Yalu discussion of the war, both at the
popular and scholarly levels, focused on an evaluation of Asian cultures
in the context of American conceptions of historical development,
progress and Social Darvvinism. China and Japan provided a laboratory
for the testing of attitudes concerning the meaning of civilization.
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Americai^s explained the fact that 40 million people were
defeating 400 million by contrasting the fundamental characteristics
of China and Japan. "China, in fact, cannot be regarded as a nation
in the same sense as are the nations of the West," senior China
diplomat Charles Denby explained, "because of its provincial diversity
2
and lack of nrtional awareness." Tlie regrettable deficiencies in
nationalism aad patriotism, asserted military historian and Harvard
lecturer Theodore Ayrault Dodge,- stenmed from China's organic evolution
According to Dodge, "the body of China \7as not hoinogeneously sentient
as if the nervous system of the mass was so subdivided that a lesion
to one part did not reach the nervous center of the whole structure,"
China's bulk alone could not V7in a V7ar against organized and unified
Japan, Dodge noted, any more than the "Persian hosts" could defeat the
Greeks
.
Tne theme of Chinese venality also pervaded American analyses of
the var* Official corruption hindered an effective and concerted war
effort • Treccherous officials, particularly the Empress Dowager's
chief eunuch, Li Lien-ying, reportedly siphoned off funds allocated
for prosecution of the war; while indifferent Chinese citizens turned
their backs on their country's struggle. "Piles of shells mzde of mud
have been exhibited as the real article," Denby informed Gresham.
"Provisions have proved worthless, high priced guns useless, regimental
lists of men have been fictitious; commanding officers have embezzeled
military funds; men have gone without psy." Chinese warships even
passed inspection armed with huge cannon balls of black-painted clay.
Forced coolie labor cut wood for harbor defense booms as contractors
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charged the government for regular wage labor.
^
Social Darwinists in the United States explained China's lack
of national awareness, as V7ell as its inherent corruption, in terras of
the biological "inertness" of the Mongol race. The Chinese were not
exactly a diseased race, Tlieodore Dodge declared; indeed many Chinese
lads were rugged men "who would be marked down for football-players in
any American college." But even if he looked robust, the "Chinaman is
filthy in mind, body, and estate." The lethargic and slovenly Chiiaaman
could best serve the V7orld, according to this theory, as a "mere human
animal" because his "nervous structure is less fine than the Ar>^an*s."
Paradoxically, these sub-hitman traits v?ere sometimes spoken of as
military assets. The Chinese could "endure unblcnched the pain of a
surgical operation which would seriously compromise the reactionary
power of most white men." Theodore Roosevelt, then police commissioner
in New York City, shared this evaluation of Chinese racial attributes.
He received sketches of Chinese infantry, clearly resembling monkeys
with long pigtails, from his friend in Peking, Speck von Sternburg.
The latter, noting that Roosevelt's police force had tested its
revolvers on cori^ses to measure the effects of gunshot wounds,
explained that he had examined pistol wounds of Chinese who had walked
320 miles over the Liaotung Peninsula and had survived. "E-H-tat
fighting material you could make out of those chaps!" the German
official told Roosevelt. The future President fully concurred.^
Lucius H. Foote, the first American Envoy Extraordinary and
Minister Plenipotentiary to Korea, added his ovm interpretation of the
Chinese condition. A "cumbersome bureaucracy" motivated by "personal
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aggrandizement" dominated China's "densely ignorant" population,
breeding an atmosphere cf distrust and national apathy. Chjna, Foote
stated, "has always been an enigma among nations, exclusive, anomalous
6
and grotesque, she seems to be a petrified relic of the past."
A discussion of China's "overplus of superstition" supplemented
the Social Darwinian analysis of the Chinese stereotype. Chinese
soldiers were portrayed in the United States as evincing "more faith in
their war god and their green dragon than ... in pov^der and lead" and
they reportedly carried umbrellas, fans and ceremonial chickens into
battle instead of modern rifles. Chinese villagers, many Americans
believed, refused to dig wells for sanitary conditions in their towns
because they feared that holes v?ould sink the land. At the same time,
journals such as the Catholic World proved "beyond dispute" that
infanticide and other horrible practices existed on a large scale in
7
China.
llie Chinese were barbarous as well as bacfa-zard. Commenting on
China's offer of rewards for Japanese heads, the Brooklyn Standard
Union asserted, "a people that can be guilty of such revolting acts
deserves no sympathy from civilized nations." Moreover, surrounded by
"effeminate luxuries" as well as an "army of from eight to ten thousand
eunuchs," the Chinese emperor appeared too dissipated to lead his nation
against anyone; yet at the same time, Americans believed he was capable
of '»savage depravity," forcing his subjects, as well as foreign
dignitaries, to seek interviews by crawling "like reptiles to the foot
cf the throne." Many probably agreed with Samuel Gorapers, president
of
the American Federation of Labor, that while the American people held
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"no antipathy" tov/ard Chinese because of their nationality, they were
nevertheless "a people which have allowed civilization to pass them
untouched and uninfluenced, a people who allow themselves to be
gbarbarously tyrannized over in their own country."
Discussion of China's internal imperfections was enough to
stigmatize her wartime image, yet her influence on the rest of Asia
becaiae the subject of even greater condenination* Durham VfUite Stevens
(the American secretary employed by the Japanese embassy in Washington,
yet claiming to be an impartial observer) insisted that China
threatened to destroy "the genius of enteri)rise and progress" in East
Asia. Corruption and insurrections in Korea, he apprised, resulted
froin China's iiEposition of its repressive "system" on the helpless
kingdom.
In all of Korea's domestic dissexisions the hand
of China can be traced. Her influence is secret, but
none the less patent. She shirks responsibility to
other nations, but hesitates at no means--cajoIery
,
bribery, rrienace--to dominate Korea. Whatever object
her policy may have, its plain result has been to
paralyse progress, and to leave the country weak and
defenceless, a ready victim of foreign aggression.
Rov?ard Martin, a former secretary in the American legation in Peking,
supported Steven's argument. Americans had a special interest in the
outcome of the war in Korea, Martin suggested, because they had helped
open the country to western contact. Therefore, the United States
should oppose China's repressive presence in Korea since a Chinese
victory would mean "the forcing back of the Koreans to Oriental
sluggishness, superstition, ignorance, and anti-foreign sentiment
and
w^thods." The Korean war, Martin concluded, pitted Japanese
"Progress"
Ill
against Chinese "Extermination."^^
Seeking dramatic contrasts, Americans developed the theme of a
progressive and modernized Japan opening Asia to commerce and
Christianity. According to this concept, the Japanese, though admittedly
a part of the Mongol race, had adapted gracefully to the modern V7orld,
assimilating western civilization and adopting western technology. The
Japanese supposedly exemplified Chiistian virtue by their "honest
helpfulness, unending amiability, loyalty to the powers that be, filial
piety in its highest expression, law-abiding {Steadiness, and keen sense
of honor." The Japanese had learned to respect law even more than the
Aiiglo-Saxons, and were, as Lucius H. Foote insisted, "their equals in
courage and tenacity." As for the reported superior physical qualities
of the individual Chinaman, a typical view was enunciated by the
expatriate American editor of the Kobe Chronicle, Lafcadio Heam, who
predicted that as Japan progressed, the "Japanese Physique" would also
grow larger, thus eventually offsetting the only Chinese advantage in a
comparison of the two peoples. Even more flattering to Japan was the
more widely-held idea that, despite their diminutive size, the Japanese
already possessed superior courage and "exceptional power of endurance,"
producing an "infantry able to march to the end of the world."
Though soinewhat more restrained due to the policy of neutrality,
even officials of the United States government discovered means
of
praising Japan. Tlie President found quite laudable Japan's
desire for
"more, liberal Intercourse, couplete autonomy in her
domestic affairs,
and full equality in the family of nations." Grover
Cleveland told
Congress in December of 1894 that "the Japanese Er.pire
of today is no
112
longer the Japan of the past and our relations with this progressive
nation should not be less broad and liberal than those with other
powers." Secretary' of State Gresham also sympathized with Japan. He
admitted to EdT^3.n Dun that he had alv7ays considered Japan the "most
civilised countiry in Asia." TJiough he would uphold Aiaerican neutrality
in the present V7ar, Greshara revealed his personal views of the conflict
to Senator wTohn Morgan of Alabajt^a. "Japan has stepped out into the
light of a better day and she regards the United States as her best
friend." He hinted that the United States must preserve this friendship
Meanvjhlle, the administration's agent in Nagasaki, W, Abercrombie,
assured Assistant Secretary of State Edwin Uhl that "history furnishes
no example of such wonderful and rapid progress" than the advancement
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of Japan since Commodore Perry opened it to western progress.
A short step from unqualified praise of the Japanese was their
correlation with Americans. As the New York Tribune editorialised,
"the Japanese have for years called themselves 'the Yankees of the
Orient,' and their style of fighting rather goes to support their claim
to the title • . . their vrarfare against China is going ahead in an
iEEnensely practical businesslike way, and the results of it are
peculiarly American in character." RuGK)rs that Japan's royal prince
was searching for a wife prorrpted suggestions that, if he could not
find a Match with some European princess > an Arti.erlcan woman would Liake
an admirable Empress of Japan. "While the Japanese are dark skinned
there is no race prejudice against them in other countries," the
it^J:3Ilt^ Constitution reroarked, "and they are
cordially received in
„13
circles where a Chinaman or an East Indian would be barred."
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Japan's "excellent and praisev7orthy" conduct of the war up to
this point had done nothing to detract from her reputation in the
United States* "The Japanese here are vmder perfect control," Araerican
missionary George Heber Jones revealed from his post at Chemulpo, "for
over tvo nicnths v:e have had thejn about us by the thousands, but I have
not seen a drunken soldier at any time*" This evoked particular
comment since American legation guards in Seoid allegedly remained
perpetually drunk, carousing and pestering Koreans, Japanese cormiaanders
also inspired favorable opinions. Field Marshal Count Aritomo Yamagata
"is a soldier, like Moltke," the New York Heraljd reported; stable,
brilliant and capable of controlling Japan's fiery younger officers.
On the other hand, Americans scorned China's lack of capable military
leadership. Even the old hero Li Kung-chang had fallen into disrepute.
"Hie much lauded Li Hung Chang is one of the biggest boodlers in
existence," charged American Board missionary VJiiliara Scott Ament.
Denby wrote Gresham that "the reputation of Li Rung Chang has been
shown to be based on pretence .... He is responsible for this
„14
war."
Called China's greatest statesman not many months earlier, Li
had becG^ie an object of ridicule in the American press. The Boston
Glqbe^ claimed that Li had outlived his usefulness to China and had been
overestimated by the world in the first place. Wliile Americans
extolled the virtues of Japanese leaders and soldiers, Li furnished
the subject of several popular ditties:
Li Rung Chang he belly sick,
Alle saniee he get lick;
Chinese n^akee muchee racket,
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Li Hung lost he yelle jacket.
LI Hung he get licked again
On the sea by monkey men;
Alle sainee chilleo weather,
Li Hung lose he peacock feather.
Next time Li Hung he get lick,
Better vatch out belly quick;
There'll be a pretty how-dy do,
And Chang will lose his pigtail, too!
At the same tirae the N£.w Orleans Picayune pictured its daily "frog"
vjeather forecaster as Li Hung-chang, complete with fan and opium
pipe, followed by poetry alluding to Li's disgrace and China's defeats:
I am a Frog Brownie and Heathen Chinee,
And I've hopped all the way from my home o'er the sea.
For the vjorst of your weather is naught to compare
With Che cyclones the Jap pigs are stirring up there.
They've ruined our vessels and slaughtered our troops.
And can:\ot be scared by our hurabugs and V7hoops.
They gobble our money, and frighten our crones.
And I fear they vjill steal all our ancestors' bones
Exponents of the barbarism versus civilization theories contended
that the United Stated should not be neutral in this Asian contest
because the war was a Japanese crusade introducing Asia to the modern
world, particularly to American ideas and technology. William Elliot
Griffis"'former missionary to Japan, teacher, author of the NIkado'
s
^Tiigire, and considered one of America's foremost experts on Japan--
procla.imed that the Sino-Japanese War "is one chapter in that eternal
struggle of progress which has been V7ritten with graves of Absolutism,
Divine Right, Slavery, the Holy Roman Empire, Patriarchal Barbarism, the
Inquisition, Theocracy, etc., in the long perspective of its past
triumphs," Japan fought for stability and the preservation of peace
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in the Orients Griff if? asserted, and the war v7ould open Korea and China
to western civilization. "Let us hope that true Americanism and the
work of our nation will be that of the Great Pacific Power,'' the
missionary stated.
Another Asian expert told readers of the Overland Monthly that
Jap^in should be permitted to reorganize Asia "under the new order of
things" without interference from outside powers. Japan promised to
cultivate "liberal" elements in Asia and to set Korea on the path to
"culture in its tn.ie sense." Others discovered the "hand of God" in
Japan's victories over China in Korea, breaking down tVte walls of
Chinese resistance to Christianity and civilization. Students of the
war delighted in the prospect of China's ultimate collapse. They
suggested that the Chinese, unfit to have a govenrnent of their ovm,
would benefit from Japanese domination and reforms. Some seriously
doubted whether China should even be preserved in its present shape,
although they hesitated to advocate the partition of China by the
European "beasts of prey." Especially dangerous were the "Russian Bear
and the British Lion" who hungered "to dismember the crippled and
helpless Chinese Empire."^
^
Rumors persisted in the United States that China stood on the
brink of rebellion. As early as the middle of September, Consul Sheridan
P. Read reported power struggles between Li and the powerful Dowager
Empress on one side and the Emperor and his clique on the other for
control of China's government. "I pass on these facts as serving to
throw light upon future events, it being not altogether precipitate
to
forecast the downfall of the present dynasty, or at least serious
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intei-nal disruptions. l-ieanv/hile, Chinese-Americans had organized an
anti-Manchu Society called the Gee^Hing and allegedly conspired to
overthx"Ov; the Chinese Eiriperor. Reports that the Society's leaders had
held a secret meeting in the basement of an Omaha, Nebraska, laundry
stimulated speculation concerning plots by enlightened, Americanized
Chinese.
Hiough Kost commentators expected China's eventual defeat and
collapse, they did not predict a partition of China. Charles Denby Jr.
admitted the "remote contingency of dissolution of the empire." But
he doubted that China V70uld completely collapse and believed the V7ar
vjould benefit that nation by forcing it to enter "the path of western
civilisation." China's humiliation, others agreed, would pronipt reform
£nd the request for western assistance. W. Rockhill hoped China
would recognise the need for a "nationa l system of defense" and a
complete financial reorganization. Lafcadio Kearn accepted China's
defeat as part of the cyclical tradition of Chinese history in which
periods of corruption and disaster preceded periods of reform. "It
Is not impossible that after such a humiliation, China niight irainediately
set to work developing and expanding all her latent and now useless
power--building railroads, forming armies of really efficient troops,
purifying her offices, en^ploying and ejnpoijering the best foreign teachers
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that money could engage."
Critics of Japan, much fewer in nuraber than the pro-Japanese
Americans, also threatened the policy of strict neutrality by advocating
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that the United States halt Japanese aggression. They V7arned against
Japan's ambitions in Asia and indicated that the United States should
strengthen its position in the Pacific at the very least and possibly
v;ork to block Japanese expansion as a last resort. They believed that
strict neutrality would lead to a dangerous Japanese-American competition
in post-war Asia. Critics also objected to a policy which seemed to
insure a Japanese victory since it would lead, as they claimed, not
to peace and stability in Asia, but to nulitarism and intense rivalries.
A Japanese victory might even prove a vehicle for the development of
China's latent pov;e.r. China's humiliation, one American array officer
warnied, actually posed a threat to the United States. "If China ever
gets into the V7ay of thirsting for Arierican gore, they will promptly
attack Aia?-rlcan ships, and American coast." Therefore, as the Pacific
Coinp/iercial Advertiser suggested, "every shotted gun, fired in this v?ar,
is a signal gun to the United States, of the coming events," since it
. ,
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would wake Chinese militarism from its centuries of sleep.
Events on the battlefield also inspired American warnings of
Japanese ainbitions. For exaniple, Augustine Heard, former minister to
Korea, deplored the pro-Japanese bias, noting that Japan's adoption of
western learning had blinded Amaricans to the menace of Japan the
conqueror. As a Boston merchant interested in American investment in
Asia, Heard insinuated that Japan's desire for commercial ascendancy
lay behind its facade of reform rhetoric and should be "a fair subject
for criticism" in the United States. Japan, Heard complained, aime.d at
a total, monopoly of Korean transportation, fishing industry and gold
min^is, hencs closing this lucrative field to foreign investment. "Her
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present attitude toward Korea, irresistibly reminds one of the wolf and
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the lamb in the fable."
Heard disagreed vith those vho claimed China had stirred up the
Tonghak insurrection in Korea. He accused the Japanese of "manu-
facturing excitement" as "a pretext to interfere by force in Korea,"
perhaps even fostering and fomenting the v/hole rebellion themselves.
China had an honorable and "voluntary" vassal relationship with Korea
and felt duty-bound to assist Korea in putting dovm the rebellion-
Korea traditionally adopted Chinese culture and respected Chinese ideas
and institutions vmile despising the aggressive and assertive Japanese.
The country needed reform. Heard adraitted, yet Japan, the object of
"undue partiality" in the United States, desired only conquest. "If
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Korea falls into the hands of Japan, God help her!"
The American Peace Society supported Heard ^s view. IJhile admitting
that Japan was progressive, the Boston-based organization noted that its
progress had not been "acco.T.panied by a corresponding moral and religious
development." It had marched to civilization "through seas of blood"
and should be considered the aggressor in Korea. Yet the pacifist
group qualified its condemnation of Japan, blaining primarily the
western "Christian" powers for having supplied the Asians with
modern
weapons of destruction. "It is England and the United States
and
France and Germany and Italy that have taught theia the arts
of modern
warfare, and the exmnple of some of these nations has led
them to
believe that national strength and gloiy can be acquired
in no other
way than by building up huge armaments and slaughtering
multitudes
24
of one's neighbors."
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For a very different reason Rev. Robert Stuart MacArthur, the
militant pastor of the Calvary Church of New York City, warned
Americans of Japan* s progress. In a sermon delivered in October of
1894, HacArthur explained that "the United States is humbled in the
presence of this Japanese victory" particularly since "we could not
have placed in Eastern waters during the time since this war. began a
naval force at all adequate to contend with that of Japan-" Reviewing
this sermon, the Pacific Confrere ial Advertiser ascertained that the
war would greatly influence Anierican attitudes toward Asia in the
future*
For the firfit time, the American people, are
eameatly looking westward . They may not, for a while
yet, fully take in the drift of events, but it is
something for us, that they must look at the Asiatics,
in a new light, and, very soon, must deal with them on
a new basis, that is, the military and naval basis- It
means for us, the occupation of Pearl Harbor, and a
strong policy, in the Pacific.
The New Orj^sns Picayune echoed these fears, contending that the
Pacific Ocean would henceforth be dominated by "purely Asiatic"
military
and naval power- This voice of Gulf Coast shipping interests
wondered
.what the United States planned to do about Japan's growing
challenge.
Tlie Picayune suggested not only military preparation and
closer commercial
25
ties but also construction of an interoceanic canal.
Additional criticism of Japan emanated from Am.erican
missionaries
in Jap.'.n who were intimately acquainted with Japanese
attitudes and
from Asian scholar and diplomat W. W. RockhiU. The latter,
while
predicting that "a good thrashing" of China would be "the
only tonic
vhich seems to suit that queer country," feared Japanese
victories.
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"The Lord only knows where they will stop," Rockhill wrote to a friend
in China. "Tlie Japanese are going to occupy Korea, for the same
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reason and in the same \my as the British did Egypt." The missionaries,
perhaps mindful that they were losing their prestige and positions to
aggressive Japanese Christians, took a similar vie;?. The Rev. Dwight
Leanted observed from Kyoto that Japan believed it had humbled a pov/er
that England and France feared to attack and had accepted "a heaven
given mission to lead this part of the world if not all Asia." The
"ccairnon people" behaved rudely toward Americans in Kyoto, Learned
said, and this rerainded him of the fate Americans V70uld face if they
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ever tried to dominate Japan.
Americans often discussed the impact of the war on trade with
East Asia within the context of the barbarism versus civilization
theaie. "^Then this cruel v/ar in China is over," the Boston Globe argued,
"the United States are bound to realize the larger share of the new
and enlarged coniruerce with the east that can but be the result of
China's severe shaking up. We have as yet seen hardly the dawning of
the icimense cotumerce with China that is in store for us in the future."
llie Globe was joined by various business spokesmen who claimed that
the war revealed the "wonderful progress of Japanese manufacturing"
vhich would force open new Asian markets to the eventual benefit of
such AB^erican products as cotton. Decrying American "co^Timercial
serfdom
to England" which forced the Couth to sell raw cotton to Asia through
"the great English metropolis," southern cotton interests renewed
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pressure for the construction of a Nicaraguan Canal. They predicted
that some day "the coimnercial men of the world my be surprised to see
fleets ox vessels carrying American cotton through the canal via
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Havjaii to the Japanese factories."
American consular agents asserted that China's expected collapse
promised to create "enlarged business relations between the United
States and China," Consul-General Thomas Jernigan retnarked that the
people in Shanghai assumed that Japan's victories V70uld force China to
undertake an extensive system of internal improvement. TVie United
States should strengthen its navy in Asiatic watei-s and be prepared to
take advantage of the opportunities afforded by a Japanese victory.
Suggesting A.marican intervention in post-war China, Consul Sheridan
Read expanded upon Jernigan' s advice:
It will be my aim that America whose hands are clean as
regards China, shall secure her fair share of the orders
to be placed, and shall come fon/ard as the best country
from which to draw men and material. It is in cur
country that moderTi civilization is at its best, as it
is untinged with the ideas of ancient Europe and Asia.
In closing. Read claimed that American trade in the East would "never
assume its correct proportions until a canal has been cut through the
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Isthmus of Panama."
Less optimistic commentators believed that Japan's success
portended not lucrative Asian markets for American coiranerce but severe
competition from Japan. Japan possessed advanced machinery,
inventive
genius and cheap labor, they observed, and could undersell
western
trader, not only domestically but in world markets.
Careful students
of Asian affairs reasoned that Japan's drive into Korea
was a step
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toward economic domination of East Asia. Japan's vigorous search for
markets vould block Araerican projects and investments. Rockhill varned
thst the war would probably hinder American penetration of the China
market and would certainly lead to severe Japanese competition.
"Japan is bound to become a great rrianufacturing country and will cut us,
and Great Britain and Germany also . , . out of the Chinese market,
or at least we will only supply Japan with raw materials which it will
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put in manufactured shape on the Chinesa market.'
Debates on the war also influenced Araerican attitudes toward
treaty revisions with China and Jspan. The question of treaty relations
with China in 1894 still centered on immigration. Aided by widespread
anti-Chinese prejudices, exclusionists worked diligently for co:nplete
restriction of Chinese irmnigration and the registration or deportation
of Chinese already in the United States. Tlie war increased such
sentiment, for there \.'ere fears that Japanese victories might drive
the
defeated Chinese to seek refuge in the United States. Wa don't want
"these dirty folk" on California's shores, exclusionists stated.
They
de^ianded thaf iir^igration laws protect the United States from
having
"the. Chinese empire dumped on us.
Both China and the United States were pushing for a
formal
treaty outlining restrictions and rights concerning
Chinese-Americans.
In March of 1894 Gresham and Yang Yu had signed a
convention which was
ratified by the Senate in August and signed by
Cleveland. Tne Gresham-
Y^ng Treaty prohibited further i.mnlsration to
the United States for a
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period of ten years and clarified some of the questions left vague in
an early treaty signed In 1880. The 1894 treaty was more restrictive
than the original Sino-Araerican Inanigration Treaty of November 17, 1880,
in which Article I had provided that the United States government might
"regulate, limit, or suspend" Chinese immigration "but iriay not absolutely
prohibit it." Article I of the new treaty, however, prescribed that
the iranigration of Chinese laborers ".-^hall be absolutely prohibited."
In September the Gresham-Yang Treaty arrived in China for ratification
and Gresham worried about war-induced public utterances against China,
as well as pro-Japanese sentimsnts, believing these detriraental to
Chinese acceptance of the pact. China, however, was in no position to
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argue. She signed s treaty that was clearly an affront to her.
While the Secretary of State discussed treaty relations with
China, both Japanese Minister Go?:o Tateno and his successor
Shinchiro
Kurino belabore.d the State Department with requests for a new treaty
of their own with the United States. Japan, unlike China,
insisted
upon the removal of all vestiges of the early unequal
treaties between
the two countries, such as extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Speaking
often of current sympathy for Japan in the United
States and of
Japanese militao' successes, Kurino became bolder and
pushed harder
for treaty revision. V^hitelaw Reid observed that
the Japanese "are
feeling a little more like taking a strong tone
with Mr. Gresham."
Indeed, Japan had already succeeded in winning
revision of extra-
territoriality from Great Britain and now urged
the United States to
,
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follow the British example.
Pressure on Gresham to revise the treaty
with Japan also emanated
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from Republican critics of the Secretary's foreign policies. Incensed
at British leadership in treaty revision with Japan when the United
States had supposedly become the foremost defender of Japanese rights
and equality, critics attacked Gresham. They claimed that British
Minister Sir Julian Pauncefote had "duped" the sluggish mind of the
Secretary by promising him that Great Britain would not negotiate a
treaty with Japan until the United States had concluded a similar
pact. "It is exceedingly unfortunate that the State Department in this
crisis in the Orient should be placed in the embarrassing position"
of ignoring Japan's requests for treaty revision while Japan's erstwhile
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critic Great Britain had already concluded a friendly pact.
Pushed by Kurino and sensitive to criticism, Gresham proceeded
to negotiate a nei'? ttecxy which eliminated American consular jurisdiction
over the affairs of its citizens in Japan and enumerated certain export
duties between the t^^ro nations. Tne New York Herald declared that
Japan considered this abolition of extraterritorial rights more important
than all her victories against China. "Japan has made such progress in
civilis^ation during the past two decades that her national pride
revolts at a continuation of such authority which is only demanded in
cur treaty negotiations with semi-barbarous nations /such as China/."
Finally on November 23, 1894, Kurino and Gresham signed the new treaty
fulfilling Japatiese demands. "The acceptance of thi^ treaty by
the
Senate will be a great cor.plim.ent to the progress and
civili^.ation of
Japan," one editorial averred; "it will be tantamount to
a recognition
that the little island empire of the Far East has earned
by its
progressiveness and enlightenment a right to be ranked among
the most
125
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civilized nations."
No one could misinterpret the meaning of the two treaties of 1894
One offered a hu-Tiiliating slap to China and the other a bow to Japanese
prestige* Gresham believed that he had concluded fair and impartial
treaties with both powers, yet the treaties themselves indicated
otherx-zise.
Tlie building of Japan's reputation in the United States during
the war was due in part to natural preferences in an era vhich prized
progress, efficiency and the competitive spirit"-and in part to the
concerted efforts of Japanese propaganda. Initially the Japanese had
prohibited American V7ar correspondents to accon^pany their armies and
bad been caught tampering vith and censoring the mil of American naval
personnel sent from Japan to the United States. But vith the arrival
of Shinchiro Kurino as the new Japanese lainister to the United States
at the end of August 1894, Japan began to coordinate and cultivate a
program designed to win American approval. American reporters were
allowed to travel with Japanese units while Kurino improved the Japanese
profile in the United States. "I have seen a good deal of the Jap
Minister, Kurino, who is a good fellow-^very civiliscd-'-an ex-graduate
of Harvard and a great exploiter of the press," a British diplooiat
residing in Washington during 1894 observed. "He is 'up to all the
I..36latest American tricks. *
Tae new Japanese nunistcr countered Yang Yu's cloae ties
vith the
Gresham family by cultivating friendly contacts of his own
with the
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American Secretary of State, "Mr. Kurino told my son and myself,"
Mrs. Gresham later recalled, "that during the Chinese-Japanese War he
met Mr* Gresham almost daily, and received from him information as to
what vas going on in the diplomatic world." Both the Chinese and
Japanese ministers arranged dinner parties for Gresham and sent the
ti
family trinkets and momentos of friendship. Kurino offset Yang Yu's
warnings of Japan's "sinister designs" on Korea with his own assurances
to the Secretary of State that Japan only V7ished to reform that corrupt
37
and anarchic little country.
The Harvard-trained Japanese minister supervised journalistic
exploitation of the v;ar, even contributing his own article on the
"Oriental VJar" in the North Ar.iorican Rqyiew. A Forum article of
October 1894, inspired by Kurino, concluded that Japan should be
viewed as an American-styled republican goverrjnent in Asia. Con-
currently, the Arena vigorously defended Japan with a wide spectrum
of those arguments employed by Japanese propagandists. In November
the Arena published an article by the Japanese scholar Kunia Oishi which
traced the causes of the "War in the East." He argued that China's
resistance to "social and political innovation" in Korea lay at the
root of the conflict. Kuraa testified further that Chinese-backed
Tonghak rebels, who were fanatics intent on blocking the influence of
Western civilization, had forced Japan to intervene to preserve law and
order. Japan since 1868 "has been steadily pursuing a determined
and
upright policy toward Corea," the object being to recognize her
independence and to secure her autonomy. Tne Japanese propagandist
designed this approach especially for American audience,
because the
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United States and Japan, he pointed out, had shared first honors in
recognizing Korean independence by treaty. China's policy of clandestine
and greedy machinations had left Korea "destitute and defenceless,"
which in turn invited foreign aggression and threatened Japan's
security.
Another approach designed to appeal to Americans pointed to the
"gradual encroachment and increasing supremacy in Asia of the European
powers." This was the "most momentous cause of this war." In order to
resist European invasion, Japanese propagandists argued, China and
Japan must "duly recognize the law of the survival of the fittest" and
attain the "highest possible degree of civilization in the shortest
possible length of time, using the word civilization here in its widest
sense, so as to include the development of material resources, of
military strexigth, of intellectual and moral qualities of the people."
China, unfortunately, had not understood these demands of history.
"Stupid and haughty," she had resisted the natural development of
nations, thus threatening the peace and stability of Asia. China had
refused to cooperate with Japan in a reforai program for Korea and
Japan had been forced to accept the challenge alone not for territorial
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gain, but because of a "moral obligation" to Korean civilization.
Japanese writers also flattered Americans and identified Japan
with standard /^,arican ideals. Japan represented the "light of
civilization and an unbroken era of tranquillity and prosperity,"
while
upholding "the cause of liberty, of civilization and of humanity"
and
defending all "lovers of justice and freedom."
If this struggle of progress against stagnation, of the
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right against the i/rong, during its course, proves to some
extent, detrimental to the commercial interest of the West;
if it justly recalls to the rainds of the lovers of peace,
the vivid pictures of all the horrors and evils attendant
upon fire and courage, the enormous advantages which will
probably be derived after the close of the var must not
be forgotten.
Japanese scholar Julius Kurrjpei Matumoto, in his introduction to
Trumbull White's popular history of the Sino^Japanese War, told the
American reader that Japan was the "true standard-bearer of civili-
zation and progress in the far east. Her mission is to enlighten
the millions of slumbering souls in the Celestial Kingdom, darkened
for generations." Re urged Americans to recognize and accept Japan
as a powerful and "living force" in the world.
The American intellectual climate was congenial to Japanese
arguments and the propaganda reinforced these views. "The Japanese
have learned the lesson of lying gracefully 6c persistently," the
American missionary William Scott Ament wrote in October 1394. "The
Chinese have no writers to present their cause before the world 6
the
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Jans have had their own way, and well they have used ic.
CHAPTERVII
THE PORT ARTHUR MASSACRE
Pro-Japanese enthusiasm had reached its height by the end of
November 1894. So far Japan had done little to harm such feeling. The
Kowshing, affair was regarded as s regrettable mistake, hardly rememberad
amidst the glories and virtues of the Japanese cause.
As the winter snows deepened in northern China, the Japanese
methodically and irresistibly pushed onward, scattering the remnants
of enemy armies before them. During the weeks after its victory at
Ping Yang, the Japanese First Army had consolidated its position
and
then advanced north where, during the latter part of October, It
had
crossed the Yalu River and invaded Manchuria. Chinese forces
retreated
toward Manchuria's ancient capital at Mukden, laying waste to
the land.
By December 13, Japanese soldiers had occupied the Chinese
stronghold
at Halcheng. But with the overextension of Japan's supply
lines,
Chinese resistance grew more stubborn; and with the onset
of cold
weather and heavy snows, the First Army entrenched at
Haicheng.
American knowledge of Japan's Manchurian campaign had
originated
from delayed and speculative dispatches forwarded by
commanders of the
American naval vessels stationed at Chemulpo. On October 9,
Commander
Caspar Frederick Goodrich of the gunboat Concord reported
"the Chinese,
are thcugl't to be mostly, if not all, over the frontier
(the Yalu
River)." Yet. he admitted that his intelligence reports
were not up to
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the highest standards of the Navy Department, but were based primarily
on sketchy information from Japanese sources. Several days later
Goodrich cabled his commanding officer, Admiral Charles C. Carpenter,
then in Nagasaki, that the Japanese supposedly had already advanced on
Mukden, Port Arthur, Weihaiwei, and perhaps even Peking and Formosa.
Reliable information concerning Korean military operations failed to
arrive at the State Department until October 27, three days after the
Japanese actually crossed the Yalu River. In a dispatch to Gresham,
Charles Denby Jr. verified the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and
added
that Chinese leadership in Peking seemed suddenly av/are of China's
plight.
While Count Aritomo Yamagata's First Army advanced into Manchuria,
the Japanese Second Army, under the "fat, good-natured" Field
Marshal
Iwao Oyama, prepared to open another front against China.
Japanese
strategists believed that as long as the modem naval base at Port
Arthur guarded the Strait of Chihli and sheltered a Chinese
fleet,
Japanese supply lines in Manchuria vould never be completely
secure.
Port Arthur, situated at the extremity of the Liaotung
Peninsula,
presented the Japanese with their most formidable enemy
fortification.
Designed by German engineers, including Colonel von
Hanneken of Kowshin^
fame, the walls of the forts guarding the dry docks,
shipyards and
repair shops extended in some places as much as three
hundred feet out
of the sea. The forts contained a deadly array of
heavy naval rifles,
particularly forty and fifty-ton Krupp guns and rifled
mortars. Even
the Japanese high coaimand considered attack from
the sea impossible.
Thus it drew up a bold plan to land an army
above the port, march it
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around behind the forts, and besiege them from the laud side.
Advance units of Oyaraa's Second Army landed on the Liaotung
Peninsula some eighty miles northeast of Port Arthur on October 23,
1894. By November 4, the entire army, aided by willing Manchurian
peasants, had established a secure beachhead on the peninsula. Two
days later the Japanese had overrun Kinchow, just thirty miles north-
east of Port Arthur, and shortly thereafter had captured the Talienwan
forts V7ith little effort. "Our army occupied Talienwan at the afternoon
of the 8th instant," Kurino revealed to Gresham on November 14, adding
that a complete chart of Chinese torpedo mine defenses at Port Arthur
4
had also been seized.
American press reports speculated, as early as November 10, that
the Japanese were "pushing the pigtails" out of Port Arthur. However,
Japan did not attack until November 21 when if launched a three-pronged
assault on the fortifications. According to correspondent James
Creelman, "cold, stoical, Asiatic" General Yamaji, "who /had/ deliberately
plucked out his own eye at school to show his comrades that he was not
a coward," coordinated the Japanese advance. Chinese resistance,
with
few exceptions, collapsed as Japanese infantry attacked under the
cover
of their mountain artillery. The Chinese abandoned Port Arthur,
leaving
5
the dock yards and equipment intact.
As they approached the walls of the last fortification,
Japanese
soldiers discovered the m.utilated heads of their captured
comrades
hanging by strings from the m.in gate of the fort. This sight,
combined
with Chinese mutilation of a Japanese scouting party at Talienwan
and
the savagery of some of the fighting before the final
assault, incen.ed
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the victorious army. Bent on revenge and finding all the combatants
gone, Japanese soldiers and their baggage coolies turned viciously on
the civilian inhabitants of Port Arthur. The Japanese "killed everything
they saw," American eyewitness James Creelman of the New York World
reported, "unarmed men, kneeling in the streets and begging for life,
vere shot, bayoneted, or beheaded . . . the town was sacked from end
to end, and the inhabitants were butchered in their own homes."
Another eyewitness, Anglo-American gunrunner James Allan, claimed that
"the dead lay thickly in nearly every street in the quarters we
traversed, where of every age, sex, and condition, they had been
promiscuously butchered by the hundred."^
News of Port Arthur's capture reached the United States almost
immediately. Colonel Danby cabling Gresham on November 24. Reports of
the massacre, however, remained rumors in the United States for several
weeks. In fact, the initial response to Port Arthur reflected recent
American approval of Japan's civilizing mission. The New York Tribune,
for example, editorialized that: "Out of the darkness of the Far East
a light shines and it is the light of civilization evolved from
conditions of native progress." A London dispatch arriving in New
York
on November 29th, which alluded to atrocities perpetrated by both
sides
on the Liaotung Peninsula, received little publicity. Another
London
source on December 8 reported that during the night after the
capture
of Port Arthur Japanese army laborers had entered the town
and slaughtered
Chinese civilians in their homes. Yet it was not unti] James
Creelman's
eyewitness account of the massacre arrived in New York oa
December 11
7
that the atrocities at Port Arthur became a national
sensation.
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James Creelman, immaculately dressed and groomed even in
Manchuria, was determined to win journalistic fame, a goal in part
inspired by earlier frustrations experienced V7hile on the staff of
James Gordon Bennett's New York Herald . Bennett's policies had pre-
vented Creelman' s signature from appearing on his articles, and the
ambitious reporter, chafing under this restriction, had left Bennett's
staff in 1890. By 1893 he had become manager of the British edition
of Cosmopolitan Magazine and the next year he accepted an assigmnent as
special correspondent for the New York World to cover the Sino-Japanese
War. Creelman, it was said, would go anywhere and do anything for a
news scoop. At Ping Yang he pitched his tent among rotting corpses to
cover the battle. In order to catch Oyama's forces before Port Arthur,
Creelman rode a Japanese military pony all night, arriving at the
^
Japanese camp on the verge of collapse yet thankful that he had not
missed the opening shots. Several times Creelman narrov.'ly escaped
capture by Chinese soldiers because he insisted on getting as close to
•V, 8the action as possible.
Everywhere Creelman worked he stirred up controversy. As the
American minister in Seoul reported to Gresham, the writer tended
to
"over-dramatize" and in the case of his interview with the Korean
king
"doubtless put into the king's mouth what he thought he wished
to say."
Creelman had praised Japan in his early articles from Asia.
Ha wrote
after Ping Yang (where atrocities had occurred) that Japanese
soldiers
were "brave and humane," and in early September he
cabled the opinion
that the "patriotism of Japan must comitiand the admiration
of the world.
Then for about a month Creelman failed to communicate
with the Morld.
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The nev;spaper became concerned for his safety, meanwhile filling the
news void by hiring E. H. House of Tokyo to send dispatches concerning
the war to New York. The World cabled House, instructing him to
investigate rumors that a foreign correspondent had been killed in the
10
war zone.
During this time Creelman was aboard a Japanese troopship bound
for his biggest story. His first sensational letter describing the
Port Arthur massacre appeared in the New York World on December 11.
For the next month the World fully exploited the story, elaborating on
the slaughter and mutilation of men, women and children in the streets
of Port Arthur- According to Creelman and the Isew York Worl^, Japanese
officers did nothing to stop the slaughter of non-combatants, while
Japanese soldiers laughed as their comrades hunted down every living
thing in the city-'-even the personnel in the town's only hospital.
"Just below me was a hospital flying the Red Cross flag," Creelman wrote,
"but the Japanese fired upon the unarmed men who came out of the
doorway." After three days of butchery and the slaughter of "at least
tv70 thousand helpless people," Creelman noted that only Chinese coolies
11
needed to bury their countrymen survived the massacre.
The World, editorially wondering how the Japanese government would
defend this "lapse into barbarism," instructed House to elicit an
official explanation. House reported that the Japanese Foreign
Minister
Mutsu Hunemltsu had in effect verified Creelman' s story when he
ad-
mitted that some excesses may have occurred on the part of
Japanese
soldiers at Port Arthur. Yet when the American minister, Edwin
Dun,
interviewed Mutsu several days later, the Japanese official
called
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Creelman's account "a gross exaggeration of the truth, sensational in
the extreme and tending to work great injury and injustice to Japan
in the eyes of the civilised world." Kutsu admitted, however, that
Japanese troops, "inaddened by the atrocities committed upon their
comrades who had fallen into the hands of the Chinese," rriay have killed
12
more Chinese than necessary for a military victory.
Visiting other eyewitnesses, Dun attempted to reconstruct the Port
Ax^thur story for the State Department. Re learned from the French
military attache in Tokyo, Viscount de Labry, who had entered Port
Arthur with the first wave of Japanese soldiers, that Creelman's letter
over-'dramatiEed the effects of Japanese attacks with bayonet and sword.
At the same time Lieutenant O'Brien, the American military attache in
Tokyo who i;as also present at Port Arthur, admitted that there were
needless deaths but not enough to be called a massacre. Tne American
commander of a Japanese transport, George W. Conner, maintained that
Japanese action never approached the horrors reported by Creclmsn. Dun
concluded in his report to Gresham: "It is clear that the slaughter of
Chinese soldiers at Port Arthur cannot be justified by any rules
governing the usages of modern civilized warfare . . • but that the
account sent to 'The World' by Mr. Crcelman is sensational in the
extreme and a gross exaggeration of what occurred.
There were attempts to discount Creelman's observations at Port
Arthur. Led by the strongly pro-Japanese New York Tribune, a bitter
rival of the World, war conmjentators criticized Creelman's exploitation
of too incident. "These stories bore upon their face the brand of
reckless sensationalism," the Tribune argued, and Japanese "so-called
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excesses, while regrettable, vere excusable" because of Chinese
barbarism in mutilating Japanese captives. Free-lance correspondent
Frank G. Carpenter observed that vhen Japanese troops entered Port
Arthur they found that "archways of Japanese heads, vith the noses and
ears missing, had been built over the streets." Carpenter doubted
whether highly-trained and disciplined American soldiers would act any
differently under similar circumstances. "After all, war is war,"
Colonel E. F, Gregory of the United States Anny observed, pointing out
that no one had objected to the atrocities committed during the
American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War or the VJar between Turkey
and Russia. "To say that the Japanese have relapsed to barbarisn,
or have come down to the savage level of their foes, is an absurd
misstaten'.ent
.
The Port Arthur debate prompted an examination of past American
barbarity. "Have all memories faded of the manner in which American
soldiers avenged the massacre of the garrison of the Alamo by Santa
Anna?" the Pliiladelphia Record inquired. American defenders of the
Japanese reminded that "in recent times our own troops have done
precisely what the Japanese soldiers at Port Arthur did." They discussed
in detail the massacre of Indian men, women and children near Wounded
Knee Creek on the Pine Ridge Reservation by units of the Seventh Cavalry
avenging General Custer's death. Just as the Seventh Cavalry had
responded to memories of their comrades slaughtered by barbaric Indians,
the Japanese, according to this argument, had sought retribution "of
the almost justifiable sort" in punishing the barbaric excesses of their
uncivilised, savage enemy.
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Nevertheless, Creelman's articles caused new doubts* Nev7spapers
V7hich only just days before had extolled the virtuef; of Japanese
progress and civilisation now castigated the "other Asian barbarian,"
The Kansas City Jou-rnal noted that "the barbarities perpetrated by the
civilized Japanese at Port Arthur are just as revolting as if they had
been committed by the uncivilized Chinese*" The influence of Christian
teaching and western morality appeared to these critics "only a thin
varnish, scratch it, and the barbarian is revealed." Americans
suggested that if Japanese cruelty and slaughter continued, the
civilised nations of the West would be forced to interv^ene "in the
interest of humanity-" American Board missionary Franklin M. Chapin
indicated to Judson Smith in Boston that American sympathies should be
vith the helpless Chinese. "The time must coine vfaen the proud little
.
„16
nation will be punished for the slaughter of a defenceless people.
Revelation of the Port Arthur massacre threatened to undo the
carefully woven fabric of Japanese propaganda and pro-Japanese sentiment
Almost overnight Japan's claim as the torchbearer of civilization and
moderation in Asia becam.e suspect. "Scratch a 'Jap' and you have a
savage notwithstanding his pretensions to civilization." The Japanese
were "mere children" when it came to the historical development of
tiankind. They had civilized too rapidly, imitating the facade of
civilization but not the moral commitraents . "Civilization cannot be
put on like a cloak, and Japan may, after all, never grov up to
it."
A letter to rhe editor of the .^Tew York VJorld signed "Ignite
Man" warned:
"any one who -would place absolute trust in those sly little
figures,
almond cyec and catlike 'politeness' without a much longer
course of
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probation than Japan has yet endured would be very foolish." Always
eager arbiters of moral issues, American copiraentators in Boston,
New York, Cincinnati
,
Minneapol is
,
Philadelphia, St . Louis
,
Washington
D«C., Fort Worth and San Francisco agreed that Port Arthur constituted
an ineradicable stain upon Japan's "vaunted progress and civilization.
"^'^
yoj^ World
,
having discovered that its Port Arthur stories
had increased circulation, continued to exploit the massacre. "No
other American nex^spaper had a correspondent on the scene," the World
boasted. Other papers sneered at the ex^^ose, then suffered through
Mutsu's confessions, British war artist Frederic Villiers' confirmations,
editorials in the London Times and London Standard and other verifi-
cations of Creelman's story. As the World proclaimed, Creelman had now
become the world's foremost jov.rnalist. The New York daily expanded
on its coup by printing sketches by Villiers which showed piles of
mutilated Chinese corpses in the streets cf Port Arthur, as well as a
poignant drawing of a puppy curled up beside the body of his fallen
Chinese master. Pulitzer's paper, the first of the so-called "yellow
journals," accused Japan of trying to bribe Creelman with preferential
treatment if he would keep the Port Arthur affair quiet, at least until
after the ratification of a new Japanese-American treaty. The American
public soon tired of the atrocity story, however, and the World turned
t
1^
to new fields of excitement and recalled Creelman at Japan s request.
Several factors, including news of operations at Weihaiwei, tempered
American criticism of Japanese behavior at Port Arthur. Across the Chihli
139
Strait from Port Arthur lay the fortifications and naval station of
Weihaiv7ei. In some respects Wei was a replica of Port Arthur--heavily
fortified by western engineers, armed with modern weaponry and equipped
with dockyards, repair stations and auxiliary services. Tliis port
remained the only obstacle to Japanese control of the Gulf of Chihli
and the Yellow Sea, for the Chinese fleet had sought refuge at Wei
after the fall of Port Arthur. Tiie Japanese command outlined a plan
similar to its earlier campaign across the Gulf. This time it proposed
the landing of an array on the Shantung Peninsula behind the fortifi-
cations and an attack from the rear.
On January 10, a little more than a month after Port Arthur, a
Japanese army landed thirty-seven miles below Weihaiwei. The command
of this expedition rested with Port Arthur hero Count Iwao Cyama and
included many of the same officers and units involved in the previous
operation. Oyama's Third Army moved in tv70 columns up the Shantung
Peninsula toward Wei's outer forts, while the Japanese nav>' shelled
coastal positions and bottled up the Chines^, fleet. For two weeks the
Japanese advanced, storming Chinese earthworks and positions as they
moved. At times Chinese resistance proved stubborn, particularly at
the Motienling fort, and Japanese casualties were unusually heavy—much
19
heavier than they had been around Port Arthur.
The main forts, island forts and Chinese \;arships concentrated
hea\'y fire on Japanese forces, preventing penetration of the inner
defenses. In response, the Japanese employed small torpedo boats in
night raids to cripple some of the Chinese fleet. By February 7th most
of the Chinese resistance had collapsed and several days later,
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Admiral Ting, coinraander of the Chinese fleet at Wei, offered to
surrender the ships, forts and arms, provided that the Japanese would
20spare the lives of his crev;s, soldiers and foreign advisers.
In contrast to the Port Arthur capture, the Japanese displayed
restraint at Weihaiwei. Chinese prisoners vere released vith two day*s
supply of food. The Japanese provided a steamer to carry the body of
Admiral Ting, \^h^ had committed suicide, as v^ell as his surviving staff
and advisers back to Tientsin. American observers, permitted iiraiediate
access to the battle area, found no evidence of Japanese atrocities,
although the intensity of the fighting had surpassed that of Port
Arthur. Perhaps influenced by the presence of foreign advisers through-
out the VJeihaiwei defense system, as well as by the observation of
foreign warships— including the American cruiser Charleston , accorded
special favor by the wTapanese-"the victors took precautions against a
21
repeat of the Port Arthur massacre.
Increasing attention paid Japan* s military medicine and Red Cro5S
activity also helped diminish criticism of Port Arthur. Reading of
Japan's modern hospital system and humane treatment of v/ounded Chinese
prisoners, Americans could believe that this, "rather than the action
of a body of men in the heat of battle, where death threatens them on
every hand," displayed the "true spirit of any nation." The Journal
of the American Medical Association proclaimed that the Japanese had
demonstrated the best in medical treatment, the newest antiseptics and
the latest training, and concluded: "truly the Japanese is a wonderful
man.'* Despite Japan's aberration at Port Arthur, the Springfield
Republican pointed out, "nothing more emphatically sho\vs the vast
progress of Japan out of the barbarism of the Asian nations" than her
adoption and employment of the Red Cross Society in the war with China.
The fact that the Japanese Red Cross Society had sent six physicians
and twelve nurses with each troop transport bound for Korea and China
was widely noted. Rev. J. R. DeForest wrote in the Missionary Herald
that the employment of the Red Cross Society "has helped to give Japan
power to wage war on a higher plane of humanitarian spirit than has
22
ever been reached before, even in Christian nations*"
On the other hand the Chinese rejected the help of the Red Cross
and refused to form a Society of their own. They left their wounded
to freeze and starve on the battlefield, and they mutilated and
murdered Japanese wounded. As Rev. Charles A. Stanley noted from
Tientsin, "The Chinese are making no hospital or ambulance arrangoraents."
Other Americans regretted China's lack of an organized medical department
Chinese officers of rank and wealth employed their own personal doctors
but soldiers received no aid. Allegedly, the Chinese even failed to
bury their dead.^^
Chinese officials refused to guarantee protection for Red Cross
nurses who requested transportation to the front to aid wounded Chinese
soldiers. '*^/e don't want to save aiiy wounded Chinese," the Governor
of Tientsin informed one Red Cross worker. Even worse, the American
Medical Association revealed that Chinese fired on ambulances, killed
attendants and attacked surgeons wearing the Geneva cross, a symbol of
Christian humanity and compassion. It was recalled that early efforts
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by westerners to form a Chinese Red Cross Society had met with repeated
failure. Under pressure from the Western community, Li Hung-chang
placed the steamer Toonan at the disposal of an Independent Red Cross
Society at Tientsin to bring back wounded Chinese from around Port
Arthur. Four American medical missionaries accompanied four British
doctors on the trip. When the Toonan was refused permission to carry
the wounded to hospitals at Tientsin, the mercy ship returned empty-
handed. This appeared to be further evidence of China's barbarism*
Hoping to improve American military medicine and treatment of
wounded, the American government expressed interest in Japan's modern
techniques- Greshara requested copies of pamphlets issued by the Medical
Division of the Japanese Department of War. The United States V/ar
Department asked Dun to ship items of eqtiipment from the Japanese Ai'my
Medical Corps for study in Washington, D.C. At the same time, the l^avy
Department dispatched navy surgeon C. U. Gravatt of the Charl eston to
25
visit field hospitals at Port Arthur.
Gravatt 's investigation reinforced the image of a humane and
modern Japanese medical corps. He discovered immaculate hospital
facilities, as well as typhoid fever patients treated with the latest
technique--"hydro"chloric acid." He observed highly-trained nurses
busily bandaging wounds (of both Japanese and Chinese personnel) with
bags of "mercuric gauze," and feeding the wounded fresh food. Everything
was carefully organised, Gravatt reported, from the dressing stations
at the froii'. down to the main field hospitals at command headquarters.
Tl>e navy surgeon paid particular attention to sanitary measures
instituted by Japanese military officials upon entering a captured
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Chinese town^ such as employing Chinese labor to clean the filthy
streets and houses. "Closets have been constructed at many of the
corners," Gravatt explained, "and Chinamen are fined when detected in
committing nuisances."
The New York Wo rl d ^ s exposure of the brutality at Port Arthur had
threatened to dcotroy an American impression of the Japanese as the
"Yankees of the Orient." One American newspaper, hov/ever, could not
reverse the current of public attitudes. Americans reminded themselves
that they had coimnitted similar atrocities during the formative stages
of their own civilisation and Japan* s example only seemed to reinforce
the similarity of two national experiences. The World '
s
impact
diminished as reports of Japanese humanitarianism at Weihaiwei reached
the United States, and respect for Japan actually increased through the
attention given its medical technology and Red Cross Society- The
press theme of "^barbarism versu s civilization" had been altered little,
if at all, by the end of the year.
But the fighting grew heavier and moved toward the major cities.
In the weeks ahead, a new concern—for the lives of Americans rather
than Asians---began to affect the American response to the Sino-Japanese
War.
CHAPTER VIII
THE PROTECTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS IN EAST ASIA
Tlie capture of the maatnioth fortifications at Port Arthur and
Weihaiwei, combined with the Japanese offensive in Manchuria, threw
thousands of Chinese soldiers into disorganized retreat. Cutting
swaths of pillage and destruction, bands of defeated troops terror-
ized the Chinese population as well as the foreign coimiiunities of
northern China. Chinese soldiery had become "a lawless mob, v/ithout
discipline/* missionary Franklin K. Chapin observed from his station
at Linching. "They collected in bodies especially at night, and
attacked the villages, and even towns, looted and murdered," Speck
von Sternburg advised Teddy Roosevelt. "The poor traveller, who came
across theruj was stripped and left naked at the roadside in the
terrible cold . . . ."^
Foreign residents throughout the norlh daily expected to fall
"victira to the rage of the bi£2^^^ pagans of the celestial empire" v/ho
were believed ready to attack mission stations and settlements.
Alludin,2 to the earlier murder of James V7ylie, a Scotch Presbyterian
iJilssionary , medical missionary Willis C. Noble reported from
Forctlagfu that anti-foreign rabble had almost created "another Wylie
affair'* at his station V7hen they tormented and threatened violence to
the Christian con;munity. Even the missionaries at the treaty ports
would not be safe, asserted tha Rev. R. 0, Hayden, unless they could
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2find refuge aboard foreign gunboats.
Foreigners in China, from the outset of hostilities , had urged
the V7estem powers to send more naval protection to China's treaty
ports. Grover Cleveland, always sympathetic to American missionary
requests, had been among the first to respond to such pressures by
ordering the strengthening of the Asiatic squadron. The President
told Congress that the V7ar had "rendered it necessary or expedient to
dispatch eight vessels to those waters." Secretary of State Greshara,
influenced by the "great number of communications" from American
missionaries in Asia and their friends in the United States, advised
Secretary of the Navy Hilary Herbert to send "some small ships > able to
3
run up the rivers" for the protection of Amaricans in the interior.
By the end of August, American naval reinforcements began to
arrive on the Asiatic station, joining the Honocacy and the Baltimore.
The first on the scene, gunboats I?^etrel and Concord, were soon joined
by the Charleston, the Yorktovm and later by the Detroit and the Machias^.
Yhe additions to his fleet increased Admiral C. C. Carpenter's ability
to respond to requests for gunboats, yet he realized that even the
larger fleet would provide insufficient strength to guard all of the
scattered American missionary groups. To derive maximum effectiveness
from his fleet, Carpenter devised a tv/o-fold strategy. First, he
deployed several vessels at what the Navy Department considered key
points and usad the rest to maintain a continual patrol, visiting
potential trouble spots to "show the flag." Second, Carpenter worked
toward e.n agreement with the other naval coircnanders to cooperate in
deploying their ships for the protection of all foreigners. The
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Admiral particularly desired the cooperation of the nineteen-ship
British Asiatic Squadron. He coznraunicated regularly with Vice-Admiral
E. R. Frenantle, cona-nander-in-chief of the British naval forces in
China. Carpenter revealed vhere each American ship would be stationed
in order to facilitate British protection of Americans in areas where
the United States Navy was absent. In a private conversation v/ith
Fre.mantle on November 4th, Carpenter learned that the British would
cooperate. Fremantle, however, cautioned that the entire arrangement
must remain informal and he carefully stated that the British agreement
constituted only a general expression of cooperation to protect each
other's subjects. Several days later the American commander reached
a similar understanding with Ad;Tiiral Dupuis of the French China fleet.
Geinnan gunboat coiraiianders also indicated that they v;ould protect
A . 4Ar^ierxcan citizens in China if absolutely necessary.
Carpenter's first concern was to free the Baltimore from its
guard duty on the Korean station. American naval forces, as well as a
legation guard, had been stationed in Korea since July. But with the
imposition of Jspanese military law Carpenter believed that Americans
in Korea needed little protection. Nevertheless, Minister Sill insisted
that his guat'd be maintained, even though its members were often drunk
and did little more than stand watch at the legation gates. Hopefully,
Sill arr^^nged for the construction of winter barracks for the marines
who were still quartered in leaky tents around the compound's courtyard.
Confiding to Car^pcnter that "in the pre??ent condition of communications
I cavroot wait for instruction," Sill cabled, "I have taken it for
granted that the Us-vy Department will supply stoves and fuel . . . and
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fit it up vith bunks and blankets." Hie Admiral complied but also
reduced the guard. When the gunboat Concord arrived the latter part of
September, Carpenter replaced the galtimore^s guard with a smaller
continscnt from the gunboat and assured a worried Sill that the flagship
would be close at hand if needed,^
After another month of calm in Korea, Carpenter inquired whether
Sill still considered a legation guard essential. Tbie minister replied
that, while the Chinese no longer threatened Seoul, "the whole kingdom
/hadj never been in a more complete state of anarchy and confusion."
Although he was undoubtedly concerned for the lives of the eighty
Americans in Seoul, Sill also had become interested in maintaining an
Arr.£rican military presence in Korea as a post-vzar wedge for a larger
American role in that country. Evidently influenced by advice from
legation socret>ary and missionary Horace Allen, Sill closed his letter to
Car-pentcr indicating that the United States should retain its guard
for the present because both Russia and Great Britain had left their
guards"-and net because Americans confronted immediate danger.^ At the
same time, the minister dashed off a cable to a skeptical Gresham to
tell him that troops should remain because rumors of assassinations and
plots continued unabated. Again in December Sill infomied his chief
that Japanese reforms had been largely unsuccessful and had left the
kingdom in disorder. He also reminded the State Department of Korea's
commercial potential, noting, "It is expected that Japanese influences
will soon open and develop the rich gold and coal mines of the country."^
Sill perpetuated the image of near anarchy in Seoul as a basis
for the continued presence of American soldiers in Korea. He bombarded
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all listeners with tales of unrest and disorder. l-Jhen the Charleston
replaced the Concord as the watch ship at Chemulpo, the minister
revealed to its captain, George W» Coffin, that the factional struggle
in Seoul had become more and more bitter and might forecast an insur-
rection. Sill continued to insist on a guard even after foreign forces
had been withdrawn, ''In this city American citizens outnumber all other
caucassian /.sic/ nationalities combined and these are largely women and
children," he informed Gresham. "My responsibilities are greater than
those of any European Representative, hence I cannot consent to follow
g
blindly any example of v/ithdrawal of guards that any of them may set."
Despite Sill*s pleas for retention of the guard, American marines
had become somewhat of an embarrassment, though they provided the only
excitement experienced in Seoul's otherwise secure American coiiimunity.
The first incident occurred when a drunken marine allegedly entered the
house of a Korean Christian^ frightening the woman and seizing "a
perfectly useless article of clothing." Mistakenly assuming that the
voman was in the clothing when the trooper grasped it, a female American
9
inissionary reported the outrage to the Navy Department. No sooner had
the furor quieted when word of another incident reached the desk of
Acting Secretary of the Navy William IfcAdoo, who ordered "a searching
investigation" of American military conduct in Korea, McAdoo had
received a letter from a friend of Rose Ely Moore, another American
missionary' in Korea. "We have to blush for our American soldiers and
some of the officers from the Baltimore," Mrs, Moore had reportedly
written. "They get beastly drunk and carouse about the streets in a
most disgraceful manner, frightening and surprising the Japs and
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Koreans." The letter alleged that the soldiers "v;ere so drunk they
probably v,'ould have not been of any use" had the Tonghaks attacked the
city or trie legation.
In response to McAdoo's order. Carpenter called for statements
from the officers of the BaUirnqre and also requested Sill's cooperation
In the investigation. The officers denied any knowledge of excessive
drunkenness. Assistant Surgeon Lex^is Morris asserted that "some of the
men, at times, were under the influence of liquor but V7ere promptly
punished by the officer in conunand." Concurrently, paymaster's clerk
Jamas Schon assured his superiors that he possessed no knowledge of
the affair. Sill discovered the identity of the letter writer, who
admitted that she had based her report upon rumors. "My husband's
Korean teacher said ha saw soldiers drunk and carousing in the streets,
and Dr. 0. R. Anison told me he had seen a soldier in a shop dead
drunk, 'Beastly drunk'," Mrs. Moore said whan questioned. "I
did hear
that the officers got drunk at the club, and had to be brought
home,
but I cannot recall who my informant was." Sill was relieved.
Intent
upon retaining his gu.rd, he assured Carpenter that the
legation had
,
11
no information to sustain the charges made in Mrs.
Moore s letter.
Ben Franklin D?.y , captain of the Baltimore, concluded
that the
accusations had exaggerated the misbehavior of his officers
and men.
"It would have been surprising, and not in accordance
with the usual
experience with landing parties had there not been
some drunkeness
amongst th-^m as they were supplied with money
monthly
. . .
and there
was plenty of liquor for sale of the most potent
kind." Day admitted
confidentially to navy veteran Carpenter, "Men who
do not get drunk are
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not plentiful in the Navy and Marine Corps." Concurring with Day's
conclusions, the Admiral urged the Navy Department to drop the case.
With the Korean station secure under Japanese occupation, the
Gulf of Chihli patrol assumed the primary attention o£ the American
Asiatic squadron. Since the Gulf was bordered by the Liaotung Peninsula
and Port Arthur to the north, Weihaivei and Chefoo at the tip of the
Shantung Peninsula to the south and Tientsin and the Taku Forts to the
west, patrols cruised near the areas of current Sino-Japanesc
hostilitie
^'he Charleston and Wetown. were mainly responsible for patrolling the
open Gulf, while throughout the winter the Petrel, remained stuck
in a
mud dock at Newchwang on the mouth of the Liao River.
Although he
occasionally joined the patrol, Carpenter preferred to maintain his
flagship Bal_ti!v^ at Nagasaki as a communications center
rather than
toss about on the rough winter seas of the Gulf. Vlhen
the Yorkt^onn
arrived at Yokohama on December 7, Carpenter inunediately
assigned her
captain, Connnander William Mayhew Folger, to the arduous
Chihli station.
"
By late December the Yorktown had established
Chefoo as its watch
station, where ice, gales and blinding snowstorms
r,ade operations at
sea almost in,possible. Nevertheless, Folger
responded to every
n.issionary's plea for help, keeping his crew
drilled in landing and
rescue operations. On January 18. three
Japanese warships, ignoring
a white flag raised by .missionaries, shelled
the port city of 1X>ngchow.
west c£ Chefoo. Folger investigated,
coiror.unicating with the American
ruissionaxy leader. The Rev. Calvin Hateer
requested that Folger infom.
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the Japanese of the mlssi-onaries ' presence in the city. Folger replied
that the Japanese had a right to fire on Tungchow. "A state of
war exists, and, legally all foreigners that remain in the country do
so at their own risk." Several days later the missionaries decided to
leave and Folger sailed up from Chefoo in a heavy snowstorm to rescue
them. He picked up sixteen women and children, but "six men and three
ladies . . . all Americans," Folger cabled Herbert, insisted upon
staying "to protect their property, and to aid the Chinese, their pupils
14
and converts, with their counsel."
The Americans still at Tungchow made another effort to enlist the
United States Navy as an intermediary betvreen themselves and the
Japanese command, offering to surrender the city if it would mean less
bloodshed. Admiral Carpenter considered such action "inadvisable and
dangerous," even if the missionaries approached the Japanese directly
and did not involve the Navy. As to any intervention on Carpenter's
part, the idea was absurd. "I am not authorized by the United States
Government to act as a mediator for the belligerent Japanese and
Chinese, and cannot, in consequence, be a party to forwarding an
unauthorized communication from an American citizen offering to use his
best efforts to have a city of one country surrender to the forces
of
another. '
No sooner had the Ttmgchow matter quieted when the Admiral
received a telegram from a Baptist group stranded somewhere near
San
San Saddle on the Shantung Peninsula. Without charts to guide
him.
Captain Coffin of the Charles ton, dispatched by Carpenter on the
rescue
mission, attempted to locate the missionaries. At last
successful in
152
his search. Coffin rammed his cruiser through foot-thick ice in the San
San Channel until he reached a point three miles from land. He then
used the ship's steam-launch, towing a whale boat, to traverse a narrow
ice-free channel to shore, vhere he rescued fourteen Araerican, British
and Swedish missionaries and their families. Upon returning to the
Ch^rLes^ton > the party found the cruiser frozen in the ice, and, as
Coffin later reported to Carpenter, only "by raimaing the ice and going
astern and then ahead with full speed," was the shi.p able to break
16
itself free.
At the same time the Yorktown arrived at Ichowfu on the southeast
coast of the Shantung Peninsula to keep an appointment with some
beleaguered missionaries. But the group had failed to reach the point
of rescue due to heavy snow, bad roads and the Chinese seizure of all
means of transportation. Folger received a note from another missionary
ashore pleading "please do not go off vrithout them." For two days the
captain maintained position, even when a violent storm threatened to
drive his ship onto the rocks. He departed only after receiving word
that one of the missionaries. Miss Anna Larson, had contracted pneumonia
ou a mountain road and the others refused to leave her< "We believe
therefore that God has something further for us to do here," the message
17
to Folger related, "and that he will take care of us."
Folger, Coffin and Carpenter became increasingly impatient with
the missionaries. The Admiral communicated that "as a class they are
thoroughly helpless and irresponsible as far as taking precautions are
concerned and by their lack cf unanimity of action would defeat the best
laid plans for their rescue." In January Carpenter had ordered a
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fifteen-man guard for the Araerican consulate at Chefoo and urged
missionaries to go into the city "as it will be impossible to afford
protection to those that insist upon remaining in the outlying
dwellings," He repeatedly explained that his marines would not be
sent to protect the missionaries "individually and collectively" in
their own homes • Yet they refused to seek refuge in Chefoo. Exasperated,
the admiral expressed his dismay in a lengthy cable to Secretary of the
Navy Herbert
:
The missionaries appear to have no conception of a
state of war, as long as the danger appears to theia remote
they disregard all advice, preferring to remain to care for
their worldly possessions, rather than to prepare for possible
contingencies. Ifnen it becomes almost too late, and they find
themselves confronted vith dangerous conditions, they appeal
with pitiful energy for assistance, and start aimlessly for
the coast hoping for aid and succor. To them the presence of
ice along the shore and the absence of soundings on the chart
mean nothing, as long as they reach the seaboard at any time
they apparently think their responsibility ended.
The missionaries continued to trouble the Navy with unneutral
requests. Mateer at Tungchov; urged Carpenter to forward a letter to
the Japanese general in command of the forces nearest his city. He
disclosed that eight Americans, who "liave no connection whatever with
the Chinese Government or with the defense of the city," would "exert
ourselves to have it- surrendered by a flag of truce" if the Chinese
proved unable to defend it. Carpenter of course refused. At the same
tlsie some missionaries just to the south of Chefoo requested help.
After stopping at a number of villages along the shore in a thick fog,
Folger finally located and rescued a number of missionary f^imilies.
After several hectic months of rescue work, the na^y recorded a decrease
in requests for aid and by the end of March conditions seemed tranquil
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on the Chihli station
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While the Yorktovm, Charleston and Baltimore steamed through
the seas on their patrols, the tiny Petrel sailed up the Liao River
to the north. Carpenter had assigned this gunboat to protect
missionaries at Mewchv/ang. Opened to foreign commerce in 1860, this
port on the Gulf of Liaotung had become an important trading nexus
for the Liao River plain. As the Fej: r€i]L churned up the brown waters
of the Liao and approached the city, only the tile roofs of a few
temples and the v/hite tower of the Chinese Imperial Customs building
appeared over the high mudbanlcs bordering the river. The gunboat
passed reed beds in stagnant water infested with mosquito larvae and
hundreds of trading junks heav>' with produce from the interior. To this
city of mud, mosquitoes and fat cockroaches, the foreign missionaries
had fled, es^caping the Chinese armies who swarmed through the neighbor-
ing countr>-'side on their way to the war zone. The Petrel had been sent
to protect them.
Unaware that the Navy Department had revoked orders to proceed
to Newchwang, Lieutenant-Cominander William Hensley Emory forced the
twelve-foot-draf t Petrel into an eleven-foot mud dock next to a smaller
British gunboat, the Firebrand , Inextricably mired in the mud, the
Petrel ^O'^l*^ remain until spring rains could provide sufficient flotation
for removal. The crews of the two gunboats, preparing for an extended
duty station, constructed mud barricades around their ships and mounted
gatling guns at key positions. Emory arranged accommodations " for the
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foreign community if it v;as forced to seek asylum aboard his gunboat*
He drilled his crew daily V7ith bayonets, revolvers and gatling guns,
warning them all the while to avoid trouble in the port town, par-
21
ticularly since the streets swarmed with Chinese soldiery.
In view of the Petrel's immobility, it was fortunate that nothing
occurred to prompt the fulfillment of her mission, v;hich was to aid the
escape of Americans from Kewchwang, There was only one minor incident
between a member of the crew and a Chinese mob, and no foreigners
requested assistance, except for the Rev. John Mclntyre, who borrowed
some Colt revolvers. Even so, Emory's ship was valuable as a listening
post. Closer to the actual battlefield than any other vessel, the
Petrel's intelligence people not only relied on Chinese informers but
could themselves count the troops and equipment passing through
Newchwang. During January and early February of 1895, Chinese units
marched north and not much later, drubbed again by the Japanese,
swarmed back along the same roads. Emory carefully recorded all
movements and kept the Department informed of war news- On March 6
the Japanese occupied the city and General Michitsura Nodzu of the
First Army called on Emory to assure him that order would be maintained
With the spring floods, the Petrel floated free of its mud dock
and
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left for Shanghai.
While the Petrel was wintering in the north, the Concord
assuir.ed
responsibility for the protection of Air.erican interests in
the Yangtze
River region. Anti-Manchu signs accompanied by
anti-foreign placards
had appeared at the treaty port of Chinkiang at the
mouth of the river,
prompting the American convmunity there to request a
gunboac. The
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Concord steamed as far as Wuhu on the Yangtze, exercising, according
to her commander, "a restraining and wholesome effect'* on this part of
the river- Commanding officer Caspar F. Goodrich also made arrangements
with the captain of the German gunboat II tis for cooperation in the
event of anti-foreign activity at Chinkiang. Both vessels v?ould land
arxoed parties and gatling guns to close off the western settlement and
23
the Customs Residence,
In addition to his contingency plan with the litis , Goodrich
cooperated freely with the British along the YangtJ^e. In December
1894 he received a request from British Consul W, R. Carles to assist
the Municipal Police at Chinkiang in clearing Chinese gun sampans away
from the landing pontoon of Jardine, Matheson & Company. Two boatloads
of arnied Americans went ashore. Goodrich justified this intervention
under his general mandate to preserve order and protect property. Yet,
Concordes action in behalf of a British commercial house was of
little aid to the State Department's continuing attempts to convince
China that the United States was neutral. Shortly after the favor to
Carles, the British consul at Wuhu requested a gunboat to settle some
reported unrest. Goodrich hurried to the spot, where he found everything
quiet. "My trip to Wuhu is justified," Goodrich informed Carpenter,
"in the confidence it has brought to the foreign community, which
includes a number of American missionaries.
In January 1895 Cominander Joseph Edgar Craig replaced Caspar
Goodrich as captain of the Concord and was soon pursuing the same
energetic tactics as had his predecessor. Upon learning that the
Taotai (Governor) at Ningpo had refused pemission for foreign meu^of-war
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to visit his city and that the American missionaries in the treaty
port feared attack, Craig secretly arranged a plan with Consul "General
Jeraigan at Shanghai to force his v;ay into the harbor* "I believe
that the situation demands that the flag of the United States be shown
on board a man-of-var at Ningpo," Craig asserted. Without v/aiting for
orders from Carpenter, he steamed into Ningpo despite vehement Chinese
protests. The Concord'
s
visit passed without incident and Craig
received the thanks of American Consul Fowler for strengthening his
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hand in dealing with Chinese authorities.
'^^^ Q2J}£9lA proceeded to Chinkiang V7here officers went ashore to
hunt game. Instead they accidentally shot and slightly V70unded a
Chinese boy. During the race back to the ship a Chiiiese mob managed
to seir.e one of the Air.ericans. News of the incident reached the
American press which, for a time, threatened to exaggerate the affair.
As one editorialist raved: "Great fears are felt for the safety of the
entire party, as the Chinese are wrought up to an extreme pitch of
resentment." Long before the first editorial, the incident had been
amicably and quickly settled by "the payment of twenty Mexican
dollars" to the boy's father and treatment of the superficial wound by
the Concord's surgeon. Jernigan, worried over the "graphic account"
of the Chinkiang shooting in American newspapers, took pains to announce
that no one had been seriously hurt and no one. should be blamed for the
affair, since even the President himself could not have resisted
hunting in Chinkiang, were he in China. "Probably he is a better
marksman," Jernigan joked, "than some of our naval officers appear to
be."^^^
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The Concord remained at Chinkiang without further incident,
suffering only frorn its own poor deck caulking which admitted a
dangerous amount of water during the torrential spring rains. The
gunboat's patrol on the Yangtze had been an abrasive one, but fortunately,
matters here were not so sensitive as in the main v^ar theater farther
to the north.
The Tientsin station, protected by the decrepit, unscaworthy
Honocacy , became the center of American governmental concern. Early
in the war reports had circulated that Tientsin and Peking would be
attacked by Japanese forces. "Pekin is Panic Striken,'^ the New York
Herald's European edition announced in late September 1894. A^nerican
Board missionary Williara Scott Anient v^rote from Peking that foreigners
fear "Pandemonium" may break loose among the "unsavory elements" of
the city at any time. The British evacuated their women and children
and American Laissionaries met with Charles Denby Jr. who urged them to
follow the British, Mews that Great Britain would employ Sepoy troops
-to protect the lives of foreigners from brigandage, murder and outrage
hardly soothed the fears of Americans in Tientsin. Unable to decide
whether the Chinese mob or the Sepoy troops posed the greater danger
in China, one American commented that England's Sepoys were
"no better
than the Hessians and the red savages who were turned loose
upon us in
..27
the revolution."
Under pressure from the foreign community, the Chinese
government
placed huge posters on mission compound walls m.aking it a
crime
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punishable by death to harass foreign residents in the city. Young
Denby, in a press release, assured Americans that reports of danger
in Peking had been greatly exaggerated. The acting minister told of
his concern over false dispatches, '^^atever their object, whether
to justify foreign interf erencej or to serve other purposes," he
cabled Gresham, "they V7ill cause groundless anxiety in Europe and
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America." Peking remained quiet and fears of riots decreased.
The bogey of anti-foreign violence reappeared shortly after the
return of the senior Denby to his ministerial post. On October 31 he
wrote to Gresham of his concern for the lives of the sixty Americans
in Peking if the Japanese rnarched on the capital. "I do not wish to
abandon r.y post, therefore I have written to Rear Admiral Carpenter,"
suggesting that the crew of the Moriocacy at Tientsin be increased by
fifty men and that the officer commanding be itistructed to send them to
Peking "upon my request." Carpenter envisaged a recurrence of the
Korean problem and objected to sending reinforcements to the old gunboat
Re argued that the draf ty and cramped quarters aboard the Monoca^^. could
not adequately support the existing crew, never mind fifty additional
men. Further suggesting that fifty n^en would be insufficient to force
their way inland to Peking, the Adirlral testified that the Inter-
national Force at Tientsin would be able to meet all emergencies
and
refused to approve Denby's request. Even Gresham quietly
prompted
Denby to advise the missionaries to seek asylum at the nearest
treaty
port where naval officers on the Asiatic station could
protect them.
At the same time Denby's interpreter, F. D- Cheshire,
privately assured
Third Secretary Rockhill that "everything is quiet
here in spite of
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29the news at home to the con trar}'--there is no danger."
Yet Denby persevered. In a dispatch to Gresham, he bypassed
Carpenter and requested the strengthening of the Monocacy'
s
crev?.
Denby succeeded in winning Gresharn's approval, who in turn convinced
Secretary of the Navy Herbert. When the Bal timore arrived in Nagasaki
on November 29, Carpenter found orders directing the assignment of the
additional force to the Monocacy. Reluctantly, Carpenter steamed to
Chetoo, where three officers and forty-two marines boarded a British
steamer bound for Tientsin. The steamer arrived off the Taku Bar and
v/aitcd for earlier vessels to transfer passengers to landing lighters.
Facing a severe shortage of rations and the possibility of river freeze,
the coainander of the marine guard, Captain George Elliott, decided to
land his troops without perraission and shuttle them to Tientsin by
rail. "I v;as well aware I had no right to land an armed force v/ithout
permission in a foreign country, but it was impossible for me to get
this permit within necessary time, so I embarked the men and baggage
on a tug/' Elliott later recalled. He marched his men through a
"motley crov;d'* of coolies and soldiers, instructing the American marines
to apply "vicious; blows with the butts of their pieces" in order to
reach the train. After an hour-and-a-half ride to Tientsin on an open
car in freezing wli^ds, the contingent enjoyed the relative warmth of
the leaky Mojiocacx.* I'hey purchased long sheepskin coats, fur caps and
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gloves and settled down to ax^ait marching orders for Peking.
An Imperial Edict had forbidden the passage and entry of foreign
soldiers into Peking, but Admiral Carpenter had instructed the commander
of the Monocacj^ to use his own discretion as to the advisability of
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sending men there. The Admiral reminded the commander of agreements
with foreign naval representatives which might make it necessary to
send an allied force to Peking and stressed Herbert's order to avoid
offense, "if possible," to either the Japanese or the Chinese,
Carpenter added his own warning. "Although arms and ammunition vjill
be provided, it is not expected that any occasion v/ill arise for their
use, and recourse to arms shall take place in an extreme emergency only
such as self defense, or the defense of the Legation against attack by
31
an irresponsible mob."
Even after the capitulation of Port Arthur and Danby's request
for reinforcements at Tientsin, Peking remained relatively calm. Ament,
writing from the capital in December, noted that the Imperial Rescript
and the patrols of K^nchu bannemion at Christian chapels had proved
effective in curbing anti-foreign outbreaks. "The people are so
overawed by these mult3.plied indications of care for us on the part of
the authorities that they hardly lift their eyes to a foreigner as he
goes along the street for fear they will be immediately decapitated,"
Denby advised the missionaries to remain in Peking if they felt secure
and appeared to believe that the Monocacy's reinforcements would not
be needed after all. Then, without consulting other foreign repre-
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sentatives, the Russian minister called his marines to Peking.
Denby cabled that he might act soon. Herbert opposed rending the
troops, but the Cleveland administration had authorized the dispatch
of a guard if China failed to protect foreigners or if the "other
Powers send Marines to Peking." The action of other western nations
assumed a central role in Denby's ruminations. "If the other nations
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bring their marines hither and we bring none, and anarchy supervenes,
and mob violence breaks out, and my own people who are more numerous
than any, perhaps all others, are left without protection, I should
33
feel that I have not done my full duty."
Gresham began to doubt the wisdom of sending troops to Peking.
Yang Yu voiced his government's opposition to the dispatcli of American
soldiers through Chinese territory. Requesting that Gresham not
insist on sending troops, the Chinese minister assured the Secretary
of State that the Chinese government would protect the American
legation and the "presence of foreign troops as you request would
aggravate the situation." Gresham promised Yang that the United States
would not insist upon sending troops "unless the other Representatives
ma'Ke similar requests of the Chinese Government." Meanwhile Denby
stepped up the pressure from Peking. He cabled news of his meeting
with the foreign diplomatic representatives in which all insisted on
the right to convey armed guards into the Chinese Imperial capital.
"It is likely that Russia, France, /and/ Italy /will/ bring troops,"
,34
Denby warned. "England has now fifteen here and will bring more."
President Cleveland, regarding American marines in China as a
violation of neutrality, shared Gresham' s reservations. Tlie
latter
cabled Denby on January 1: "President thinks Carpenter's
opposition
to sending marines reasonable and expects that in no
event will you
insist upon marines, unless other legations do." Once
again the final
decision seemed to revolve around the actions of western
powers rather
than the Chinese. At the same time. Carpenter
suggested an alternative
to the transportation of a marine guard to Peking,
inquiring whether
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the American community might not seek the safety of heavily-guarded
3 ^
Tientsin.
In February 1895, reports of dic-turbances and mutinies by Chinese
soldiers increased. Consul Read called missionaries of the American
Board and the Methodist Episcopal church to the refuge of Tientsin.
In conjunction v.dth Cormnander Robert E. Impey of the Konocacy , he
cabled Denby requesting one hundred more irien from the American force
at Chefoo. Inipey ordered Captain Elliott to visit Peking and raake
ari'angeinents for the housing of his marines in the abandoned Dutch
legation. Meanwhile, Denby informed Admiral Carpenter on February 21
that he V70uld request the fifty marines "in pursuance of the cooperation
policy which prevails in the East." Aware that Denby was finally
prepared to call for American armed intervention, the Secretary of
State sent a last warning. Legally the United States had no right
to bring up troops, Gresham cabled on February 28th. "I do not find in
any of the treaties with China provisions authorising the protection of
the legations by foreign troops, but if other powers bring up marines you
, _ ii36
arc autnorized to do the same."
After months of tension and false expectations, mob disorders
failed to materialize and Denby never made the final request. By early
May the Monocac^ls reinforcements had returned to the Baltimore ^
Circunistance allox/ed the United States to avoid yet another situation
which could easily have compromised the policy of neutrality. The
American government had been extremely sensitive to the perils, whether
real or imagined, faced by missionaries in East Asia. Troops had been
landed in Korea, a siseable fleet had been engaged in protective duties.
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the administration had permitted the deployment of troops in China and
had almost consented to marching these troops to Peking against the
vishes of the Chinese government. Once again State Department
instructions derived more front principle than from comprehension of
existing conditions. Typically vague and sometiines self-contradictory,
such iiistructions virtually invited American diplomatic and naval
representatives in East Asia to interpret them loosely or even disobey
them.
Early 1895 brought peace feelers, providing the United States
with yet additional tasks to undertake in its role as a conscientious
and energetic neutral.
CHAPTER IX
THE AMERICAN ROLE IN PEACE PRELIMINARIES
From the beginning of hostilities in Korea, European nations
had pressured the United States to join thera in nmltilateral inter-
vention between China and Japan. As early as July 1894 Cleveland had
indicated that the United States wuld not participate in such an
arrangeKient . Yet rumors persisted that the United States would serve
in a mediatory capacity, or would at least offer unilateral arbitration.
In fact, soHiO Americans desired early mediation of the conflict. In
September 1894 the American Review of Reviews insisted that the United
States Thad a duty to end the war on her o^n tenvs. "VJe believe that
any solution of existing Asiatic difficulties that the United States
should declare to be just and right would be promptly accepted by
Russia and England, as well as by the Asiatic powers theiaselves."
Ar^ericau pacifists agreed, suggesting immediate mediation. The American
Peace Society even alluded to American participation in an inter-
national police force which would guarantee the independence and reform
of the Korean governiaent. Leading pacifist Belva Lockwood was not so
patriotic about peacemaking. She believed that the American branch of
the International Peace Bureau, for ^7hich she worked as secretaiT,
should submit a plan of arbitration to the Pope or some other
European
1
leader » rather than to President Cleveland.
Reports of possible Aiwerican partnership in a multilateral
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intervention increased in early October. A New York Herald reporter
hastened to Assistant Secretar>^ of State Uhl's home on the evening of
October 5 determined to discover whether the United Str.tes contean-
plated involvement in Asian politics. Uhl insisted that the State
Department had never received an official request for cooperation in
a program of joint intervention, but he refused to cormr.ent further on
the subject. Pushed to discuss ^v^hat the United States might do in the
event such a request should be received, another "official source"
revealed that the United States V7ould follov7 the traditional policy of
"absolute non«intervcntion in the East" and would not cooperate with
any power to effect a settlement of the war "except from a humanitarian
point of view." Possible limitations en humanitarian action were not
2
discussed
.
On the following day Uhl received a fornial note frOiH Mr. \L E.
Goshen of the British Embassy inquiring whether the United States v/ould
participate in a projected joint intervention. Uhl sent the note to
President Cleveland, then vacationixig at Buzzards Bay. For alraost a
week the State Department waited for the President's reply. Remarkins
that the British expected a prompt answer, Gresham cabled his chief on
October 12: "Shall I say in reply to Goshen's note copy of which was
sent you that while the President earnestly desires that China and Japan
shall speedily agree upon terms of peace alike honorable to both nations
and not humiliating to Korc.a he cannot join England Germany Russia and
France in an intervention as roquasted?" Leaving the policy statement
coiTipletely u? to the Secretary, Cleveland replied, "Tnat is exactly
what I was going to suggest in reply to Nr. Goshen ... it is
exactly
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right." The President returned to the New England woods for more
hunting, and further pleadings from Goshen--£ssuring that any inter-
vention v;ould be limited to diplomatic axtion at s suitable time-»w£re
3ignored by the State Department.
Pressure for American mediation came next from China. On October
23 young Denby had learned that the Chinese Foreign Office would concede
Korean independence and pay a war indemnity to Japan, although at this
point China had not yet requested American mediation. Later the Tsungli
Yamen called for the employment of American good offices under the first
article of the 1858 Treaty of Tientsin. This article provided for good
offices to bring about an amicable arrangement of a dispute between
China and another nation, acting "oppressively or unjustly toward
China." llie senior Denby, now in Peking, immediately warned Gresham
that this would be a violation of American neutrality, since under this
arrangement the United States vzould in effect be recognizing Japan as
the aggressor and China as the innocent victim. Furthermore, since
China had requested similar mediation from other powers, acceptance
would entangle the United States in a multilateral understanding
4
designed to protect China. »
Yang Yu, using his friendship with Gresham to good advantage, had
already convinced the Secretary of State to extend an offer of Araericaix
good offices for mediation to China. Gresham cabled Denby and instructed
him to make such an offer. China's request and Gresham' s instructions
to Denby each formulated without the knowledge of the other, arrived
at their respective destinations coincidentally , reinforcing China's
opinion that the United States had accepted the role of mediator under
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the terms of the Treaty of Tientsin, Explaining that Denby's cable,
fon-7arding China's request and v^arning against its acceptance, had
arrived after the American offer of mediation, Gresham asserted that
"China's similar request addressed to the great European Powers may
somewhat embarrass the President's freedom of action/' President
Cleveland would serve as an impartial arbiter only if China and Japan
accepted the United States as the sole mediatory agent* As Gresham
announced, "He will gladly aid them by conference at this capital, or
in any other practicable way." Washington further complicated the
situation when Cleveland hinted that he might cooperate v/ith other
pov/ers "simply in determining amount of indemnity if Japan's consent
obtained," thus opening the door to possible American involvement in
5
the post-war settlenent.
Gresham realized that he must attempt to clarify the American
position. "It was not until China through her minister here, had
repeatedly requested it, that the President expressed his willingness
to act as peacemaker," the Secretary assured Denby. At the same time
he explained American policy to the Japanese minister in Washington,
Shinchiro Kurino. Ihe offer of mediation had been made not because
Atiiarica v?as opposed to the war but because continued warfare might
force European intervention. Motivated by "sentiments of friendship
toward Japan" and iiot by the desire to hinder Japanese military progress,
Gresham suggested that Japan express its willingness to initiate peace
talks which would prevent outside interference. Therefore, Japan as
well as China was allowed to understand that American mediation efforts
6
would aid its cv;n interests.
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News of the American offer reached the press about a v/eek after
it had arrived in Peking and Tokyo. The usually-critical New York
Tribune, believing that American mediation vjould benefit Japan,
supported the latest American move. This policy differed from the
Cleveland administration's "earlier diplomatic fiasco" (warning Japan
to preserve Korean integrity) which the Tribune said had been designed
to "dazzle the public and distract attention from the State Department's
other lamentable and disastrous ventures" in Hawaii. Pro-mediation
spokesmen argued over whether to support the American policy because
"it would materially advance this country's growing commercial
interests" in Asia or because the United States should mediate "v;ithout
personal interests or prejudice to warp her decision." Others believed
that the United States could at the same time, be both commercially-
oriented and impartial. Selfish interests could not hurt the
nation's
role as an "ideal mediator," since neither Japan or China
would be
favored in future Asian trade. "The one possible objection to the
acceptance of its friendly offices is the remembrance of Mr.
Gresham's
scandalous indiscretion at the beginning of the war," the
Tribune
concluded. Unaware of Gresham's assurances to Kurino
and resorting to
earlier form, the Republican newspaper asserted that
"Japan might veil
hesitate to submit her case to the judgement of a Goverment
whose
foreign policy was in such hands as his."
In line with existing patterns of public
opinion, most opponents
of American mediation assumed that American efforts
would be more
beneficial to China than Japan. Ihey wondered why
the United States
had m.anifested such a sudden interest in what
they called entangling
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alliances and suggested that Yang had manipulated the American
Secretary of State. These critics asserted that the war had progressad
nicely for "the friends of progress and Christian civilization" and
should be allowed to take its natural course. By trying to stop the
var, the United States allegedly played England's game, on grounds
that British commercial supremacy vms being threatened by continued
warfare.^ Tnese analysts ignored V7ell-publici2ed fears that continued
warfare might lead to European intervention against Japan.
VJIiile AiTiericans debated possible mediation efforts, Japan remained
silent. Not until November 15 could Dun report that the Imperial
Cabinet had decided to discuss the proposal. On the next day the
Japanese "politely'^ refused to accept American mediation, Gresham
learned that while Japan appreciated the kind offer it could not achieve
"the just and reasonable results of the war" unless China directly
approached Japan on the subject of peace negotiations. In other words,
China must humble herself. Japan indicated that it would accept the
Chinese proposals if they were transmitted through the American
legation
in Peking. Gresham, accompanied by Secretary of Treasury John
G.
Carlisle, drove out to Cleveland's suburban Georgetown retreat,
Woodley,
9
and presented Japan* s reply to the President.
Public response to Japan's rejection coincided with earlier
attitudes toward American mediation. Generally, those who
had favored
it accepted the rebuff with little more than a hint
of criticism.
"There is nothing offensive to the United States in this
deliberate
refusal to take advantage of the good offices of . a
benevolent peacemaker."
After all, American diplomats could still fu:K-.tion as
messengers, if
171
not formal mediators, between the two belligerents. The San
Francisco
Examiner predicted that even this limited role would project the
United States into the center of the peace negotiations and
enormously
increase its prestige in Asia. The Louisville Courier-Journal
maintained that the United States would now benefit from its treaty
role
without assuming the "thankless office of mediator." Other
newspapers
praised the administration's humanitarianism. "The spectacle
of the
United States as the friend of all peoples, referred to
without question
as an unprejudiced mediator in the quarrels of nations, is one
of which
Americans should be proud." extolled the Philadelph^ Led^. "IJe not
only keep the peace ourselves, but we are trusted
peacemakers in all
parts of the world.
"^^
Critics of American mediation cited the Japanese
rejection as
evidence of more bungling, "the Administration has
received another
humiliation at the hands of Japan," the India^apoli^
Jc^
l-he Detroit News claimed the govermaent deserved
the "snub" because of
its inept diplomacy. Detractors contended
that American mediation had
been refused since it would interfere with
Japan's civilizing crusade
in Asia. "China is such a stumbling block
in the way of commercial
progress in the East that it will be a good
thing for Japan to thoroughly
shake up the Celestials and cure them of
their unprogressiveness and
exclusiveness by a practical demonstration of
the advantages of
civilized and enlightened methods." The war
was "none of our business"
and Gresham's offer constituted "an
officious piece of meddling."
The most virulent anti-administration
attack came from the
New York Vy^, a Republican opponent of Cleveland.
The Pre- accused
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the British oi; using Americans to preserve their trading supremacy in
Asia vhich was based on the infamous Indian opium trade. Ttie United
States by offering mediation had become the "tool of England in the
East" in supporting a decadent and detestable Manchu dynasty. "For
the sake of the national honor and the American name, it is to be
hoped that this blunder will prove the last: that Messrs. Cleveland
and Gresham will cease to act as flunkeys to Lord Rosebery, and that
the President of the United States will conclude to adopt a foreign
policy that will no longer bring shame upon the country and confusion
12
upon himself*"
Despite the Japanese rejection, they had helped pave the way
for American participation in any peace preliminaries between themselves
and China. In the good offices agreements both Asian countries hnd
accepted American diplomatic representatives as messengers to keep
lines of communications open between them. No European nation played
such a role. Minister Dun in Tokyo, Consul -General Abercrombie in
•Nagasaki, Consul Read in Tientsin and Minister Denby in Peking served
as the only means of official communication between the belligerents.
Denby particularly relished this opportunity to influence the
future
course of Chinese history, as well as the American presence in
Asia.
Denby told his friend Gresham that China appeared on the brink
of a
profound and historic transformation and indicated that he
wanted the
Ur.itcd States to be in on the shaping of a new China.
Believing that
only he could assist China in its negotiations with Japan
according to
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accepted standards of western diplomacy, Denby suggested that the
Tsungli Yamen invest him in writing with the power to coir^unicate
China's overtures of peace to Japan
.
But before Dcnby could assume the role he desired, Li Hung-chang
attempted to deal directly with Japan. The Viceroy, without the
knowledge of the Chinese Foreign Office, dispatched his private
agent,
Custoius Con-^issioner G. Detring, a German, to Japan with
a personal
letter to Priir.e Minir.ter Viscount Ito Hirobumi. The
Japanese government
refused even to receive Detring. stating that he was
not properly
accredited by the Chinese government to discuss peace
and would not be
recognized in any capacity. Kurino inforrr.ed the American
press that
Japan's rejection of Detring stemioed. not from Japan's desire
to
prolong war, but from its atte.npt to insure the
success of any peace
negotiations by forcing China to send a fully-accredited
envoy.
Shortly thereafter Detring left Japan without
meeting Ito. Denby took
personal advantage of Datring's failure, telling
Gresham. "When I
undertook to negotiate on the part of China
to bring about peace the
Chinese Govenxment inunediately recalled Mr.
Detring.
At the moment Denby 's role was important
enough even without
his exaggerations. Japan's treatment of
Detring implied that it would
talk with China only through the An,erican
legation in Peking, "^is
left Denby in the key position to transmit
and receive all peace
proposals. Furthermore, the Chinese
relied on the American minister
to interpret Japanese diplomatic
maneuvering, as well as to help the
Ya.en forruulate appropriate responses.
Although he never acted as an
Official mediator, Denby served as a
key adviser for the Chinese
Foreign
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Office on "non-substantive matters" during prelirainary negotiations
with Japan. In fact he found it difficult, at times, to convince the
Tsungli Yamen that he could not act as a mediator and conduct all the
negotiations for China. "They even asserted that their Minister at
Washington had wired that the President had consented that I should
act for them as commissioner to make peace," Denby revealed to the
Secretary of State in Dcceuiber of 1894.
While insisting the Chinese Foreign Office understand that his
good offices role could not include mediation, Denby continued as an
intimate adviser for the Chinese in the peace preliminaries. On
November 27, vhen Dun cabled Japan's terms for opening peace talks
to
Denby. the minister showed the cable to the Yamen and advised
China
either to decline Japan's terms or to appoint a fully-accredited
AKbassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary for the
purpose
of negotiation. China procrastinated, requesting Denby
to cable
Japan that China would not designate a representative
until the
Japanese governnient indicated exactly what the two countries
were to
discuss. Denby fonvarded this niessage but pressed
China to accept
16
Japanese terms.
Having received another cable from Dun on December 2.
Denby
visited the Yamen and after a lengthy debate advised
China to follow
Japan's directions and designate a peace envoy.
"I pointed out that
the war would now go ca at the expense of China,
and while I wished to
leave the Yamen perfectly free to carry on war
or make peace still it w
my duty, as they consulted me as an adviser,
to say that unless they
hoped to gain great successes in the future
it would be better to make
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peace." Denby, apparently concerned about overstepping his role as a
neutral representative extending good offices to a belligerent, took
pains to defend his advice to Greshara. "Understanding that my Government
favors peace my effort has been to bring about that result, but I ara
always confronted with the assertion of the excessive friendliness of
the United States, and V7ith a piteous and helpless reliance which makes
me an adviser when in truth I am only an intermediary between the tv;o
Governments." VJiiether he realized it or not, Denby 's advice was
anything but impartial. The Japanese would have been grateful had they
known how diligently Denby was working to promote Chinese surrender to
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their harsh terms.
China, apparently prepared to follovj Denby' s advice, agreed to
appoint a minister with full povrer to negotiate peace. After rejecting
China's offer to hold the talks in Shanghai, Tokyo stated that it would
appoint Its plenipotentiary only after China's peace ambassador arrived
in Japan and presented his credentials. These arrangements
humiliated
the Chinese, who had never negotiated with foreigners outside of
China.
Denby told his advisees to surrender to this demand. He patiently
explained that international law required a defeated nation to
accept
the site of negotiations from the victor, and he assured
the Yamsn that
its plenipotentiaries would be safe in Japan. Apparently
convinced,
the Chinese Foreign Office appointed two peace
coiranissioners on
December 20th. But China could also play the subtle
game of saving
face. The two officials, chosen expressly for the
pui-pose of affronting
Japan, were minor officials and one of them. Shao
Yu-lien, previously
had ordered pris.es for Japanese heads while Governor
of Formosa.
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Nevertheless, as Dun cabled, Japan feared European intervention,
desired peace and would meet the Chinese plenipotentiaries at
18
Hiroshima.
Although Denby considered the Japanese terms "schocking /.sic/,"
he expressed relief that China had finally decided to negotiate peace.
"I have, alone, done the troublesome and difficult work of inducing
China to sue for peace, . . . jealousy, distrust, ill feeling in and
out of the Yamen had to be overcome." Believing his good offices
duties finished, Danby assured Gresham on December 29th that "I have
done all I can to bring the two nations together and now it is up to
19
them."
During this interval another prominent American, former Secretary
of State John Uatson Foster, became involved in the
Sino-Japanese
peace preliminaries. Foster had visited China the previous
year, where
Li Hung-chang had taken him on a tour of the ICaiping
mines and railroad
Foster, hoping that China's resources could be exploited
by American
capital, had become enmeshed in several schemes to
introduce American
investment into China. He was involved with James
Harrison Wilson,
Delaware entrepreneur and promoter of enterprises in
China, and his
name had also been linked with the "infernal
machine" plots early in
the war. Now. in December of 1894, Foster
appeared at the State
Department and informed Gresham that China had
requested his assistance
,
20
in the peace talks.
Foster requested that the State Department
assign a clerk to
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accompany him to Asia. Gresham refused. The Secretary of State
believed Foster's interest in the peace negotiations was purely
financial. Besides, Foster was a Republican who had contributed to
the e>:pansionist activity during the last months of the Harrison
administration. The Secretary wrote Thomas Francis Bayard, the
American minister to England, that Foster and a Mr. Holcouibe of New
York City had raised a large loan for China in the United States. "You
can readily see that if Foster is not already a very rich man his
prospects for becoming a millionaire are flattering." Several days
later Gresham suggested the same to Denby, writing that "Foster's
trip will not injure him financially." Ttie New York World reinforced
Judge Gresham' s suspicions when it revealed Foster's complicity in
raising a Chini loan with George Flint and Chaster Holcombe of Nev; York.
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Foster vigorously denied all allegations, then departed for China.
Whatever Foster's motives, Gresham carefully divorced the State
Department from his mission. Tne Secretary hastened to assure Kurino
and the Japanese government that Foster's intention to help the
Chinese had originated "entirely without the sanction of the United
States Gov't." The following week, in response to a Senate
inquiry,
administration spokesman Senator Morgan of Alabama asserted that
General Foster "has no connection in the world with any
official act.
or recognia^ance even, of the United States Government."
Gresham was
determined not to open new avenues for anti-administration
attacks by
an unneutral act"-espe.cially an unneutral act in
behalf of China.
n.e Secretary also resented the former public servant's
alleged
financial machinaticns and opposed the mission on
moral as well as
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diplomatic grounds.
Denby, meanwhile, continued as unofficial adviser and inter-
mediary. He fonv'arded China's request for the names of Japan's
plenipotentiaries and inquired as to the exact spot for their landing.
Realizing that everything he had done had worked out in Japan's favor,
he informed Dun that Japan's treatment of China was embarrassing him.
Dun answered that Foreign Minister Kaitsu regretted that he could not
relieve Dcnby's embarrassment. At this point, Denby further expanded
the authority vested in him under good offices. Sending a message
directly to Mutsu, he advised Japan to treat China more gently.
Furthenr.ore, he pressed Washington for increased American influence in
determining the outcome of peace talks. "It would be advisable for the
Department to consider whether supervision should be had of the treaty
making process, and whether good results might follow friendly suggestions
made in the interest of the treaty powers." He argued that the
proven
impartiality and friendship of the United States permitted it to act
in
a supervisory role, if it so decided, without arousing the
animosity of
either belligerent. Denby advocated American assistance in
shaping
the settlement "for the benefit of humanity." He added
that he was
not presentitng a case for either side but was only
seeking to increase
American influence in order to gain post-war commercial
benefits
derived from the "most favored nations clause." He
did not mention
Japan's earlier rejection of a "supervisory role" for the United
States.
Denby had prepared a draft of credentials for
the Chinese peace
envoys, and he assured Dun and Gresh.m that he
had included the words
"plenipotentiaries with full powers." Supposedly
equipped with these
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credentials, the Chinese negotiators left Shanghai on January 26th
aboard a French mail steamer and arrived in Kobe, Japan, on the 30th.
Foster, already in Japan, met the Chinese envoys at the dock and
examined their credentials. As he later recorded in his memoirs, the
letters were "not in the usual form among nations" and he expected the
Japanese to refuse them. Ito and Mutsu, after unleashing a propaganda
tirade against Chinese duplicity, refused the "defective and unsatis-
factory" credentials. The Chinese party, accompanied by Foster,
returned to China. As one American editorial suggested, "even the
ornate whiskers of our own John W. Foster couldn't persuade the
Japan-se authorities to accept the credentials of those envoys from
China.
Denby, almost as embarrassed as the Chinese, reacted too quickly.
He insisted that he had prepared standard diplomatic credentials
but
that the Chinese had substituted their own letter for his,
striking out
any reference to "full powers" for signing a peace treaty. The
minister angrily castigated the Yamen for revising his work.
"I
demanded that any new letters of credence prepared by the
Yamen should
be submitted to me before transmission and they agreed
to this demand."
Then Denby heard reports that the Japanese victory at
Weihaiwei, combined
with the passage of a bill by the Japanese Diet for
"whatever amount
of appropriations may be necessary for the purpose
of military
expenditure," had been the real cause of the Japanese
refusal. This
eased Denby's own embarrassment as well as his
anger toward the Yamen.
Yet, in demanding that China show him everything
before sending it to
J- . 25
Japan, Denby had assumed the authority of a
mediator.
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Gresham iramediately recognized the rainister's assumption of new
powers. He warned: "Wliile acting as intermediary do nothing that v;ill
even appear to compromise in any degree this government's position of
impartial ne^xtrality between China and Japan." Gradually Denby had
assumed an increased role in influencing China's peace preliminaries.
He had opened the door for American participation in the post-var
settlement but Greshaiu and Cleveland refused to enter. Now, under
pressure from Washington, Denby attesr.pted to raake amends. Calling his
contribution to China simply "an unofficial act of kindness," he told
Gresham that he had done nothing to compromise American neutrality.
Yet he said that he would "severely heed the admonition." Gresham
assured his friend that his efforts had not been "inconsistent with
our attitudes of impartial neutrality.
At last China surrendered to Japanese demands and Denby 's advice
by appointing Li Hung-chang, all his honors restored, as the sole
plenipotentiary with full powers to treat for peace. At the same time,
the Yamen begged Denby to urge the President of the United States
to
request an armistice. "I told thei.i that our position of strict
neutrality forbade such action and that their request could not be
granted, but they begged me so strenuously to send a telegram
that I
agreed to do so," Once again Dun warned Denby that the
Japanese would
not accept Li's mission unless he had full powers to
recognize the
complete independence of Korea, the cession of territory,
an agreement
for the regulation of trade and any further demands
Japan might make.
The Japanese govemm.ent i^str^lcted Dun to make
certain China understood
these conditions and was prepared to comply with
them before dispatching
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any more emissaries. Japan assumed this tougVi position, German
military attache Speck von Sternburg wrote Theodore Roosevelt from
Peking, because the Japanese public was in a mood to accept only ens of
tv?o alternatives, "some extraordinary bargain" or the capture of
Peking.
Wily Li Hung-chang delayed answering Japan, hoping in the meantime
to involve some western powers in the peace negotiations, thereby
substituting complexities for the frightening clarity of the Japanese
dcinands. He visited Denby on February 21 and requested Aiiisrican
assistance in persuading Japan to discuss an armistice. Li urged the
American minister to use his influence with Japan "to befriend" China.
Denby replied "flatly and firmly that my Government would in no wise
intervene in the war, nor interfere in any way between the two nations"
and if Li really desired peace he should immediately accept Japan's
tenr.s
The able Chinese diplomat received more favorable responses from
certain
European representatives, particularly the French and Russian ministers
in Peking and thus laid the groundwork for the later tripartite
inter-
vention. When Denby reported Li's machination to Washington,
he
indicated that the Viceroy had received no assurances from the
28
Europeans
.
If Li had wrung any comir.itments from other powers,
he certainly
did not tell Denby. Yet he persistently requested
American aid. Denby,
in contrast v.o his earlier attitude, just as vehemently
refused to
compromise American neutrality. He drew the elder
statesman aside "as
an old friend" and expressed his views
"unofficially and personally."
Denby intimated that European intervention would
only lead to the
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dismemberment of China and that China should cooperate instead with
Japan as a fellow oriental power. He held out the prospect of China,
Japan and the United States cooperating to build a progressive,
modern
and enlightened post-war East Asia without European interference.
Xhis great end could be accomplished only if China agreed to
surrender
29
to Japan.
Noting that Li would include the Americans Foster, Pcthick
and
Dennison as legal advisers in his party, Denby wondered whether
the
United States might still benefit from this service.
Throughout his
dealings the minister had kept in mind the prospect of
increased
Ai^erican investraent in China. Now, as he prepared
to travel to Japan,
Li stopped once more to see Denby. The minister
suggested that Li
should achieve the power to refonn China's railroads,
mining enterprises.
banks and other resources, leaving the guidance
of such a program "in
the hands of English speaking people." In
frankness Denby admitted
that neither he nor his goverx^cnt could
officially arrange for
AB^ericans to participate in these rcforras, but
he hoped that he was
30
sowing seeds for future events.
Accon,panied by over 150 officials and
attendants, travelling in
tvo stealers. Li expected to impress
the Japanese with the si.e and
splendor of his retinue. An An.erican
missionary in Japan commented,
nf he had taken his grip in hand and set out alone
in a canoe, he would
Kavo made .uite as strong an impression,
as the Japanese are not likely
to be overawed by anything a Chinaman
can now get up in the way of
display, and he would have more money
left toward paying the indemnity
that Japan will exact." In any event,
on March 20. 1895, Li and his
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troupe arrived at Shimonoseki , the site selected by the Japanese for
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the conference v/hich V70uld open on the following day.
Though American interest in foreign policy had for some weeks
been distracted by troubles with the British in Nicaragua and in
Venezuela, news of the impending peace conference drew public attention
back to Asia. Tlie New York World competed with rivals to scoop the
conference, assigning former Tok^o Times editor Edward Howard House to
cover the great event. The Horld praised House for his cable on the
peace preliminaries which made the daily "a day ahead of everybody."
Other newspapers discussed the prelimii-^ary teras, focusing on
several
major issues^-Chinn' s apparent peace "trickery," Japan's terms and
motives and the disquieting interest of the European powers in
the
peace negotiations. Though critical of China's alleged
duplicity in
delaying the negotiations . press cciranent in the United States
seemed
far more concerned with the possibility of European
intervention.
Many believed that Russia, portrayed as the villain
of the East, would
cause the most trouble. If Russia blocked Japan's
legitimate aims,
the New Yor>: Tribune threatened, Japan "would
have the moral sympathy
of the world, and perhaps the physical aid of
some rival of the Czar."
Then, on March 26. Americans read that Li
Hung-chang had been shot.
CHAPTERX
JAPANESE-AtSRICAN FRIENDSHIP
On tlarch 24, 1895, Li Hung-chang was being carried in his open
sedan chair along the narrow streets of Shimonoseki . A young Japanese
fanatic, dressed as a laboring man, rushed from the crowd and fired a
pistol point blank at the face of the Chinese Viceroy. Ihe bullet
entered just below Li's left eye and lodged deeply in his cheek bone.
The elder statesman was rushed to his residence where foreign surgeons
examined him. One surgeon expressed grave concern for the Viceroy's
life and observers, expecting the worst, axwited further news.
Gresham
informed Yang Yu that the President of the United States "has
heard
with profound regret of this most deplorable occurrence and
earnestly
hopes that the distinguished sufferer nay speedily recover
from the
effects of his wound." American newspapers, at last
syrapathizing with
1
Li, carried the story under prominent headlines.
Several days earlier, when Li Kung^-chang and his
peace convnission
had arrived at Shirionoseki, the Japanese had
imposed tight security
precautions around Chinese quarters and along the
route to the
conferences. Yet thousands of curious Japanese
ja,T«ned the roadside
in hope of seeing the enemy leader. For
several days the Chinese
travelled back and forth without incident.
On the first day the Japane
accepted the Viceroy's credentials, yet
rejected his request for an
inMcdiate armistice. Viscount Ito and Foreign
Minister Mutsu. the
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Japanese peace plenipotentiaries » indicated they might consider an
amiistice if China first agreed to surrender Shanhailc^^an, the Taku
Forts, Tientsin and all war munitions, as veil as paying the e:cpenses
of the peace negotiations. The Yamen asked Denby's opinion of the
armistice terras and the American minister offered some "unofficial
advice." Re, in effect, urged China's complete surrender. "I said
this was severe but if they thought China could not defend these
places they should accept." Ihis time, perhaps at last disenchanted
with American impartiality, the Chinese government ignored Denby's
advice. It resisted Japan's demands and ordered Li to refuse the
armistice terms vmich V70uld have rendered Peking utterly defenseless.
Li Hung-chang was returning from this third session, where he
had
rejected the armistice proposals, when the atterr.pt on his life was
2
made.
Colonel Foster, Li's chief legal adviser, arrived at the
wounded
envoy's apartment as the surgeons probed for the
embedded bullet. Li
grasped the American's hand and asked hixo. to return in
the evaning.
That evening a rouch-strengthened Viceroy held a
private conversation
with Foster. He told the fortr.er Secretary of State
that Denby had
assured hin that there 'Vould not be the slightest
danger" of assassi-
nation in Japan. Li had lost confidence in Denby
and perhaps in the
American government. Now he began to rely more
heavily on Foster,
thus practically ending official American
good offices. Foster regained
constantly beside the Viceroy, calling his
anger at Japan for the attack
He clain^ed later that his presence and
advice had prevented the perpe^
tratlon of '^some grave indiscretion" by the
Chinese peace commission.
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In fact he promised Li that the attack "would turn out for the benefit
„3
of China, as Japan would be less exacting in its terms.
Foster asserted that Li's vound "was the most effective shedding
of blood on the Chinese side during the entire war, as it brought to
him the sympathy of the whole world, and made the Japanese pleni-
potentiaries more considerate of him, if not less exacting in the terms
of peace." There was some agreement. One American missionary in
Japan feared that "a defeat in a great battle would have been preferable"
to this blow to Japan's prestige and bargaining position. -Others
echoed the belief that the assassination attempt would have a profound
effect on the peace negotiations. "This is an almost unheard
of event
in the histor>' of modern peace conclaves," the JourrSi 2L^ ^nisilts
of Labor reflected. One American newspaper suggested
that Li would
take advantage of the incident to win more favorable
terms from the
Japanese. "He will probably be able to secure better
terms than would
have been possible prior to the attack made upon him."
Some even
suggested? that Li would break off negotiations if
the Japanese failed
to grant a suitable concession to China as a
result of this grievous
4&ct.
me Japanese government declared an unconditional
armistice on
March 30, 1895. This armistice, lasting
until April 20, 1895. met
China's initial terms for a continuation of
the peace talks .nd probably
vould not have been granted except for the
embarrassment caused by the
attempt on Li's life. Yet the cessation
of hostilities occurred only
in the northern war ^one since the
anrdstice ignored military activities
.hich continued around Formosa. In fact,
the Japanese pressed forward
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in Formosa and the island eventually fell after a short-lived decla-
ration of independence and pleas for French and British protection.
As one American observer noted, "It is now generally believed that
Japan vill demand the possession of Formosa as part of the war in-
demnity; but, anticipating probable objections by foreign pov7ers, the
Japanese authorities no doubt thought it wiser to capture the island
in advance, so as to have the advantage which actual possession
always gives."
The assassination attempt also propelled Li's two American legal
advisers into the main current of peace negotiations. When Li Ching-
fong, Li Kung-chang's son, was appointed an additional peace pleni-
potentiary to assist his wounded father, the yoting man's tutor and
intimate adviser Charles Pethick accompanied the new envoy in his
conversations with the Japanese. According to Foster, this "cultivated
and intelligent American . . . proved a valuable member of the Peace
Embassy" since the younger Li heavily relied on his guidance.
In
addition, Viceroy Li, directing peace negotiations from his bed,
now
6
employed Foster almost exclusively as his representative.
John Watson Foster, seasoned diplomat and expert on
international
law. Li later recalled, was "a great national friend"
of China. "I
do not hesitate to say that but for Foster the
case might have gone
more heavily against u., though he was by no
means one-sided in his-on
several points in the dispute actually taking the
view of the Japanese."
Foster apparently had a certain amount of
influence with both China and
Japan, although he may have magnified it
himself. American missionaries
claimed that when the fomer Secretary of State
had arrived in Japan
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several months earlier, he had been influential enough to persuade the
Japanese government to curb anti-missionary writing by patriotic
Japanese intellectuals. In any event, with Li confined to his bed and
the armistice opening up the peace talks, Foster acted as Li Hung-
chang s spokesman.
On April 1, the Japanese submitted their terms— the independence
of Korea, the cession of the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula
and of Formosa, an indemnity of three hundred million taels
and
important trade concessions. Wlien these terms reached Li's
bedside,
he was despondent. But Foster assured the Viceroy that
the terms
were not final. "I insisted to him that the case was
by no means
hopeless, that a good answer could be made to several
of the demands,
and that I believed we could force the Japanese, out
of their ovm
sense of justice and their regard for the good opinion of the
Chinese
nation, to make important modifications." Back
in Peking the Yamen
asked Denby's opinion of the terms. But the
minister, realizing that
he had lost the Yamen's confidence, refused
to comment on them, even
unofficially, despite hints that England or
Russia might intervene to
8
prevent the imposition of these terms.
Foster examined the treaty stipulations
and suggested answers for
each. According to Foster, the Viceroy
accepted these as the basis
for all further Chinese responses to
Japanese demands. The Foster
memorandum stated that Japan, contrary to
accepted practices of
international law, demanded territory it
had never actually occupied.
Furtherxaore, Foster documented the
irresponsibility of Japan's indemnity
claims and commercial deo.ands,
indicating that excessive burdens _on
the
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Chinese government would create instability in Asia dangerous even to
Japan. Li's adviser believed his memorandum influenced the final
Japanese decisions to relinquish some territory, as well as to revise
-the indemnity and commerce claims--al though it is more probable that
later pressure of European intervention played the key role in bringing
9
modification of the Japanese treaty terras.
The Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed April 17, 1895. Edwin Dun—
unlike Denby, Read or Jernigan—usually had avoided the long, editorial
type of dispatch, but this time he v/arned
:
Thus has ended one of the most remarkable v?ars of
the nineteenth century. It came upon the world as a
surprise and its results have startled and bewildered
all but the very few who have closely observed and
studied the conditions existing in the East. With the
signing of the treaty of peace at Shimonoseki the
first chapter only of the history of the era in the
East begun with war has been closed. The changed
conditions to ensue will be far reachiiig, not only
upon China and Japan, but upon the entire world as
veil. 10
The details of the treaty reached Washington on April
25th.
Despite Foster's previous hopes, the treaty met all of
Japan's earlier
demands--tha independence of Korea; the cession of territory
on the
Liaotung Peninsula; the surrender of Formosa and the
Pescadores; an
indemnity of two hundred million taels ^fatsu had
always considered
the indemnity negotiable), payable fifty million
in six months and a
like amount every twelve months thereafter
at five percent interest
annually; and the opening of treaty ports to
foreign manufacturing and
the importation of foreign machinery. Denby
noted that Japan had already
ratified the treaty and now awaited China's
final response. Perhaps
concerned that his earlier advices had
contributed to China's acceptance
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of a punitive and severe treaty, Denby sent a brooding dispatch to
Gresham. He believed that the treaty terms were extremely harsh and
China was very unlucky, adding that Li's weakened condition prevented
his resistance for better terms and that the armistice, contrary to
popular belief, actually helped Japan capture Formosa, "Tne cession
of territory is appalling," and it "makes Japan a continental power."
This bothered the minister mainly because Japanese "aggrandizement"
on the continent might upset the status quo and provide the European
... 11
powers with an excuse for intervention in Asia.
\^hile Denby revealed his forebodings to Gresham, the European
powers were already planning to intervene. German Under-Secretary
of
State for Foreign Affairs, Max von Brandt, a former minister
to China
who had continued to communicate with Li Hung-chang;
and Count Cassini,
the Russian minister in Peking, coordinated efforts
to create a multi-
lateral European response to Japanese seizure of
continental territory,
l-hough rebuffed by Great Britain, von Brandt and
Cassini gained the
cooperation of France in a tripartite understanding
designed to check
Japanese ambitions on the Asian continent. On
April 17, immediately
after the signature of the peace treaty.
Russia requested the support
of Berlin and Paris in a "friendly demarche,"
advising Japan to refrain
from occupying any mainland territory.
Ministers of the three powers
delivered their advice "verbally and
confidentially" to the Japanese
Foreign Office on April 23. insisting
that Japan.se occupation of the
Liaotung Peninsula rendered the independence
of Korea "illusory," and
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would "constantly disturb the peace of the East." The Russian repre-
sentative hinted that if Japan refused t+ie three might use their sea
12
power to isolate the Japanese armies in China.
The tripartite intervention evoked little surprise in the United
States. Throughout the war, Americans had predicted European inter-
vention. In fact, along with discussions of China's barbarism and
Japan's civilization, European intervention had persisted as one of the
more popular themes concerning the war. in the United States. "Will
Europe Try to Save China?" a Springfield Republican leader inquired in
December of 1894^ and there had been attempts to learn the ansvjcr by
studying the European press. For example, the European edition of the
New York Herald^ published comments from Europe alluding to possible
intervention. One of these, from the English MomiK^ Post,, explained
that it was "impossible to allow Japan to dictate terms to China without
consulting the European powers," because "for the sake of the world's
peace . . • Russia, Germany, France and Great Britain must intervene.
The American press concentrated its resentment on Russia, often
said to be coveting an ice-free port in Korea as a terminus
for her
great Siberian railroad. "Russia is the one power that
wants the earth,"
and having got a vast area of it, she must also have the sea."
The
Russians seemed to have been responsible for the entire
Korean crisis,
"egging on" Japan and deftly mixing in peninsular
politics. The
Commercial and F_inancial Clvronicle warned that Russia
"has got a
foothold on Corean soil. The time will come
when she will claim it
all ; and whether Corea retains her
independence or comes under Chinese
rule, Russia's claim will be conceded.
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Despite current American opposition to British policies in
Venezuela and Nicaragua, Russia rather than England continued to be the
main object of American criticism. In March, Denby wrote Gresham to
keep his eye on Russia as the power most likely to disturb the future
peace in the East. He indicated that Great Britain and now Japan, as
satisfied countries in Asia, would cooperate with the United States to
preserve the status quo in that area. Sill also warned the State
Department of Russian ambitions. He revealed that the King of Korea
believed Russia would assist him in ousting the Japanese conquerors
15
from his territory.
Reports reached the United States that Russia had strengthened
its navy in Japanese waters and would block Japan's fulfillment
of her
treaty gains. In addition, Russia had instigated the
"curious new
triple alliance." of Germany, France and Russia, formed to
deprive Japan
of its "legitimate" gains. After Japan had completed
the "noble" work
of defeating barbaric China, the York Tribune
surmised
.
"these three
great, chivalric. Christian Powers come prowling
around the scene of
strife licking their hungry chops, and whining
and snarling for a few
mouthfuls of prey." Russian behavior toward
Japan was "something not
only outrageously unjust but so unparalleled in the
histor-y of all the
past that one wonders not so much that the
other nations look on in
silence as that such Powers as Germany and
France should abet such gross
selfishness." the Cos^e^ and Financial Chronicle added. It
was only
because "they each want an opportunity to
steal some of the territoxy
of China without Just cause." the Chro^^ continued .
that Europeans
vould intervene. Japan had won the
victory without outside assistance
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and was entitled to the fruits of its
triuznph. Japan had not exacted
.ore than its fair share of the spoils
of war and^had "kept well
within bounds of international law and
practice."
some editorials suggested that while
Japan was justified in
taking the Liaotung Peninsula to
preserve the "integrity of Korea,"
it was also blocking Russia's quest
for a warra water port on the
Pacific. 0n.e Indiana^ News admitted that Russia,
as an Asian power,
had "so.e reasonable ground for
her proposed interference." The
New
Orleans Picavune warned Russia,
however, that Japan would be .uch
harder
to discipline than ^rkey had been
in 1876. .he Staunton W^ekl^
Ne^
p.on.ised that .any Americans would
sympathize with Japan if it fought
^.Kussia, because, "of the .... Japan
is the .ore civilised, the
.ore
-3 ..^ n-r. form of eovernment . . • ^t^^>
progressive, the more modern her
t n^i r g
.ake bold to say, the .ore
Christianized." It would be a
"world..ide
misfortune" if Russia blocked the
natural development of Japanese
power
progress. "Ihere is. in fact,
no good reason why Japan
should not
interference, and the people of
the United States will
rejoice to see
. .ff victorious in the diplomatic
fencing now in
the Japanese come o
orious, j-
progress with the continental
powers of Europe."
•
..A that the united States might
extend more than
Rumors persisted cn
eo„Une ... ^UUa.. cpacU. ana
,ro,..s~s .apan »UH
.e.o...e.s Of CM„a „o... P»3e..
a va.. .o^i.aM^ .a,Ha.
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to the ambitions of Europe, and V70vild make Japanese domination in the
Orient complete and paramount." With the tripartite intervention,
some speculated that England and even the United States might join
with Japan in alliance systems to balance Russia, Germany and France
in the Far East. The London correspondent of the New York Times
reported that England and the United States may have an understanding
to support Japan in its current crisis with the European powers,
although he revealed "it is impossible to hint at the sources of this
infonnation." The Springfield Republ ican asked, "Have we a finger in
the pie?" and added that the United States should not become entangled
even as "a silent partner in the alliance." But the Pica^mne insisted
that, while the United States must avoid entangling alliances, it
should realize that a policy of isolation might be obsolete. Our
interests in the East were greater than those of any other country,
according to this argument, and appeared identical to those of Great
Britain and Japan.
Some disagreed that the United States should cooperate v?ith Japan .
and Great Britain and instead advocated the exploitation of Japan's
involvement with the tripartite powers to the advantage of the United
States. This view was based on speculations that a victorious Japan
would now covet the Hawaiian islands, the annexation of which the Cleveland
administration had rejected. The Frovidenc_e Journal noted that the
Japanese had the largest male population on the islands and that during
the war these Japanese had daily drilled as militia. "With the
Chinese war ended, the Mikado and his advisers may well turn their
attention more seriously to other fields of conquest," and at the
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present time the United States would be no match for Japanese expansion
into the Pacific, Concurrently, the Cinc innati Commercial Gazette
predicted that Japan would sooa "sv7oop down on the islands . . . and
place them in subjection to what is called the light of Asia." The
Sp ringfiel d Republ ican revealed that it would be easy for a force of
one thousand Japanese regulars to combine with the indigenous Japanese
population of 20,000 and seize the island republic for Japan* Thus,
the United States should use Japan's probleras v^ith Europe to secure
assurances from Japan that it will leave Havaii alone. "If we had an
Administration thoroughly American," the New York Tribune concluded,
and "if there were at Washington a statesman of sufficient breadth and
earnest patriotism to care for American interest in every emergency,
there can be no doubt that important advantages could be secured at
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this juncture which Japan would most readily concede."
Americans in Asia also discussed the tripartite intervention and
its impact on Oriental politics. Consul -General Jernigan indicated
that the foreign community in China was obsessed by the possibility of
a world war over the peace terms. "It is evident that Japan Intends to
dispute the ascendency of European nations for the corrjnerce of Asia
and that European nations will not yield without a struggle, it may be
a struggle of force." Jernigan observed that Russia would forcibly
oppose the cession of any part of Manchuria, "having In view that less
is to be apprehended from the Chinese as neighbors than from
the more
warlike and restless Japanese." He predicted that Great Britain
then
might oppose Russian policy by force, while France. Germany
and perhaps
Spain, might suddenly discover the acquisition of Chinese
bases
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essential to their national interests. "A great problem now confronts
Europe and Asia," the consul-general warned the State Department.
"Its solution may be in blood, or the agency of higher
civilization
^20
may be invoked to solve it in the interest of peace."
Meanwhile, both Lafcadio Hearn in Japan and Sheridan P. Read
in
Chefoo observed the deployment of Russian ships. "The hea^o^
Russian
battleships were stripped for fighting," Hearn recorded.
Consul Read,
arriving in Chefoo shortly before the ratification
conference, watched
the crews of Russian warships camouflage their
ironclads. He counted
nine men-of-war, three torpedo boats and a merchantman
leaded with
munitions assembled in the harbor directly in front
of the Japanese
waterfront residences. "Russia's movements are
being keenly watched
as it is thought likely by all that she will
declare war against Japan
in the event that Japan refuses to comply
with Russia's demands for a
modification of certain terms in the Treaty of
Peace.
On the other hand, Peking legation secretary
F. D. Cheshire
believed that Russian action was "merely a
bluff" and that the idea of
French and German participation was ridiculous.
But American Board
missionary William Scott Ament hoped Russia
would fight Japan. He
believed that the tripartite intervention
quite righteously had rescued
China from Japanese domination. Japan
should not complain "if the
privilege of a highway robber is denied
her." Horace N. Allen, noting
that the Japanese were controlling
everything in Korea and remembering
his days of influence with the Korean
king, expressed excitement at the
prospect of observing "the chip knocked
off the shoulder of the cheeky
little Jap . . . Allen's friend in
the State Department.
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William W. Rockhill, agreed. "Like you I dislike to see the Japs so
belauded for a parade campaign," a friend v/rote Rockhill. "Perhaps
their vanity, which is stupendous will drag them on to complications
with a European power-I don't care what one-and if it does I
shall
.
.
.,22
rejoice.
The tripartite intervention delighted the Chinese.
Denby
reported on May 1st that China had requested a delay in
ratification
of the peace treaty for at least another ten
days to permit the three
powers to discuss the issues with Japan, Denby in
Peking and Jernigan
in Shanghai both reported that China hoped for
European armed inter-
vention to prevent the imposition of Japan's terms.
"This action makes
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continuation of war probable," Denby informed Gresham.
In the meantime, John W. Foster had learned
that the Russian
minister. Count Cassini, supported by French
and German representatives
in Peking, had exerted his influence in the
Imperial Court to prevent
the Emperor's ratification of the treaty.
Foster, on the other hand.
urged Li Hung-chang to journey to the capital and
defend the treaty
before the Imperial Cabinet. But Li
insisted that his many enemies
were too strong in Peking and begged the
American to undertake the
mission himself. After some hesitation,
the fox-mer Secretary of State
24
agreed and left for the Chinese Imperial
city.
^
Once in Peking, Foster accepted
advice from the Viceroy's agents
and discarded Li's interpreter in
favor of an interpreter "cheerfully-
supplied by Denby and the American
legation. Also, he made his
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headquarters in the American compound. Therefore, when he travelled to
his interview v.'ith the Cabinet (the "ten most influential men of the
Empire"), his mission appeared to be officially sanctioned by the
United States rather than by Li Kung-chang. Supported now by Denby,
V7ho had changed his mind several times on the subject of treaty terras,
Foster argued for ratification in front of the Cabinet, reminding
China's mandarins that the treaty was no longer Li's but the Emperor's,
because Li had been sent under Imperial rescript. Ihe Emperor's
advisers listened carefully and may have been influenced by Foster's
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arguments since they urged their monarch to sign the treaty.
Japanese policy also contributed to China's decision. Cognizant
that continued Chinese procrastination would strengthen the tripartite
position, Japan refused the request for a ten day delay in
ratifications
On May 4 Denby recorded that Japan demanded immediate
compliance with
the treaty terms. Several days later Dun reported that
Japan "knew
of no reason to delay ratification." Japan could take
this hard line
with China because it had reached an understanding with
the tripartite
powers. Still insisting on undelayed exchange of
ratifications of the
original treaty, Japan indicated that it would "imrr.ediately
aftenvards
renounce definitive possession of all the Liaotung
Peninsula, with the
exception of Port Arthur and Talienwan, provided the
indemnity /was/
„26
increased to compensate Japan for territory relinquished.
American Board missionary Devello Sheffield praised
Japan's
"self-restraint" in not forcing warfare on Asia by
defying tripartite
suggestions. Thomas Jernigan described the relief
in Asia over Japan's
submission: "It is the opinion of the more
thoughtful and circumspect
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here that Japan made the better bargain in accepting the additional
indemnity, and leaving European nations the disputants over the
Manchurian territory." Equipped vith Japan's assurance and increasingly
divided over the pux-pose of the three pov-7er arrangement, the ministers
of Russia, France and Germaiiy instructed China to exchange ratifications
of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Tnis China did at Chefoo on May 8, 1895,
, . , ^
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thus bringing to an end na.ne months of var.
No other v?estern power had been as intimately involved in peace
preliminaries and in the final treaty as had the United States,
^jserican diplo.^iatic representatives, empov7ered by their government to
offer good offices, had served as intermediaries rather than mediators.
Nevertheless, diplomats on the scene had enlarged upon their "messenger"
role by acting as advisers. Apparently considering strong Japan in
Asia preferable to a feared European partition of China, Americans had
taken Japan's side in the negotiations by consistently advising China
to hasten the negotiations and to surrender to Japan's terms.
American support for Japanese treaty demands capped months of
general admiration for Japan. Throughout the war the American press
had praised Japan's progress, patriotism, industry, efficiency
and
spirit of aggressive competitiveness. At the same time, somehow,
the
Japanese had seemed to represent deip.ocracy, Christianity
and humani-
tarianism in Asia. They were "just like Americans" and the true
"Yankees of the Orient." Japanese propagandists had of
course con-
tributed to the partisan enthusiasm, an easy task under
the circumstances
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China's wartime stereotype, on the other hand, had been repulsive.
Reinforced by Social Danvinian rhetoric and sensational journalism,
Americans criticized these backward, un-American people. The Chinese
lacked patriotism, humanity and the drive for material progress.
They were lazy, heathenish and unintelligent. Though awesome in sheer
numbers, they could not stand up and fight a much smaller opponent.
China represented superstition, stagnation, barbarism, evil and filth.
Thus, a majority of Ajaericans had felt that a victory for Japan would
be a victory for all mankind.
Yet, the Anserican government insisted that the United States
remain strictly neutral in the Asian war and that Americans display an
appropriate impartiality. Cleveland and Greshara believed that
neutrality carried with it moral duties and responsibilities to foreign
nationals, American missionaries and the combatants themselves. "Good
offices" meant more than a diplomatic technicality; it was a solemn
responsibility that had to be worked at diligently. Tlie more responsi-
bilities it undertook, the more vulnerable the United States became to
the play of circumstances. The atrocity of a local warlord, the
execution of a Japanese prisoner or any incident which could strain rules
too strictly applied, all threatened to enmesh the United States in
foreign complications. Ironically, the more intensely neutrality was
applied, the more it compromised itself.
Diplomats in the field often believed that policies based upon
principle did not m.ect the needs of Asian complexities. Washington's
formulas, sor.etimes too rigid and sometimes too vague, made practical
iraplementation a virtual impossibility. Yet, when ministers, consuls
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and naval personnel acted on their own the results v/ere usually further
perversions of their government's neutral policy. Confusion and
unplanned partisanship were damaging to American prestige and hurt the
government's desire to increase its influence in East Asia. If Denby
and others promoted Japanese interests in order to open Chinese markets
for American coimnerce or to strengthen the American position in Asia,
these hopes too proved illusory. The "mysterious East" had fully
retained its mysterj' insofar as American diplomacy vas concerned.
Unintentionally American policies during the Sino-Japanese War
had obtained one valuable, if temporary, benef it--.the gratitude of
Japan. It was most satisfying to read statements such as that voiced
by a Japanese translator at the Chefoo conference which praised the
American response to the war. "American friendship to us has been
consistent ever since its coinmencemant , and our appreciation for same
is daily increasi'ng." Tlie Emperor of Japan also sent his official
thanks to Grovcr Cleveland for American policies during the war
which
had "served to draw still closer the bonds of friendship
and good
neighborhood which happily united our two countries." Reading
such
statements, Americans could well believe that their response
to the
Sino-Japanese War had been an important contribution to
justice and
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progress in East Asia.
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